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Abstract: 
 
Pension reform is one of the biggest challenges facing national governments. How to 
reform the old pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems is still under hot debate; one of the 
most influential funded pension schemes is designed by the World Bank. In the 
second chapter of this paper, we first review the arguments for and against the PAYG 
and then critically discuss the World Bank model by drawing on related literature. 
The third chapter of this paper presents our empirical results. Regarding the link 
between economic growth and pension reform towards World Bank model, our panel 
estimation suggests a negative relationship in the short run and positive relationship in 
the long run, although the results for OECD countries are not very statistically robust. 
The second empirical work is focused on pension fund assets and economic growth. A 
positive link between these two variables is found by our standard economic growth 
specifications; in addition, there is evidence that pensions are a good predictor of 
economic growth. This result is then consolidated by our Panel Granger causality test. 
The last empirical work deals with the relationship between pension assets and 
financial development. On balance, our Panel correction model and Panel Granger 
causality test suggest that pension funds growth leads financial development, although 
some sub-group estimations are not strong. In addition, there is evidence that 
traditional banking industry is declining relative to other financial institutions, but not, 
even increasing relative to the economy.  
 
 
Key words: Pension reform, Pension fund assets, Pay-as-you-go, Panel error 
correction model, Granger causality test 
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1 Introduction  
 
 
The world is aging! 
 
 
The current global demographic change towards population aging is becoming more 
apparent. Table 1 reveals that although the world total dependency ratio will drop 
from 65 per cent to 57 per cent during the period of 1950-2050, the elderly 
dependency ratio is expected to rise from 9 per cent in 1950 to 14 per cent in 2020, 
then further to 25 per cent in 2050, a 3 fold increase in total. The trend is more 
obvious for More developed regions (MDRs) than Less developed regions (LDRs), in 
that by the mid of this century, the elderly dependency ratio for MDRs is 44 per cent, 
2 times higher than the then elderly dependency ratio for LDRs. This long term trend 
of population ageing across both developed and developing countries is largely caused 
by rising life expectancy and declining fertility rate (Munnell 2004; House of Lords 
2004). Figures 1 and 2 indicate that over the 100-year period from 1950-2050, women 
have less babies and people live longer. It is anticipated that by 2050, people in MDRs 
will live up to 81.6 years old while those in LDRs live up to 73.1, a sharp increase 
from the middle of last century.  
 
Mainly due to rising longevity and declining fertility rate as well as the unfunded 
nature of PAYG systems, most governments in both OECD countries and Emerging 
market economies (EMEs) are facing financial difficulties. Public pension systems’ 
generosity also contributes to the current rising public pension liability, i.e. excessive 
pension benefits have been granted to retirees (see Section 2.1.2.4 for details). Disney 
(1999a) presents a projection of public pension liabilities across a range of OECD 
countries. For some countries, e.g. the US where the population is relatively young, 
public pension payments as percentage of GDP is projected to increase from 4.1 per 
cent in 1995 to 6.6 per cent in 2030. But on the other side of the spectrum, e.g. Italy 
this figure was 10.6 in 1995 and 20.3 in 2030. In addition, a recent EU report reveals 
that public pension expenditure in EU-15 on average amounted to 10.4% of GDP as 
of 2001 but will peak in 2040 at the level of 13.6 per cent (Oksanen 2004).  
 
Regarding EMEs, except for several Central and Eastern countries (Holzmann et al 
2001), the magnitude of public pension liabilities is generally less due to younger 
population and smaller pension coverage. It is shown that across 35 low and middle 
income countries, pension spending was at the range of 1 – 5 per cent of GDP for 
most countries as of 2000 with Uruguary having the highest ratio of 14 per cent 
(Holzmann et al 2004). The long term demographic transition in EMEs, however, 
indicates the existence of financial difficulties of unfunded PAYG systems as well. 
And in some cases, it even leads to the bankruptcy of existing PAYG systems 
following financial crisis (Queisser 1999), e.g. Argentina in 1994. 
 
Therefore, financial substainability of PAYG systems combined with the prospective 
ageing population across the world, has led many countries, including both OECD 
countries and EMEs, to re-think their pension systems. Typically, they switch 
partially or wholly from unfunded systems, e.g. PAYG to funded systems. Pension 
reform given its complexity, however, can have potential impact on various aspects of 
the economy. In particularly, the possible relationship between pension reform, 
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economic growth and financial development has been receiving great attention from 
both academia and policy makers across the world.  
 
In general, pension reforms which introduce element of funding can have a positive 
impact on financial market development because following such pension reforms, the 
functions of financial markets are improved (Davis 1998). For example, financial 
systems’ function of managing uncertainty and controlling risk could be strengthened 
with pension funds growth as pension fund managers as portfolio professionals have 
better expertise knowledge than individual investors.  
 
How pension reform is linked to financial markets development is widely analysed in 
current literature. Davis (1995, 2000a) presents the impact of pension funds growth on 
European capital markets, while Walker and Lefort (2002) study the same issue across 
emerging markets. On balance, a positive relation between pension funds growth and 
financial development is found. We will discuss this issue in detail in Section 2.2.3.2. 
 
The relationship between pension reform and economic development also is well 
documented. Holzmann (1997) finds a contribution of pension reform to Chilean 
economic growth as well as financial markets.  How pension reforms contribute to the 
saving rate is analysed by many researchers (Poterba et al 1996; Disney et al 2001). 
But the results are mixed. Concerning pension reform’s impact on other aspects of the 
economy, e.g. labour supply, there is also hot debate with mixed findings (Disney 
2003; Bosworth and Burtless 2004a). Regarding pension funds’ direct economic 
implications, e.g. via corporate governance, however, the current literature is 
relatively sparse, although Davis (2003a) looks at pension funds plus other 
institutional investors and economic performance across 17 OECD countries and finds 
a positive correlation between pension funds’ share of equity and several economic 
variables.   
 
Regarding the contributions of this paper, we seek first to examine the relationship 
between pension reform, economic growth and financial development in a more 
comprehensive - given that pension reform is so complex that it has impact on various 
aspect of an economy - and consistent than the current literature way. Most current 
work focuses on only one aspect in one paper and normally different papers have 
different datasets and econometric specifications. So in this paper, we use the same 
and larger data set and consistent methodologies to identify pension reform and 
pension funds’ impact on various aspects of the economy, in order to ensure the 
results’ consistency and comparability.  
 
Second, one main weakness related to current literature is that most current empirical 
work focuses on either emerging markets, notably Chile, or developed, e.g. OECD 
countries, therefore the findings derived from existing studies might suffer from the 
drawback of incompleteness. Developed and developing countries are in their 
different development stages, therefore pension funds growth might entail differential 
impacts. As Diamond (1995) points out, though the contribution of funding to 
financial sector growth is not an argument for OECD countries, it is potentially 
relevant in transition and developing countries. This paper intends to fill in this gap.  
 
Third, many researchers confuse or do not distinguish pension reform and pension 
funds. These two concepts are closely linked but not identical. In other words, pension 
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reform does not simultaneously mean pension funds growth, notably in the case of 
defined contribution PAYG reform; there might nonetheless be a positive effect on 
the economy. In addition, it might be argued that pension reform provides people with 
expectations that pension funds will increase and PAYG systems are not sustainable 
in the long run. Therefore pension reform, particularly towards funded systems could 
have potential effect, independent of pension fund assets. Hence, in this study, we 
isolate these two concepts, i.e. pension reform and pension funds, and investigate their 
contributions to economic growth and financial development separately.  
 
Last, we use various econometric specifications, e.g. panel error correction model and 
an extension of panel Granger causality tests to look at the long run and short run 
relations. We view panel analysis as appropriate given the lack of the satisfactory 
length of dataset about pension funds in many individual countries; also one reform 
alone cannot give statistical significance.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised into three parts. Part one, as a literature review, first 
presents the arguments for and against PAYG systems, then critically discusses the 
World Bank model. In the second part, we undertake empirical work to see how and 
the extent to which pension reform, pension funds, economic growth and financial 
development are linked together. The last part concludes this paper.  
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2 Literature review 
 
 
2.1 Pay-as-you-go pension systems 
 
 
Largely since World War Two, mandatory public Pay As You Go (PAYG) systems 
have been widely adopted across the world (Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt 1999). Such 
social security systems are mainly financed through payroll taxes and managed 
publicly. A number of economic reasons have been identified to justify PAYG 
systems (See Appendix A for a summary of the basic economics of PAYG systems).  
 
 
2.1.1 Arguments for PAYG 
 
2.1.1.1 Problems of annuities markets 
 
The annuities market is an important component of pension systems, but it suffers 
from informational asymmetry problems which plague any insurance market 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Informational asymmetry as one type of market 
failure1 in the real world is a very common phenomenon in that it induces well-
informed parties with private information to selectively contract with less-informed 
parties, thus exploiting the latter.  
 
One widely quoted example relevant here is that if it is voluntary to purchase 
annuities, people who know they would live longer enter into life annuity contracts 
with insurance companies, thus the latter suffers from annuitants’ longevity risk. 
Awareness of this problem can drive up price of annuities for all individuals as they 
cannot be distinguished. For example, Poterba (2001) shows that adverse selection 
leads to a wedge between the effective price of an annuity which would be charged 
based on whole population’s mortality table and the price charged to the 
representative annuity purchaser. In addition, one recent panel study on nine countries 
by Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) suggests that there might not exist ‘active’ adverse 
selection in annuities markets, but the hypotheses of ‘passive’ selection could not be 
rejected2.  
 
Annuities markets are available in many countries, but historically real annuity 
markets did not exist (Feldstein and Liebman 2001). Real annuity markets refer to 
those markets where the annuitants, e.g. the pensioners, could earn inflation-protected 
retirement payment. Despite the existence of real annuities markets now, e.g. the 
Treasury Inflation-Indexed Securities (TIPS) in the US (Sack 2002) and inflation-
indexed bonds in the UK and Chile, indexed annuities are still not available in many 
                                                
1
 The other two important types are externality and monopoly (Davis 2002a). In addition, moral hazard 
and adverse selection also plays a role.  
2
 The difference between active and passive adverse selection is first identified by Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002). Active adverse selection means that there is a direct relation between participation in 
annuities markets and private information of mortality, while passive selection refers to the indirect 
relation between participation in annuities markets and mortality, i.e. there is a direct correlation 
between employment and wealth – therefore participation in any insurance market – and mortality.  
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other countries, partly due to non-existence of indexed financial instruments, or are 
priced prohibitively (Davis 2002a).  
 
The argument for social security pensions is that only government intervention into 
this market with PAYG systems could eliminate this problem, as pensioners are all 
forced to participate in the PAYG systems and the benefits and contributions formula 
are much less linked to people’s private information.  
 
2.1.1.2 Inflation risk
 
Generally, there are three main classes of risks facing pensioners: mortality risk, 
investment risk and timing risk (Valdes-Prieto 1998).  
 
Mortality risk means that pensioners might outlive their resources.  Timing risk is the 
risk of changing exposure of any previous risk at an undesirable time. For example, a 
pensioner buys a fixed income portfolio just before interest rates increase. Investment 
risk is defined as any risk which might affect the purchasing power of the 
accumulated pension assets. Inflation risk as well as share price volatility is an 
important contributing factor in this case.  
 
PAYG schemes are generally able to protect pensioners from inflation (Barr 1998). 
The main underlying reason is that PAYG is financed by taxing the current working 
population while the funded schemes use the accumulated assets to pay out pensions. 
Obviously, the issue of inflation exerts a real problem for the latter case, not for the 
former. Pensioners could purchase inflation-indexed annuities to protect themselves in 
some way as discussed above, but they are available in only a few countries, and the 
insurers typically offer indexation up to a pre-specified level, e.g. 5 per cent in 
practice, the risk above which is still borne by the annuitants. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that the advantage of PAYG over funding is less due to 
the method of financing per se than to the fact that only the state can guarantee 
indexed amounts (Barr 1998).  For example, funded schemes could protect against 
inflation risk completely if they buy government guaranteed assets, but such a 
government promise is most likely paid out from the general tax revenues, i.e. still on 
a PAYG basis.  
 
This is consistent with Davis’s claim (1998) that it is the welfare-based arguments, 
e.g. myopia assumption (discussed shortly), rather than insurance-based arguments, 
e.g. market failure which justify PAYG retirement plans.   
 
2.1.1.3 Myopia assumption
 
This assumption holds that individuals believe the government would not allow them 
to live in poverty, thus they gamble to save little, if anything, when young, then risk to 
fall into poverty when old. Diamond (1977) finds that in the absence of social 
security, a substantial fraction of the population would end up with insufficient 
amounts of wealth for their post-retirement period. A recent study by Davis (2003b) 
also indicates the inadequate retirement provision in the UK, in part due to the 
disincentive to save, e.g. the mean-testing systems.  
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Therefore, government, with the aim of countering this problem and acting as a 
trusted agent, collects funds together from current working population and then 
allocates them to current retirees, a practise commonly referred to as paternalism. It 
should be noted that the argument of paternalism is also frequently used to justify 
mandatory saving.  
 
There are three elements underlying the paternalism (Kotlikoff et al, 1982). The first 
is the irreversibility of the retirement savings. For example, an individual cannot undo 
any previous consumptions simply due to changing tastes or because he/she need the 
money which otherwise is saved to cover the post-retirement costs.  
 
Second, people are always reluctant to admit the possibility of forced early retirement 
or disability one day in the future, or simply long life. Particularly when such 
contingences are a long time away, then the utility costs of saving a certain amount of 
incomes just for these unlikely contingencies are greater than the corresponding gains 
from insuring against these remote contingences. Given this consideration, public 
pension system is therefore desirable.  
 
Third, it is difficult for the individuals to make rational decisions because of the long 
lag between actions and consequences. Large number of uncertainties play an 
important role in this case.  Therefore, individuals sometimes make inter-temporal 
consumption and saving decisions which are not correct, nor desirable. In fact, this 
myopia assumption also is one of underlying rationales in favour of compulsory 
savings as well as PAYG systems.  
 
One recent survey study (CRR 2004), i.e. Retirement Confidence Survey (RCS) in the 
US shows that Americans are too confident about their pension coverage after 
retirement, when compared with another more comprehensive - therefore more 
representative/accurate - survey, i.e. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) sponsored 
by the Federal Reserve (2001). For example, RCS suggests that 75 per cent of 
respondents think they or their spouse will have pension coverage, while the SCF only 
indicates a 57 per cent of respondents taking the same view. In addition, the RCS 
gives evidence that survey respondents think they are saving more than they actually.   
 
Bodie and Crane (1997), however, find that individual investors are rational, in that 
they invest more in proportion of their wealth on safer assets, e.g. bonds and cash 
when getting older, in line with financial theory. Also, a recent study suggests that 
individual’s asset allocation pattern is consistent with tax-minimising behaviour in the 
US (Barber and Odean 2004). 
 
2.1.1.4 Redistribution
 
Government always stand as back-up for her people. Regarding pension systems, it is 
not an exception. Hence, one of justifications favouring PAYG is that government 
should distribute income to disadvantaged people3, be they old or disabled, so as to 
protect them from suffering (Liebman 2001).  
                                                
3
 It should be borne in mind that under PAYG systems, what current pensioners received is the funds 
paid by current workers in the form of payroll tax, rather than the revenues collected by government 
from pensioners when they were working.  
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A pension scheme has redistributive effects through three channels, i.e. redistributions 
from young to old, from rich to poor and from men to women (Barr 1998).  
 
The redistribution from young to old is also frequently referred to as Intergenerational 
Transfer. It argues that parents make investment in the human capital of their children, 
by means of education for example and earn return from children when parents are 
retired and children working (Pogue and Sgontz 1997; Becker and Murphy 1988). 
Given that children are too young to be parties to a legal contact, government should 
provide some mechanism, e.g. via PAYG to guarantee this intergenerational transfer 
to incur. PAYG indeed enables one generation as a whole to receive more than the 
sum of its past contributions.  
 
The second distributive effect is from rich to poor people, also referred to as 
Intragenerational Transfer. For many state public pension schemes, the individual A 
with half income of the individual B normally has more than half pensions of the 
individual B. Pension Policy Institute (PPI) (2003a) reports that redistribution from 
workers to poorer pensioners has increased, i.e. the proportion of pensioners in the 
bottom fifth of the UK’s overall income distribution dropped from 47 per cent in 1979 
to 26 per cent in 2001/2. Therefore, pensioners do not always tend to be the poorest. 
On the contrary, single mothers (Johnson et al 2003) and people in non-standard 
employment (PPI 2003b), among others, are disadvantaged compared with other 
groups. 
 
Despite this redistributive purpose, however, in the UK there is a growing income 
inequality among pensioners; the top 20 per cent get on average 87 per cent of 
average earnings, while the bottom 20 per cent get only 21 per cent of average 
earnings (Davis 2003b).  
 
Although the mechanism of income tax might have the same effect (Orszag and 
Stiglitz 1999), or in other words, we do not have to require a PAYG aiming for this 
redistributive purpose, the existence of differential mortality to some extent offsets the 
PAYG’s tax effect in this context. The reason is that the rich typically live longer than 
the poor, hence they contribute more but have more time to claim pensions. The main 
reason, however, has been suggested to be the political framing (Lindbeck and 
Persson 2003), i.e. from the perspective of political considerations, pension reform 
might be a more feasible choice for redistribution than general fiscal policy.  
 
The third distribution channel from the men to the women has the same underlying 
reason as above, i.e. women live longer than men. We simply talk about the issue of 
intragenerational transfer again but by another dimension. It has been found and worth 
noting, however, that women in aggregate are under-pensioned in the UK (PPI 2003b; 
House of Lords 2004), i.e. they receive lower pension income than men; reasons 
include women are less likely to work full time than men and less likely to be in 
managerial and professional groups, etc.  
 
Last, it should be emphasised that funded pension systems, e.g. funded defined benefit 
schemes could have the redistributive effects as well, but the magnitude of such 
effects is less in comparison with PAYG (Barr 1998) and largely dependable on how 
the first pillar in the funded systems is designed.  
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2.1.1.5 Administration costs
 
Administration costs charged during pension assets accumulation process play an 
important role in determining how high a pensioner’s benefit will be during 
retirement. It has been estimated that as for two hypothetical individuals, one percent 
difference of administrative charge when added up over a 40-year work horizon could 
lead to 27 per cent difference of pension assets when they retired (Bateman et al 
2001).  
 
Experience from Australia suggests that the least costly funded pension design is 
occupational Defined Contribution (DC) plan, while the occupational Defined 
Benefits (DB) plan and retail pension plans are more costly by the range of 30 – 70 
per cent (Bateman and Mitchell 2003). From the point of view of economics, 
transaction costs associated with private pension schemes are high. And 
comparatively, government-oriented PAYG programme is much cheaper, because the 
government enjoys the greatest economies of scale in administration costs (Diamond 
1993).  
 
For example, it has been found that the US social security incurred administrative 
charges at the order of 15-20 US dollars per year per covered employee in comparison 
with 24 dollars in Malaysia and 30.4 dollars in Chile (Vales-Prieto, 1994). The 
differences in administrative costs are mainly due to the differential pension systems 
across these countries. The US social security is run on a PAYG basis, Malaysia 
offers the provident fund method, i.e. EPF (Employees Provident Fund) where there 
exists only one single fund (Bateman and Piggott, 1997), and Chile is the pioneer in 
running a privatised pension system (Diamond 1993).  
 
Despite PAYG’s justifications above, however, it suffers from a number of serious 
problems, thus underlining pressure for reform.  
 
2.1.2 Arguments against PAYG 
 
This section is closely linked to Section 2.2.3, so we will discuss in more detail in that 
sector shortly, but in order to keep our presentation on PAYG complete, we still 
briefly review a number of key counter-arguments against PAYG here.  
 
2.1.2.1 Labour markets-supply
 
Social Security/PAYG systems have been suggested to have an important influence 
on people’s retirement decision (Coile and Gruber 2000). Under PAYG schemes, 
working populations are taxed to pay current retirees, which induces them to retire 
earlier, or reduce hours worked, etc., since their pension payments are contingent 
upon the contribution from future generations and have nothing to do with their 
current contributions. In other words, the distorted link between contributions and 
pensions give disincentives for people to work, a problem always referred to as lack 
of “actuarial fairness” (Lindbeck and Persson 2003)4.   
                                                
4
 Actuarial fairness is distinct from actuarial balance. Actuarial fairness implies a close link between 
pension benefits and contributions at the micro-economic, i.e. individual levels, while actuarial balance 
(Diamond 2002) is a macro-economic issue where it refers to the pension system’s long run viability, 
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The theoretical models designed by Disney and Whitehouse (1999) show that defined-
benefit plans, which shares the distinguishing feature of PAYG schemes, a 
guaranteeing return, serve as a powerful incentive for employees to leave work as 
early as possible. This finding is confirmed in the US where workers with generous 
pensions, e.g. under PAYG plans, retire earlier than those with lower pension benefits 
(Gusman et al 1993).  
 
Research by Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1997) and Packard (2001) finds that 
workers in the Latin American countries move from the informal sector to the formal 
sector in response to a funded pension reform; in other words, labour supply in formal 
sector remains at a lower level under PAYG systems and could be increased following 
pension reform.  
 
Defined-contribution (DC) PAYG systems as introduced in Sweden, Poland and Italy, 
however, might be able to mitigate the problem of labour market distortion suffered 
by PAYG systems, in that there exists a closer link between contributions and 
benefits. We will revisit this issue again in following sections.  
 
2.1.2.2 Labour market-demand
 
Product markets are very competitive. Any rational employer, therefore, aims to 
maximise profits. In light of this consideration, PAYG scheme is not the best choice 
for a country’s competitiveness. This issue is particularly relevant for the so-called old 
industry, e.g. mining, car manufacturing, where there are much more retirees than 
those in other industries. Consequently, increasing proportion of firm profits has to 
been used to pay current pensioners.  
 
In addition, under PAYG systems, employers are more likely to substitute capital for 
labour, thus giving rise to increase in unemployment rate or switching production to 
younger countries (James 1996). Meanwhile, PAYG systems have incentives for an 
informalization of production where the productivity is lower, as the population in the 
informal sectors is younger and it is easy for the employers to evade pensions 
contributions.  
 
Disney (2003) argues that the distortionary “tax component” of public pension 
contributions can also affect labour demand if the employee can pass through the 
burden of pension contribution to consumers, for example via product prices if the 
market is not fully competitive. In consequence, the product demand falls and 
producers might consider reducing the demand for labour.  
 
Another point that is relevant here is the “lump of labour fallacy”. The lump of labour 
fallacy is associated with the idea that there is a fixed amount of work available in the 
world, so for any increase in the amount of work each person can produce, there is a 
decreasing demand of labour. Given the rapid technological advances since World 
War Two, many governments intentionally, e.g. France’s socialist government tried to 
create more jobs by reducing the length of workweek and encouraging earlier 
                                                                                                                                       
i.e. total contributions in aggregate are sufficient to pay pension benefits in a long run (Lindbeck and 
Persson 2003).  
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retirement by providing generous social security provisions, of which PAYG system 
is particularly relevant.    
 
2.1.2.3  Redistribution
 
We mentioned in Section 2.1.1.4 that PAYG systems have a redistributive advantage 
over funding systems in that wealth is transferred from rich people to the poor. But 
due to some specific institutional arrangements in the real world, e.g. the pensioners’ 
retirement benefits are based on last few years’ salary under the PAYG systems, the 
function of redistribution is sometimes reversed from the poor to the rich, in that those 
in the highly paid jobs, e.g. senior managers are more likely to have a salary increased 
during their late years of career, while poor people, e.g. manual workers always have 
relatively flat salary over their working life. But it should be noted that this argument 
is only relevant to defined benefit PAYG systems and defined benefit funded systems 
where pensions are linked to final salaries (see Steurer 2003 for detailed classification 
of PAYG systems). If there is a benefit ceiling on social security, such worry should 
not be exaggerated. For flat PAYG systems, the purpose of redistribution within 
generations is well achieved.  
 
In addition, rich people in aggregate normally live longer than the poor because of 
better living conditions and therefore lower mortality rate. In consequence, although 
the rich might contribute more during their working life if pension contribution is 
proportional of salaries, they get more from the PAYG systems by outliving the poor.  
 
2.1.2.4 Political risk
 
PAYG systems are subject to political risk and there are four sources of political risk 
(Diamond 1994). The first one arises from the excessive benefits granted to people 
retiring when the population is still relatively young; this is exactly what has been 
taking place in many countries, where retirees could have very generous retirement 
benefits but this burden is becoming increasingly high. The second results from the 
excessive benefits promised to future retirees. This could happen, for example when 
politicians try to obtain more votes/support from voters who will retire in the future, 
but such promise is not viable in the long run.   
 
The third is the excessive responsiveness of benefits to the short term condition of the 
government budget and the last one is the excessive responsiveness of benefits to the 
long term condition of the government budget. The last two risks are closely related to 
the government budget with one being short run and the other long run. These risks 
can happen if the pension systems are largely dependent on government financing. 
Therefore, if the government faces a budget constraint, they might consider cutting 
pension benefits or raising taxes. All these put pensioners at the risk of adverse 
government budgeting behaviour.   
 
The political risk is suggested to be more common in developing countries given that 
politicians there are more likely to be irresponsible, therefore they change pension 
benefits and/or contributions formula frequently. Public pension systems in developed 
countries, e.g. the US and the UK, however, are not devoid of political risk either 
(Blake and Turner 2003). In the UK, the generosity of state pensions has been 
substantially reduced (Disney et al 2003), for example the basic state pension in 2001-
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2002 was around 15 per cent of average male earnings compared with 20 per cent in 
the early 1980s.  
 
2.1.2.5 Saving rate
 
Another common argument against PAYG holds the view that personal saving is 
decreased under an unfunded system. The intuition is that people do not save much 
under PAYG plans since they think the government will always “bail out” them if 
they fall into poverty, a form of myopic situation as shown in earlier section. Also, it 
is maintained that many people view social security systems as implicit wealth if they 
are confident about their ability of getting benefits later. Therefore, if contributors to 
public systems perceive they are entitled to secure benefits when retired (Disney 
2003), they reduce discretionary savings accordingly.  
 
Empirical results, however, are mixed. Several comprehensive literature reviews 
(Kohl and O’Brien 1998; Schmidt-Hebbel 1999) show that some studies find a non-
significant relationship between social security wealth and personal saving, while 
some others do reveal the expected negative relation. For example, Feldstein (1977) 
argues that the public social security programme in the U.S. effectively reduced total 
private saving by 38 percent and total personal saving by nearly 50 percent during 
1960s.    
 
2.1.2.6 Implicit debt
 
A PAYG programme, by definition, is unfunded. This feature implies that the 
government has to make up the budgetary hole or implicit debt once pension benefits 
could not be covered by the accumulated payroll taxes collected. Although the 
government could increase the contribution rate or reduce the replacement rate, 
obviously they both are always politically sensitive, particularly because the 
contribution/replacement rate might have to be raised/reduced to a prohibitably 
high/level level when working population is very small relative to retired population.  
 
Therefore, PAYG systems could go well during the period where the dependency 
ratio5 is low, or in other words, the country is very young. However, when the country 
is aging as now, this implicit debt problem does adversely affect the net benefit of 
PAYG retirement plans.  
 
It has been argued that demographic changes should not bear all the blame for the 
current pension crisis (Persson 2002). The combination of both demography and non-
actuarial benefit rules is the main reason. So as long as PAYG is designed on an 
actuarial basis, our worries on PAYG’s unsustainability should be eased. For 
example, several countries, e.g. Sweden, Italy and Poland have tried to implement 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) systems6, one main benefit of which is the 
                                                
5
 Dependency ratio =  number of people aged over 65/ number of people aged between 16-65. 
6
 With NDC systems, individuals have private accounts which are credited by their contributions and 
from which they withdraw their pensions when retired. But it should be noted that these accounts are 
still notional/unfunded and current pension contributions are used to pay current retirees’ pensions. 
Largely due to this point, it has been argued that NDC systems might have positive effect on 
microeconomic side, e.g labour supply but have less impact on macroeconomics so it cannot be a 
substitute for funded systems (Borsch-Supan 2003).  
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close link between pension contribution and benefit and thus more sustainable 
compared to traditional PAYG systems (Disney 1999b and Williamson and Williams 
2003). This model, however, may still have a deficit at macro-economic level, as by 
definition, it is unfunded. One innovative element of Swedish pension reform is the 
indexation rule where both the age of retirement and life expectancy are taken into 
account when calculating pension benefits, the main purpose of which is to position 
Swedish new pension system better to meet the liability in the long run (Scherman 
1999 and Palmer 2000).  
 
 
2.2 Pension reform-World Bank model 
 
Given the problems related to traditional PAYG systems, economists, policy makers 
and different multinational organisations around the world have sought to find 
appropriate old age provision schemes.  
 
The most influential one might be the multi-pillar pension systems designed by the 
World Bank (Holzmann 1999a; James 1998). However, partly due to the different 
mandates from those of various other international organisations, e.g. International 
Labour Office and International Social Security Association (James 1996; Queisser 
2000; Gillion 2000), but also from academics and other commentators, the World 
Bank model has received a considerable critical literature (Beattie and McGillivray 
1995; Singh 1996; Kotlikoff 1999).  
 
In this section, we first present the World Bank model, then review pension systems 
across the world based on our 72 sample countries; last, different arguments regarding 
the World Bank model are discussed.  
 
2.2.1 Features of World Bank model  
 
The World Bank model comprises three parts:  
 
A mandatory, publicly managed and tax-financed pillar for distribution 
A mandatory, privately managed and fully funded pillar for savings 
A voluntary pillar for those who want more protection for their post-retirement 
life 
 
The first pillar resembles the old public unfunded system, principally aiming for 
redistribution function of social pension as we discussed earlier. In other words, tax-
financed funds are used to provide a minimum income level necessary to old people.  
 
Under this heading, there are three variant schemes. The first one is a flat pillar as in 
the UK, called the basic state pension whereby people receive universally the same 
benefits after they retire7 (Whitehouse 1998). There could also be a minimum pension 
guarantee as in Chile (Godoy and Valdes-Prieto 1997) where the state guarantees a 
                                                
7
 At the moment in the UK, men need 44 and women need 39 qualifying years to receive full basic 
State Pension which is universally the same. The qualifying year is the year when national insurance 
contributions are paid. If qualifying year is less than 44 for men and 39 for women, pensions received 
are reduced accordingly. 
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22-25 per cent of the average wage to workers who have contributed to the mandatory 
systems for at least 20 years.  
 
Last, mean-tested plans are implemented in several countries as in Australia. 
Supporters of mean-tested proposal argue that government should only pay benefits to 
those who lack private assets or pension income for post-retirement life, rather than 
allocate public fund equivalently to every individual regardless of their financial 
condition as under universal security programme8 (Feldstein 1987).  
 
The second pillar, as the main ingredient in this innovation plan, shares similar 
characteristics to defined contribution (DC) plan, whereby the compulsory plan is 
fully funded and funds are competitively managed by asset managers following the 
profit maximisation principle.  
 
The third pillar serves as a complementary scheme, targeting those people who want 
more retirement income after they retired from work.   
 
Given that the most innovative part of the World Bank model is the second pillar, we 
briefly outline the associated acclaimed merits.  
 
Merits of the Second Pillar 
 
Why mandatory? 
 
Given that people are always short-sighted or simply because they do not have 
sufficient information to anticipate what will happen in the future, it is advisable to 
force people to participate in pension schemes. It should be noted that mandatory 
contribution is also a feature of PAYG systems. Three factors identified by Kotlikoff 
et al (1982) to justify myopia assumption as shown in Section 2.1.1.3 are relevant here, 
i.e. irreversibility of the retirement savings, reluctance to admit the possibility of long 
life and difficulty of making rational decisions.    
 
Why privately managed?  
 
If funds are managed by the government, political corruption often follows. For 
example, the government, with the purpose of either financing fiscal debt, or reducing 
investment risk, might ask funds to buy government bonds, which is not always 
desirable from the economic point of view (Mitchell and Hsin 1997; Mitchell 1998), 
as government bonds are vulnerable to inflation. Moreover, publicly managed funds 
are easily engaged in politically natured investments, e.g. infrastructure projects 
(Vives 2000). If privately managed, funds could alleviate such political corruption as 
well as inflation risk, thus achieving a higher real rate of return.  
 
Why defined contribution?  
 
                                                
8
 However, the existence of adverse selection might imply that people deliberately over-spend before 
retirement, and then become eligible for mean-tested scheme (Feldstein and Liebman 2001). Also 
means-tested plans, e.g. in the UK are a disincentive for saving (Davis 2003b), partly due to the myopic 
reason as we pointed out in section 1.1.3.  
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Neither the State nor firms could promise to pay guaranteed returns to employees in a 
financially and actuarially sensible way in the long term (Clark 2002). Therefore, a 
defined contribution programme is needed, which in turn subjects employees to 
investment risk and uncertainty.   
 
DC, given its characteristic of actuarial fairness, introduces the strong linkage 
between contribution and benefit as we briefly talked about earlier. In consequence, 
the inherent problems associated with PAYG and DB funded systems, e.g. earlier 
retirement, evasion could be solved or at least mitigated, therefore having economic 
implications, such as productivity increase.  
 
Why fully funded?  
 
In Section 2.1.2.4, we noted four sources of political risk by Diamond (1994), often 
arising from the irresponsible and insensible promises from politicians. Prefunding 
makes the costs clear up front so that politicians’ tendency to make promises today 
which could not be kept in the long term is largely reduced. Second, inter-generational 
transfer is eliminated, since based on fully funding, people receive what they 
contributed, plus accumulated profits, after they have retired. In other words, the 
linkage between contributions and benefits is strengthened. Third, the increase in 
payroll tax and drop in replacement rate are avoided which otherwise are two options 
for politicians to delay financial crises under PAYG systems. Fourth, as revealed in 
Section 2.2.3.2 following, funded systems are beneficial to the development of capital 
markets as happened in Chile and other countries (Holzmann 1997 and Davis 1995, 
1998 and 2003c). The issue will be treated empirically in Part Two, where on balance 
we found a positive link between pension reform and financial market development.  
 
2.2.2 Pension systems and reforms across the world
 
Since 1994, when the World Bank’s Averting the Old Age Crisis was first published, 
many countries around the world have been shifting towards the three-pillar systems, 
although the actual designs of pension systems differ across countries. In addition, 
other pension systems, e.g. notional defined contribution (NDC) systems have been 
designed and implemented in several countries as well.  
 
The successful introduction and implementation of a private pension system in Chile 
around 25 years ago has attracted great attention from academics, international 
organisations and governments. Following Chile, many Latin American countries 
have introduced or are considering a transition towards the Chilean model, i.e. 
privatising old public social security systems. Among those countries are Argentina 
(1994), Bolivia (1997), and recent examples include Costa Rica (2001), Dominica 
Republic (2003) etc. All of these countries could be defined as structural or systemic 
reform countries (Mesa-Lago 2002). In other words, they radically changed the public 
pension system by either replacing it with private schemes or introducing the private 
scheme which is a significant component of the whole social security systems. In 
                                                
9
 The discussion of this section, particularly the specific years of reform regarding each country are 
compiled from a variety of sources, including review papers, national sources, etc. Two of those 
sources which are in particular helpful and comprehensive are regional survey papers from Vols. 54, 55 
and 56, International Social Security Review (2001, 2002 and 2003) and one World Bank paper from 
Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999).  
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contrast, non-structural reform or parametric countries are defined as those which 
only improve the financial sustainability of the public systems in the long run, e.g. by 
raising the pensionable age and tightening eligibility etc. A number of countries in 
Latin America implemented a parametric reform, e.g. Brazil which has nevertheless 
been considering introducing a systemic reform.  
 
Some countries in Central and Eastern Europe have followed the World Bank model 
recently, for example Bulgaria in 2000, Croatia in 2002. Moreover, Czech Republic 
(1994) and Hungary (1997) are two of first pioneers in this region to start 
implementing structural pension reforms.  
 
Regarding OECD countries, pension reform is less radical compared to Emerging 
markets. However, some countries, e.g. UK, Switzerland and the Netherlands have 
been privatising their public systems for a relatively long time. For example, in the 
UK “Personal pensions” – individual saving accounts similar to IRAs in the US were 
introduced in 1988. Australia has also privatised its pension systems recently. Many 
other OECD countries have only conducted parametric pension reforms which are 
largely focused on raising retirement age, cutting pension benefits, etc. Example of 
these countries include Germany, France and Norway, etc. Regarding African 
countries, all of our sample countries are still at the stage of Pay as you go (PAYG) 
systems, although a number of countries, e.g. South Africa conducted parametric 
reform.   
 
Beside the PAYG and World Bank models, there are two other important pension 
systems. The first one is Provident Pension Fund systems, which are mainly set up in 
former British colonies, e.g. Singapore, Malaysia, etc. A recent example is in Hong 
Kong which implemented Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme in December 2000 
(MPFAHK 2004). Currently around 20 countries operate such schemes (Bateman and 
Piggott 1997). The other is Notional defined contribution (NDC) system. This system 
was originally designed by Sweden but first introduced by Latvia in 1996. Sweden, 
Italy and Poland are three other countries implementing NDC system.  
 
See Table 2 for a summary of pension systems and years of reform for all sample 
countries.  
 
2.2.3 Debate on World Bank model
 
Despite the popularity of World Bank’s multi-pillar model, the extent to which this 
model is better than previous plans and whether claimed advantages over PAYG are 
justifiable are still under hot debate. In this section, we divide current arguments into 
three categories under the headings of economic issues, financial issues, other issues 
respectively. In each subsection, we first introduce the arguments favouring the World 
Bank model, then present the counter-arguments.  
 
Before moving on further, however, we would like to spell out briefly how pension 
reform, pension fund assets, economic growth and financial market development are 
linked together with the help of a simplified figure. In general, pension reform has its 
impact on economic growth directly via arrow a as shown in Figure 3, while pension 
funds mainly fulfil the same function both directly via arrow c and indirectly through 
financial markets via arrows d and e, as it has been widely suggested that financial 
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development are closely linked to economic growth 10 . Regarding the link with 
financial development, pension funds can have direct effect via arrow d on financial 
development which in turn affects economic growth via arrow e, while pension 
reform mainly imposes its impact via pension funds growth through arrows b and d. 
Figure 3, although very simplified, illustrates current mainstream arguments regarding 
the relationship between pension reform, pension funds, economic growth and 
financial development. 
  
2.2.3.1 Economic issues 
 
2.2.3.1.1 Labour markets-supply 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1, due to the weak link between pension contributions 
and benefits under the PAYG systems, there is a tendency towards earlier retirement 
and job immobility. It has been pointed out that during 1950-1970, there was a very 
sharp fall in the participation rate for those men over state pension age (65+) in EU 
countries (Disney 2002). For men aged 55-64, there was a sharp fall during 1970-
1990, although this trend was less clear for women aged 55-64.  
 
One contributing factor regarding this low participation rate of the elderly in 
European countries is the disincentives imbedded in public pension systems (Blondal 
and Scarpetta 1998). In view of such problems, Estelle James (1998b), the principal 
author of Averting the Old Age Crisis, has written: “the close linkage between benefits 
and contributions, in a defined-contribution plan is designed to reduce labour market 
distortions.” 
 
Empirical research on the benefits of a shift from the PAYG to funded systems is 
conducted by Packard (2001). In that paper, data covering a panel of 18 Latin 
American countries are used. Seven countries are defined as “reformers” if 
introducing a private pension account, and the rest as “non-reformers”. His results 
show that in the long run, a transition from the PAYG to funded systems gives people 
the incentives to work in the formal industries by registering with the formal social 
security systems in Latin America, although there is a disincentive in the short run; 
this dynamics is explained that people in the reforming countries need time to adjust 
this change.  
 
Regarding the issue of job mobility, recent empirical work by Disney et al (2003) 
shows that UK Pension reform from 1980s to 1990s was closely and positively linked 
to job mobility, i.e. people who opt out of occupational pension schemes (largely DC 
plans) and switch to personal pensions are more mobile than those who do not. But it 
might be the reason that those switching to personal pensions were mobile anyway.  
 
Beattie and McGillivray (1995), however, mention that during the 1980s in Sweden 
where a very generous social security was provided, there was a higher participation 
                                                
10The relationship between financial development and economic growth has been extensively analyzed. 
See Gallego and Loayza (2000) for Chile; Levine (1997) and Levine and Zeros (1995) for the 
international empirical evidence; Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Li (2002) for the theoretical 
analysis. On balance, a positive association between financial development and economic growth is 
found.  
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rate for the population aged 60-64 in Sweden than in France and Germany11. Although 
this example is not sufficient to invalidate the argument that PAYG induces less 
labour supply, as there might be other driving forces in this case (James 1996), it does 
indicate the complexity of the relationship between PAYG and labour markets.  
 
Moreover, this issue could become more complicated if we assume that the final aim 
of pension systems is not to enhance labour supply but to increase social welfare 
(Orszag and Stiglitz 1999; Barr 2000). Therefore, if the utility gains from earlier 
retirement exceeds the corresponding costs resulting from less labour supply, PAYG –
related schemes are still welfare improving thus desirable. This argument might be 
correct but early retirement is very costly to the economy; Herbertsson and Orszag 
(2003) estimate that even if the current participation rate of the elderly does not 
decrease any further, the cost of early retirement across OECD countries would be 9.1 
per cent of GDP in 2010, up from 5.3 per cent in 1980.  
 
2.2.3.1.2 Labour market - demand
 
As we briefly discussed in Section 2.1.2.2, the underlying theory of how PAYG 
systems affect the demand side of labour market is that employers view PAYG 
contributions as one form of payroll tax, so they tend to replace labour recruitment 
with capital investment, therefore reducing labour demand.   
 
Disney (2003) argues that public pension contributions can affect not only labour 
supply as we discussed in previous section, but also the demand for labour. The 
underlying rationale is that the employee can pass through the burden of pension 
contribution to consumers for example via product prices in the non-competitive 
product market; because if so, the product prices are higher than otherwise, then 
producers might consider reducing the demand for labour given the increasing labour 
costs. It is worth noting that in a labour market which is not fully competitive, wages 
are partially set by the trade union e.g. in continental Europe, and employers decide 
employment conditional on the wages. In other words, the labour market is not 
competitive if the trade union is strong and has power to bargain with employers. 
Then, it is not easy for employers to change, particularly reduce wages accordingly if 
labour costs are rising as what is likely to happen when pension contribution payment 
is obliged for employers. Consequently, employers will consider cutting labour 
demand as labour costs are high.  
 
In most countries, enterprises are obliged to contribute on behalf of employees, and 
they normally view such contribution as extra taxes, although they might be able to 
reduce wages thus contributions if the labour market is competitive. This 
contribution’s impact on labour demand is less obvious when such taxes are not large, 
which is most likely when the population is young and only relatively small 
proportion of whole population are elderly dependent. This situation, however, is 
changing as we discussed earlier, so ageing population will entail larger pension 
contribution from both employees and employers if purely relying on the public 
PAYG system. It is this reason which underlines the possible declining labour demand 
from enterprises.  
                                                
11
 A recent simulation study, however, does indicate that if the generosity of social security systems is 
reduced by abolishing early retirement program in Norway, participation rates for both males and 
females will increase by 5 per cent (Haugen et al 2002).  
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2.2.3.1.3 Private saving
 
The World Bank multi-pillar model claims that funded individual account is 
conducive to higher saving rate. Three relevant theories which capture people’s 
saving behaviour are Life-cycle model, Bequest model and Precautionary motives 
model (Kohl and O’Brien 1998).  The most prominent theory, i.e. life-cycle model 
(Ando and Modigliani 1963) is based on the assumption that people’s primary motive 
for saving/dissaving is smoothing their lifetime’s consumption. They normally 
accumulate assets during working life and decumulate assets when retired. The 
Bequest model assumes that individuals have a multi-generational time horizon, i.e. 
they try to maximise not only their own utilities but also their children’s. If people 
when deciding their saving/consumption put more weight on factors which are 
uncertain, i.e. high health expenditures, it might be more appropriate to consider the 
theory of Precautionary motives.  
 
We discussed in Section 2.1.2.5 that empirical results regarding the hypothesis of 
PAYG reducing personal saving are an array of results ranging from no effects, to 
negative and even positive effects. If the impacts of PAYG on savings, i.e. under the 
scenario of no pension reform, are not clear-cut, what would then this relation look 
like if we consider the reform scenario, i.e. the shift from PAYG to funded systems? 
 
In principle, pension reforms generate increased saving via the following channels. 
 
First, saving rate increases given that Ricardian Equivalence12 does not hold, which 
implies that individuals would not reduce their discretionary saving or borrow money 
on a one-to-one basis for every one unit increase in the pension funds. There are two 
contributing factors, pension assets’ illiquidity and credit constraint.   
 
Due to pension assets’ illiquidity, arising from the fact that pension assets normally 
could not be withdrawn for a long period of time, households do not view such claims 
as a perfect substitute for liquid savings, e.g. deposits. This argument is valid, for 
example, given that many pension laws prohibit pensioners from mortgaging their 
future pension benefits (Cifuentes and Valdes-Prieto 1997). 
 
The existence of credit constraints to individuals, particularly to young people and 
lower income individuals in EMEs, is especially relevant in this case (Davis 2000b), 
in that any forced saving, e.g. pension assets could not be fully offset by 
corresponding decrease in discretionary saving or borrowing.  
 
Second, pension reforms are always accompanied with tax incentives whereby 
pension assets are free of income and capital gains tax during the period of assets 
accumulation but assets decumulation is taxed (McCarthy and Neuberger 2004). This 
tax deferral arrangement is designed to encourage pension saving.  
 
                                                
12 Ricardian equivalence refers to the hypothesis that rational consumers will automatically adjust their 
personal saving and consumption inter-temporarily so as to smooth their current and future 
consumption (Seater J  J 1993).  Empirical woks, however, do not support this hypothesis by evidences 
from Domenech et.al. (1997) with 18 OECD countries and Edwards with Latin American countries 
(Edwards 1996). 
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Third, there might be ‘recognition effect’ as people who witness the transition of 
pension reform from PAYG to funded systems realise the importance of saving for 
retirement whether they are affected by such transition directly or not. In other words, 
even for those who are given the option to stay in the old pension systems and where 
the government honours previous benefits, such awareness regarding the pension 
crisis might encourage people to save more.  
 
Empirically, the effect of IRAs (Individual Retirement Accounts) and 401(K) on 
personal saving behaviour in the US is widely documented. Poterba et al (1995, 1996) 
after controlling for household’s heterogeneity, conclude that IRA and 401(K) are 
positive contribution to personal savings. For example, for families with both IRAs 
and 401(K) between 1987 and 1991, the mean total financial assets increased from 
$37,882 to $44,432 while there was no decline in their other financial assets. But 
Hubbard and Skinner (1996) argue that findings by Poterba et al might be biased 
upward, and the actual contribution to saving is positive but at a lesser extent.  
 
A major empirical international study regarding the issue of pension fund assets and 
saving rate has been conducted by Reisen and Bailliu (1997), where they use data 
from 11 countries including both OECD and non-OECD nations. The empirical 
equation employed in that paper is a relatively simple single-equation regression 
model as follows:  
 
it it it it itSav X W tα β λ δ ε= + + + +                                                                                 (1) 
 
As usual, i and t proxy country (11) and time (1982-1993). Sav is the private/national 
saving ratio, X is the indicator of pension wealth (in either stock and flow form), W is 
vector of control variables, e.g. dependency ratio, real interest rate, etc. t is time trend.  
 
Based on both Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares estimation 
procedures, they give evidence that pension assets accumulation has a positive and 
significant impact on private savings, but such impact shows heterogeneity. For 
example, their estimations reveal that the impact is 8 times larger for non-OECD 
countries than OECD countries. But such a large extent of differentials across OECD 
and non-OECD nations might be a bit high. Therefore, more robust specifications are 
needed. In addition, they find that the relationship between national saving and 
pension funds growth is not significant. It might be due to the reason that the 
government running deficit offsets private saving at the national level.   
 
Recent study by Bosworth and Burtless (2004b) indicates that across 11 advanced 
OECD countries, growth in pension and life insurance assets reduces private saving 
by crowding out other forms of and/or discretionary private savings. Their 
econometric model, however, is relatively simply specified, with only five 
independent variables, including dependency rate, unemployment rate, etc. In 
addition, their model is not sufficient to capture the dynamic nature of data generating 
process, although the lagged independent variable of pension assets is included.  
 
2.2.3.1.4 National saving
 
Now we turn to the issue of national saving which include both private saving and 
public saving, where how pension reforming governments finance transition deficits, 
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i.e. implicit pension debts is crucial in determining the trend of national saving, even 
if private saving is increased. If the government tries to finance the implicit pension 
debts by public debts, then public savings would decrease, so the overall national 
saving rate might not be changed or increased (Cesaratto 2003).  
 
For example, a simulation study by (Hviding and Merette 1998) gives evidence that 
debt financed transition will not have material effects on national saving and output. 
All that has happened is that the government has altered the form of the debt (Orszag 
and Stiglitz 1999). However, if such transition deficits are partly financed by tax, it is 
more likely to increase national saving as public saving would not decline 
significantly given others equal.  
 
In addition, James (1996), the principal author of Averting the Old Age Crisis argues 
that one main advantage of World Bank multi-pillar model is that national saving 
could be boosted. And Holzmann from the World Bank (1997) also gives evidence 
that aggregate savings in Chile grew with pension reform.  
 
Moreover, Schmidt-Hebbel (1999a) estimates that pension reform in Chile spurs the 
national saving rate. Given the difficulty of pinning down how the pension reform 
was financed in Chile, Schmidt-Hebbel considers three cases, i.e. fiscal contraction 
financing of pension reform at the levels of 100%, 75% and 50%. Then with estimates 
of regression coefficients from two separate equations, one of which includes 
mandatory savings and the other without, as well as the hypothetical effects of 1984 
tax reform on savings, Schmidt-Hebbel suggests that the rise in national saving could 
be explained by pension reform from 9.8% to 45%, with the remaining being 
explained by structural reform, e.g. tax reform etc.  
 
Another cross-country study (Bosworth and Burtless 2004b) gives empirical evidence 
that pension saving reduces non-retirement public saving. Therefore, given that 
national saving is composed of both private saving and public saving, national saving 
does not necessarily increase following pension reform toward funding, as public 
saving might decrease correspondingly. But this reasoning should be taken as caution, 
as Bosworth and Burthless use the public pension funds to proxy pension saving. 
Whether private pension assets follow the same logic remains to be seen.  
 
Samwick (1999) with a panel of countries finds that no countries but Chile 
experienced an increase in gross national saving rates after pension reform towards 
non-PAYG systems. The model used is as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3 4( )t t t t t tres year after year after duingβ β β β β ε= + + + × + +                                (2) 
 
Res is the regression residuals term saved from following Equation 3; year is the 
sample year; after is a dummy variable representing post-reform years and during 
another dummy variable representing the reform year.  
 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
it it it it it
t
Saving Income IncomeGr Credit POP
Old Young Urban EXP
β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + +                                      (3) 
Saving: Gross national saving (GNS) as percentage of Gross National Disposable 
Income (GNDI) 
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Income: Log of per capita income 
IncomeGr: per capita income growth 
Credit: Private credit to income ratio 
POP: Population  
Old: Old age dependency ratio 
Young: Young dependency ratio 
Urban: Urbanisation rate 
EXP: Life expectancy 
 
In comparison with saving model of Reisen and Bailliu (1997) in previous section, all 
control variables are not the same. For example, Life expectancy is used here but not 
in Reisen and Bailliu. In addition, in Reisen and Bailliu, Dependency ratio (both 
young and old) is used while Samwick decomposed this ratio into old age and young 
age dependency ratios.  
 
In addition, cross-section evidences (Samwick 1999), based on data of 1990 and 
averages of 1991-1994, however, suggest that countries with PAYG systems had 
lower saving rates than other countries. This finding is consistent with Orszag and 
Stiglitz’s claim (1999) that it is entirely possible that the introduction of a PAYG 
scheme reduces national saving, but a shift to an individual account does not 
necessarily increase national saving.   
 
2.2.3.1.5 Capital formation and economic growth
 
The Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994) claims that economic growth is higher in 
countries with funded systems than those with unfunded pensions schemes via e.g. 
less labour distortion, higher saving rate and capital formation. Capital formation will 
be increased following pension reform if the pension assets accumulated are not 
invested abroad significantly, i.e. such pension savings are used on domestic 
investment. But it is worth mentioning that investing abroad does not necessarily 
mean losing national wealth, as residents from the home country can still obtain 
interest and dividend income13, and whether to invest abroad to a large extent depends 
on the development’s stages in the particular country.  
 
A tentative empirical study by Holzmann (1997) indicates a positive relationship 
between pension reform and economic growth in Chile. With the simple Solow 
residual specification of total factor productivity (TFP), it is found that improving 
financial markets conditions following the pension funds reform significantly 
positively affect TFP. But this model suffers from low t values which might result 
from high multicollinearity between independent variables, e.g. unemployment rate 
and stock market index.  
 
Meanwhile, Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) reaches the conclusion that pension reform in 
Chile spurs private investment, the average productivity of capital and total factor 
productivity (TFP). Always, one single regression is estimated to obtain the 
coefficients, then these coefficients are used to calculate the rise of each variable, i.e. 
private investment, average productivity of capital and TFP attributed to structural 
reform, (e.g. tax reform) and pension reform; estimation of pension reform is based on 
                                                
13
 Pension funds’ international investment is a hot topic and will be investigated in our next study.  
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three scenarios – large effects, moderate effects and small effects. In all, pension 
reform in Chile is estimated to have a positive impact on the private investment rate, 
the average productivity of capital and the TFP growth rate. For example, pension 
reform contributed to 0.1 - 0.4 per cent of 1.5 per cent increase in TFP growth rate, 
while 0.4 – 1.5 per cent of the total 13 per cent rise in private investment rate was 
attributed to pension reform with the remainder being explained by structural reform.  
 
Barr (2000) argues that there are three channels through which funding could induce 
economic growth; First, pension reform leads to a higher saving rate; this result is 
mixed as we will show shortly. Second, the higher saving is translated into more 
productive investment. Third, that investment results in an increase in output. But he 
argues that all of these three links do not necessarily hold. 
 
Simulation study on 7 OECD advanced countries by Hviding and Merette (1998) 
shows that fundamental pension reform, (gradual removal of public old-age pensions) 
has a greater effect than parametric reform, i.e. 20 per cent reduction in the 
replacement rate. For example, for the United States, per capita GDP could increase 
3.6 per cent per year in the long run under the fundamental pension reform, while the 
figure is 0.6 if under the reform of reducing replacement rate by 20 per cent. 
Econometric work on a panel of countries to test this, especially the modelling on 
both OECD countries and Emerging market economies (EMEs), is quite scarce to our 
knowledge.  
 
An exception is a tentative study by Davis (2003a) who concludes an insignificant 
direct effect of institutional assets – including pension funds, life insurer and mutual 
funds - on economic growth for 17 OECD countries, although the banking industry 
was found to be positively linked to economic growth, consistent with Levine and 
Zervos (1998). The equation Davis employed is the standard 5-year average economic 
growth model (King and Levine 1993 and Beck et al 2000), where explanatory 
variables include Bank lending/GDP, Institutional assets/GDP etc.  
 
2.2.3.2 Financial issues 

2.2.3.2.1 Capital markets 
 
One main augment favouring the World Bank model is that pension reform leads to 
capital markets development. Pension funds and capital markets, especially in EU 
countries, have been studied extensively by Davis (1995, 1998c, 2000a and 2003c). 
Pensions funds have advantages over other financial intermediation in that they fulfil 
the six functions of financial systems (Merton and Bodie 1995) more efficiently.  
 
The six functions are 1) clearing and settling payments; 2) pooling resources and 
subdividing shares; 3) transferring resources across time and space; 4) managing risk; 
5) providing information; 6) dealing with incentive problems (Merton and Bodie 
1995). Pension funds managers have been increasingly using derivatives to hedge 
risk, e.g. currency risk due to international investment. Merton and Bodie argue that 
the payment system demands of derivatives-based strategies can significantly reduce 
payment risk due to the drop of occurrence of relatively large funds transfers; 
therefore function 1 is improved. Pension funds facilitate function 1 here in that they 
have started using derivatives as one important vehicle of risk management and 
 30
diversification. Press coverage and academic works have recently turned their 
attention into exotic financial instruments, e.g. hedge funds. For example, Rail 
pension in the UK has recently announced its intention to invest more than 600bn 
pounds into hedge funds (Financial Times 2004)14, thus overtaking British Telecom as 
the UK’s largest investor in the alternative products. In addition, Greenspan (2003) 
mentions that the growing use of derivatives and related techniques is conducive to 
the stability and resilience of the largest US financial intermediaries, e.g. banks.  
 
Pooling and transferring resources – functions 2 and 3 is the fundamental 
characteristic of pension funds in that they accumulate assets and smoothe people’s 
consumption over time. Risk – function 4 can also be reduced due to professional risk 
management e.g. via international diversification (Reisen 1997; Davis 2001 and 
2002b). The function 5 can be improved in that there is evidence that pension funds 
by their superior ability to obtain information decrease market price fluctuation (Davis 
1996; Walker and Lefort 2002). The function of dealing with incentive problems can 
be better served by improvement in corporate governance because more pension funds 
have realized the difficulty of voting with their ‘feet’ by selling stock, and instead 
actively participate in corporate governance issues (Davis 2002c; Clark and Hebb 
2002).  
 
Pension fund assets have increased noticeably during the past decades across both 
OECD countries and EMEs. Figures 4 and 5 clearly reveal the steadily rising trend of 
total pension assets across all countries (18 OECD countries and 11 EMEs) over the 
period 1981-200015. In terms of Pension assets to GDP, such a trend is also identified 
from Figures 6 and 7, with only a few exceptions, e.g. Fiji, South Africa etc.  
 
Regarding the European countries, it has been estimated that in 2005, pension fund 
assets will be at the level of Euro 3,500bn (Davis 2003c). The pension assets within 
EU zone might be speeded in coming years, e.g. due to the “stability pact”; because 
EU member states have committed themselves to refrain from excessive budget 
deficits in order to comply with the rules of Stability and Growth Pact. In addition, if 
the government does not reform PAYG systems and attempts to finance such implicit 
pension debts by issuing bonds, the risk premium required by participants in the 
financial markets will be higher, as the public is increasingly aware of the 
unsustainability of PAYG systems (Holzmann 1998; Rother et al 2003). And indeed, 
credit rating agencies, e.g. Standard and Poors (2002) have started considering the 
potential impact of population ageing on long term fiscal substainability and tend to 
lower the credit rating of such governments running deficits (Davis 2004). In all, 
pension funds are expected to continue their rapid growth in EU countries due to 
reform pressure; consequently, they will have evolutionary impact on the financial 
markets (Davis 2000a and 2003c). 
 
Regarding emerging market economies (EMEs), Chile is the most frequently referred 
to country to justify this benefit. For example, Holzmann (1997) points out that 
                                                
14
 Pension fund investment, including investing in hedge funds, will be investigated in our next study.  
15
 In Figured 4 and 5, we average every 5 year observations over 1981-2000, so total together we have 
4 observations for each country. We use 1901 to denote the 5 year average over 1981-1985, 1902 to 
denote 1986-1990, 1903 to denote 1991-1995 and 1904 to denote 1996-2000. Similar designation has 
been used by Beck et al (2000). These 5 year average data are also created for our econometric analysis 
in Part two.  
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Chilean pension funds grew from zero to 39 per cent of GDP from 1980 to 1995. (The 
latest statistics from FIAP (2003) show that this figure was over 60 per cent as of 
2002), The same trend was found for financial assets, rising from 28 per cent of GDP 
to 68 per cent from 1980 to 1993 (Fontaine 1997). As of 2000, 65 per cent of 
government debts, 12 per cent of time deposits and bank bonds, 56 per cent of 
mortgage bonds, 40 per cent of corporate bonds and 7 per cent of equity were held by 
pension funds (Walker and Lefort 2002).  
 
But Uthoff (1993) notes that due to the existence of other accompanying factors, e.g. 
high and stable GDP growth, international capital inflows in Chile, it is difficult to 
draw a direct effect between pension funds and stock market development. Therefore, 
pension funds may have to some extent helped the financial development, but they 
may be in general neither necessary nor sufficient (Singh 1996).  
 
Meanwhile, Catalan et al (2000) seek to identify whether there is a Granger-causality 
relation between capital markets and contractual savings.  
 
0
1 1
p q
t i t i j t j i
i j
y y x uα β β
− −
= =
= + + +                                                                               (4) 
 
X and y in Equation 4 are the variables of interest. For example, they could be stock 
market capitalisation and contractual savings. Based on the above equation, Catalan et 
al (2000) give evidence that contractual saving institutions, e.g. pension funds, induce 
capital market’s development. But the potential benefits of developing contractual 
saving sectors are stronger for developing countries than for developed countries.  
 
They use two capital market indicators, stock market capitalisation and stock market 
value traded across 26 countries, among which 6 are developing countries. Although 
they find a Granger causality relationship between contractual savings and the stock 
market, their estimation might suffer from a small number of observations. For 
example, for the causality regression on Austria, they have only 6 observations which 
is implausibly few, therefore their results need to be checked by empirical work with 
more observations. In view of this problem, we, in our empirical section, seek to 
tackle this issue with more observations when running individual Granger causality 
tests. In addition, we use panel Granger causality procedure designed by Hurlin and 
Venet (2001) to complement Granger-causality on individual countries. In this case, 
many more observations are obtained due to the pooling of cross-country data.   
 
Meanwhile, a panel study focused on 33 Emerging markets by Walker and Lefort 
(2002) finds that pension funds decrease the dividend yield and increase the price to 
book ratio, implying a drop in the cost of capital. This result is robust even when 
pension funds are proxied by four sets of variables, i.e. a) dummy variable, b) share of 
stock in pension portfolio, c) pension investment in stocks and private bonds to total 
market capitalisation, d) pension fund assets to GDP. Other explanatory variables are 
inflation, per capita income, bank assets/GDP and dummy variable-Region. But as 
admitted by the authors, their generalised least squares (GLS) panel estimator might 
suffer from problems like measurement errors, etc. This issue has been addressed by 
researchers, e.g. Impavido et al (2003) as discussed below. In addition, regarding the 
argument of bank’s disintermediation following pension funds growth, their 
descriptive statistics on Chile, Argentina and Peru do not provide convincing 
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evidence. For example, in comparison with pension funds, banks are still the primary 
provider of short-term financing and small firms in Chile.  
 
In terms of bond markets, IMF (1994) reports that in recent years, governments have 
tried to attract foreign institutional investors by moderning the infrastructure of their 
public bond markets as well facilitating private bond issuance. For example, Benos 
and Crouhy (1996) mention that due to the motivation of attracting foreign 
institutions, French government opened future markets MATIF and introduced such 
innovations as OATs for its bond markets.  
 
Impavido et al (2003) find a positive relationship between contractual saving assets 
and bond markets, e.g. a 1 per cent increase in the former leads to 0.4 per cent rise in 
the latter. Generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel model, developed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used in their paper.  
 
' ' '
1 1 1 1it it it it it i t itY Y P Z f dα β ϕ φ ε− − − −= + + Σ + + + +                                                       (5) 
 
Y is vector of financial market indicators, e.g. bond market capitalisation to GDP 
P is a variable vector, including real returns on stocks, etc. 
Σ is a vector, presenting risk measures for financial assets, e.g. stocks 
Z includes relative size of Contractual saving (pension funds and life insurance), etc. 
f is the country-specific and time invariant variable.  
d is set of year dummies 
ε  is the error term.  
 
In order to deal with the problems such as measurement errors and endogeneity, and 
following the methodology of difference GMM estimator, the above equation is first 
differenced, then following equation is obtained:  
 
' ' '
1 1 1 1it it it it it t itY Y P Z dα β ϕ φ ε− − − −∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆Σ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆                                               (6) 
 
Term f is dropped, as it is not time varying.  
 
Use of GMM estimator is promising in Impavido et al (2003), a large improvement 
from the methodology of Walker and Lefort (2002), Reisen and Bailliu (1997), etc. as 
we discussed in previous sections.  But a number of areas in our view could be 
improved or at least complemented. First, they use the value of aggregate outstanding 
public and private bond issuance to proxy bond market development. This 
specification might not be able to disentangle the differential impacts of contractual 
savings on public and private bond markets; it should be noted that private bond 
market might be more relevant here, as the amount of public bond issuance largely 
depends on the government’s willingness to issue and its fiscal position, while that of 
private bond is dependable on the thickness and maturity of financial markets where 
pension funds are supposed to play an increasing important role following pension 
reform. Second, separate regressions on developed and developing countries ought to 
be conducted, in order to discern whether the impact of contractual savings is 
identical across countries. Third, differences of the long run and short run effects 
might be a concern of policy makers, but unfortunately, it is not available in the 
specification of Impavido et al (2003).  
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2.2.3.2.2 Stock market volatility
 
It has been suggested that growth of institutional investors, e.g. pension funds, has led 
to heightened stock market volatility and the resultant implication might be increased 
risk premium and cost of capital (discussed in next section). One main underlying 
factor is institution’s herding behaviour. Simply speaking, herding is defined as 
behaviour whereby institutional investors seek to buy or sell assets at the same time. 
There are a number of reasons institutions herd more than individuals. One main 
contributing factor is the regular performance check on asset managers against the 
market benchmark from the fund’s sponsor (Davis 2000b).  
 
Result from a questionnaire survey circulated to a large number of institutional 
investors by Davis in 1998 reveals that the most important element in competition in 
asset management is performance relative to other institutions (Davis and Steil 2001). 
The herding behaviour also is found by another questionnaire study on Germany fund 
managers (Lutje and Menkhoff 2003). All of these induce similar behaviour and 
hence herding to avoid performing significantly worse than the median fund. 
Consequently, such herding behaviour might drive prices away from fundamental 
values, thus leading to long run volatility.  
 
But herding does not necessarily leads to volatility. If institutions are rational and 
professional investors, they will only follow the fundamentals and thus speed the 
market to a new equilibrium price (Wermers 1999).  
 
Results from empirical work are mixed. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) examine annual 
changes in institutional holdings and find that herding exists among institutions 
investors for the period from 1977 to 1996. But Lakonishok et al (1991a) find that the 
average pension fund is contrarian, e.g. they buy disproportionately stocks that have 
performed poorly. This behaviour might have the effect of reducing market volatility.  
 
Meanwhile, Walker and Lefort (2002) find that pension fund growth reduces security 
price volatility for 33 emerging market economies. They use 24 month annualised 
moving volatility as a proxy for market volatility. Inflation is used to proxy macro-
economic stability and bank assets to proxy capital market development. Other 
independent variables include per-capital income, initial conditions and the region 
which are used to capture heterogeneity across countries. This negative link between 
pension funds and market volatility might be justified by such large investors’ ability 
to access more information, thus restraining prices from deviating too far away from 
fundamentals. It should be noted, however, that when another specification, i.e. using 
reform indices from Morley et al (1999) is employed to do the same estimation, the 
relation between market volatility and pension funds are not statistically significant. 
But Walker and Lefort note that the latter specification might suffer from problems of 
measurement errors.  
 
Another study is conducted by Davis (2003a) who uses a dataset covering both 
pension and life insurance assets across G-7 countries. His results suggest a positive 
link between equity price volatility and the share of equity held by pension funds and 
life insurance across both Anglo-Saxon countries and continental European countries 
and Japan (CEJ). He mentions, however, that such a link in the G-7 and Anglo-Saxon 
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countries might be due to the shift in sectoral holdings of equities rather than 
institutional holdings per se.  
 
In addition, Lakonishok et al (1991b) give evidence that pension fund managers do 
not herd except in small stocks, and the hypothesis of positive relation between 
institutional holdings and share price movements does not hold, which might be due 
to the broad diversity of institutions’ trading styles, which to a large extent, cancel out 
each other’s effect. This result in fact is consistent with the words of BIS (1998): a 
financial system’s stability depends on “the coexistence of participants with divergent 
objectives and mutually complementary behaviour.” 
 
2.2.3.2.3 Cost of capital
 
The aggregate financial market serves as an intermediary channelling funds from 
savers (households) to users (firms). Given that funded pension systems have positive 
effects on household saving, Iglesias (1998) maintains that the cost of capital for firms 
can be reduced following funded pension reform. But as we discussed in section 
2.2.3.1.3, evidence to support World Bank model’s positive impact on private saving 
is mixed. Or it could be argued that household saving increases anyway due to current 
demographic changes towards a larger proportion of the 45-60 cohort, if based on life-
cycle model whereby middle-aged population is more likely to save for their 
retirement. Meanwhile, Walker and Lefort (2002) argue that there are three possible 
channels whereby the cost of capital could be decreased. The first channel is more 
developed capital market resulting from pension reforms, thus marking issuance of 
securities cheaper. Secondly, even allowing for short-term performance evaluation, 
the expected investment time horizon of pension funds is longer than that of 
individuals and firms, thus reducing the ‘term premium’. Third, the risk premium may 
be reduced due to pension funds’ pooling and professional management. Both the 
term premium and risk premium’s reduction might lead to decreased average cost of 
capital.  
 
In addition, we might be able to gain some insight on this issue by drawing on 
relevant financial theories. Based on Modigliani and Miller (1963), the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) is given as  
 
(1 )
c
BWACC
B S
ρ τ= − +                                                                                            (7) 
ρ : Discounted rate for an all-equity firm 
cτ : Corporate marginal tax rate 
B: Proportion of bonds 
S: Proportion of shares.  
 
Then we can see from the above Equation 7 that given ρ  and 
cτ  do not change, if B 
increases, e.g. firms issue more bonds as happened in Chile following pension reform, 
WACC will decrease due to the tax benefits gained from more debt. Results, however, 
will become less straightforward if more shares are issued with bonds. But pecking-
order theory suggests that firms always prefer debt issuance to equity issuance in the 
first instance.  
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Graphically, we can see that in Figure 8, the WACC line without introduction of 
pension funds is to the left of WACC line with introduction of pension funds, so the 
optimal capital structure of the without-pension-funds scenario takes less bonds than 
with-pension-funds scenario. Consequently, the cost of capital for the firms moves 
down from N to N*.  
 
The theory of bankruptcy costs (Copeland and Weston 1992) might also be relevant 
here. When a firm goes to bankruptcy, the value of this firm is reduced by the fact that 
payments must be made to third parties other than bond or shareholders. Trustee fees, 
legal fees, and other costs of reorganisation or bankruptcy are deduced from the net 
asset value of the bankrupt firm and from the proceeds that should go to bondholders. 
Consequently, the “dead weight” losses associated with bankruptcy may cause the 
value of the firm in bankruptcy to be less than the discounted value of the expected 
cash flows from operations. Therefore, capital providers of the firm have to charge 
some premium to compensate this contingent loss. Meanwhile, agency costs, resulting 
from the separation of management and ownership for most modern firms can lead to 
some extra premium charges as well, because shareholders and bondholders in order 
to prevent professional managers from mis-management have to incur monitoring 
costs.  
 
Under the development of pension funds and given that pension funds activism is 
under way in many countries, particularly in the US, both bankruptcy costs and 
agency costs can be reduced because pension funds find the increasing difficulty of 
voting with their feet, i.e. selling in takeover, and thus actively participate in firm’s 
management so as to improve the corporate performance. In consequence, the cost of 
capital for firms can be reduced and then it might have positive implication on 
economic growth16.  
 
Empirical study on the link between costs of capital and pension funds is scanty. 
Walker and Lefort (2002) using dividend yields and price to book ratios as proxy for 
cost of capital in 33 emerging markets find that pension funds significantly decrease 
the cost of capital. But when they change their econometric specification by 
controlling for the degree of reform in different areas of the economy, the relation 
becomes  insignificant.  
 
2.2.3.3 Other issues 
 
In this section, we outline some arguments for and against World Bank model, which 
are not directly linked to economic growth and financial development.   
 
2.2.3.3.1 Political risk
 
As outlined in Section 2.1.2.4, traditional PAYG systems suffer from political risk as 
politicians may promise benefits which are not sustainable in the long run or simply 
change the benefit formula for whatever reason. In this context, it is claimed that 
funded pension systems, e.g. the World Bank multi-pillar model can avoid this 
problem (World Bank 1994). It is true that funded accounts of each individual make it 
                                                
16
 It might worth mentioning here that the development of financial markets, notably, equity market has 
been argued to stimulate and/or forecast the economic growth. Empirical work on this issue, among 
others, includes Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck et al (2000).   
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harder for government to make excessive benefit promises, in that retirees will be paid 
from their own accumulated accounts rather than from the pool of payroll tax paid by 
current working population as under the PAYG systems.  
 
But there is still political risk for the funded systems. For example, it is known that 
most funded pension systems have some elements of PAYG, e.g. the first pillar in the 
World Bank model, for the purpose of redistribution or risk diversification (discussed 
in next section). So largely depending on how large the reforming governments want 
the pillar of PAYG to be, there might be such a risk of increasing retirement age or 
changed benefit formula as well. In other words, the pillar of PAYG is basically 
unfunded and it might be used to redistribute wealth inter or intra generation as we 
discussed in Section 2.1.1.4. If any government is more concerned about wealth 
equality or it views a higher first pillar desirable, then given the ageing population, 
e.g. more retirees relative to working population, the government might try to increase 
statutory retirement age, or decrease pension benefits, etc. The consequence is the 
same as that under the PAYG systems, although the extent is smaller; the extent is 
dependant on how the reforming governments design the new pension systems, 
particularly the pillar having PAYG elements.   
 
Second, it is argued that government is poor at pension funds management, 
(Wohlstetter 1993), as many public pension managers, e.g. in the US are appointed by 
the government, thus they might always have political pressure to support local firms 
and engage in social responsible investing (Romano 1993); consequently, the rate of 
return is lower (Mitchell and Hsin 1997). Given this problem associated with pension 
funds’ public management, private management is argued to be better insulated from 
such political risk (World Bank 1994), which is also the basis of the World Bank 
model. But such lower political risk should be balanced with higher administration 
costs as we will discuss in section 2.2.3.3.3. In addition, James (1997) stresses that 
considerable regulations are needed to protect pension assets under the management 
of private managers who might be fraudulent. Meanwhile, the pension-reforming 
government might force private pension fund assets accumulated to be invested 
mainly in government bonds. An extreme case happened in the Argentina financial 
crisis when pension funds were forced to buy government bonds, which rapidly 
devalued.  
 
The regulatory capability regarding financial markets in general and fund 
management in particular in many countries particularly in the developing countries 
are quite weak (Vittas 2000). Even in the advanced countries, the difficulties of 
regulating individual accounts are discernable, e.g. the mis-selling controversy in the 
UK (Orszag and Stiglitz 1999). Given this argument, some authors maintain that some 
basic preconditions, in the areas of financial market, accounting practice, are needed 
before introducing private pension accounts17  (Mitchell 2000; Vittas 2000; Blake 
2003).    
 
                                                
17
 Many pension researchers agree that a minimal preconditions are required before the positive effects 
of pension reform towards funded systems could be realised (Vittas 2000, Blake 2003, Davis 1998c). 
Those preconditions, among others, include a sound banking sector, which is necessary for the 
settlement, clearing etc, and a strong insurance industry, which is needed in order to develop an annuity 
market (see Chapter 2 for detail).   
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2.2.3.3.2 Rate of return and risk
 
As of a mature PAYG system, the real rate of return is equal to the sum of population 
and productivity growth rates (Samuelson 1958), while the return for the funding 
systems is the market return, as the accumulated funded assets are invested in the 
market. Aaron (1996) outlines an inequality, well known as the “Aaron condition”, 
which is always quoted to compare funded and unfunded pension systems (see 
Appendix 1 for more details). If we assume that market return is r, wages g and labour 
n, then we have  
 
                             )1)(1(1 ngorr ++≥≤+                                                              (8) 
 
If r, g and n are only slightly different from 1, then equation 2 is reduced to  
              
                                      ngorr +≥≤                                                                       (9) 
 
Equation 9 is the mathematical expression of the “Aaron condition”.  
 
In words, if the market return, i.e. r is less than the sum of growth rates of wages and 
labour population – ng + , then funded systems are less advantageous than unfunded 
systems, e.g. PAYG. In contrast, if the market return is greater than the sum, funded 
systems are more beneficial.  
 
The current trend has been increasingly favouring the funded systems, in that g – 
growth of wages and particularly the n – population growth rate have dropped during 
the past decades across OECD countries and are expected to continue such trend in 
the following years in both advanced and many developing countries. Davis (1995) 
examines this issue across OECD countries while Steurer (2003) undertakes a detailed 
study using historic data from the US; Both authors confirm the benefit of transferring 
from unfunded systems to funded systems given the ageing population and higher rate 
of return of market investment.  
 
In addition, the assumption of dynamically efficient economy (Diamond 1965) holds 
that the real return on capital is always greater than the growth rate of wage bills, 
approximated to PAYG return (Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel 1997). Then, funded 
pension systems are preferred to PAYG schemes, especially given the current trend of 
declining population growth.   
 
But this argument is not immune to problems. First, even if PAYG does offer a lower 
return as shown from the historic data, it might also have a low covariance with other 
financial assets (Persson 2002), as the PAYG return is based on labour income tax. 
The advantage of this feature is that it diversifies a rational individual’s portfolio risk. 
Then, PAYG wealth might still be a desirable asset for the purpose of portfolio risk 
management. This argument can be used to justify the suggestion that any reformed 
new pension system should have at least some element of PAYG.  
 
Second, a simple rate of return comparison between PAYG and funded systems is 
misleading in that it does take into account the administration and transition costs 
(Orszag and Stiglitz 1999). Regarding administration costs as we will discuss shortly 
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in next section, normally state managed schemes, e.g. PAYG, are cheaper than private 
schemes.  
 
As concerns transition costs, if we assume that economy is dynamically efficient, 
there is no way to improve later generations’ welfare without making some or all 
future generations’ worse off. In other words, the “free lunch” to the first generation 
under PAYG systems is already given, and if we switch from unfunded to funded 
systems, this gift has to be paid anyway (Persson 2002). It could be paid by either 
double-taxing current working population, or explicitly recognising this implicit 
pension debt (IPD) (see Section 2.2.3.3.5 for detail of transition issues) by issuing 
government bonds. The latter approach is more fair in that this debt is smoothed over 
and borne by some or all future generations rather than the single current generation 
as the first one.  If such debt has to be paid by the current transition generations, it 
might have the risk of incurring political opposition.  
 
Third, based on the ‘market meltdown’ hypothesis18, Brooks (2000) agues that asset 
prices might go down if there is a smaller generation of investors for funded pensions 
to sell assets to given the trend of ageing population. Focusing on 7 industrial 
countries over the period of 1950-1999, Davis and Li (2003) find that proportion of 
aged 40-64 has positive effect on real stock prices and negative effect on real bond 
yields, both effects being statistically significant, while that of aged 65+ is found to be 
negatively linked to real stock prices and positively linked to real bond yields. 
Another cross-country study has been done by Cannon (2003), who uses dataset of 16 
developed countries over a longer period of 1900-199919. The author, however, does 
not find a strong association between demographics and returns of equities and bonds, 
thus making the market meltdown hypothesis problematic. A comparison as of these 
two studies is shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
A case study on the US is also conducted in Davis and Li (2003). They provide 
evidence that an increase of the aged 65+ cohort in the US does have downward 
pressure on both bond and equity prices. One important consequence of this finding 
relevant here is that any pension system with only a funded pillar can put retirees in 
the future under market risk, as pension assets are all invested in the markets which 
tend to go down in the long run. On the other hand, Porterba (2001) run regressions of 
US real returns on stocks, bonds and bills on demographic variables of different age 
groups, e.g. 20+, 40-64, etc over three different sample periods, i.e. 1926-1999, 1947-
1999 and 1926-1975. Overall, he finds that at a macro level in the US, there is less 
strong evidence than Davis and Li (2003) of a statistically significant relationship 
between demographic variables and asset returns.  
 
2.2.3.3.3 Administration costs
 
Despite privatised pension system’s benefits - which although are still arguable, one 
of this system’s main drawbacks is high administration costs. For example, Diamond 
(1993) points to this problem related to the Chilean pension reform and says such 
                                                
18
 Coined by Poterba (2001) the ’market meltdown’ hypothesis says when the baby boomers retire, 
there is a large amount of assets accumulated in their working period to be sold in the markets. The 
sell-off of these assets is to finance their consumption across retirement period.  
19
 In Cannon’s paper (2003), another estimation period from 1950-1999 was also used (see Tables 3 
and 4 for detail).  
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costs are even higher than the “inefficient” system that it replaced. Vales-Prieto 
(1994) estimates that Chile incurred 30.5 US dollars cost per pension affiliate 
annually while this cost is 15-20 dollars for the US and 24 dollars for Malaysia.  
 
In addition, Schmidt-Hebbel (1999b) finds that 34 per cent of AFP total revenue in 
Chile was eaten up by marketing costs in 1997, while this ratio was 10 per cent in 
1988. A large number of salespersons were hired by AFPs to lure contributors to 
change their affiliation, even in some illegal way, e.g. false signature. In Chile, 
pension fund providers offer free gifts to those people switching pension suppliers. 
This problem, however, is not unique to Chile, as high-pressure sales tactics have also 
been used by salespersons in the UK to persuade members of occupational pension 
schemes (especially older long serving members) to switch to inappropriate personal 
pension schemes (Blake 1997).  
 
Another international comparison study by Whitehouse (2000) shows that Bolivia and 
Australia have the lowest charge ratio20, while many Latin American countries, e.g. 
Mexico and Chile have much higher ratios. For example, this ratio is 9.8 per cent for 
Bolivia, 26 per cent for Mexico and 18 per cent for Chile (See Table 5 for details). 
One major contributing factor is the different pension funds management systems. 
Note that Bolivia is a pioneer in selecting pension funds managers through 
international auction in order to minimise asset management fees (Gersdorff 1997).  
 
In addition, for the second pillar of Swedish pension systems, i.e. the privately 
managed Defined contribution pillar, the Swedish government set up the “clearing 
house” which keeps all the individual accounts of individual shares and fund share 
values; the main purpose of it is to reduce administration costs (Palmer 2000). In 
addition, the Premium Pension Authority (PPA) was established in 1998. One of its 
core responsibilities is to enter into contracts and negotiate aggregate purchases with 
participating funds. Therefore, given the benefits resulting from the economies of 
scale and better bargaining power administration costs will be reduced significantly in 
comparison with other pension administration systems, like that in Chile. 
 
In view of the criticism of defined contribution individual accounts of social security 
systems, James et al (2002) argue that by operating in the institutional markets, e.g. 
where small individual accounts are aggregated into large blocks of money and 
managed on a centralised basis, individual accounts pension systems can achieve most 
of the cost advantages of centralised funds but with the additional merit of greater 
political insulation and responsiveness to workers’ preference. It is a cost effective 
intermediate option in that a single nationally centralised fund, like the Employees 
Provident Fund in Malaysia has problems of asset misallocation while the individual 
retail market, e.g. the practice in most Latin American countries incurs substantial 
administration costs. As for the UK pension fund markets, Blake (2000) raises the 
issue of economies of scale as well, and recommends the government keep the cost 
down, e.g. by establishing a central clearing house to channel contributions in the case 
of DC schemes.  
 
                                                
20
 The charge ratio is defined as one minus the ratio of the accumulated pension assets net of charges to 
the accumulation assets without charges (Whitehouse 2000).  
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2.2.3.3.4 Annuity markets
 
Current pension reforms largely focus on the accumulation phase (James and Vittas 
1999a), i.e. how to ensure sufficient money is accumulated for the post-retirement 
period. This is understandable as it is an immediate concern, while the decumulation 
of capital in workers’ saving accounts seems to be far away in the future, especially 
when old people are normally excluded from participating the new pension schemes. 
But as pension reforms progress, the second stage of reforms requires the government 
to pay attention to the issue of eventual decumulation, as one of the main objectives of 
the pension system is to provide pensioners with sufficient incomes. 
 
There are a number of payout/decumulation options available for pensioners (Valdes-
Prieto 1998) among which are lump sum payment, programmed withdrawals and 
annuity from an insurance company. But given the potential problems associated with 
the first two options, e.g. people may dissipate their lump sum payment, the third 
might be the only form of financial contract which avoids longevity risk and 
guarantees income right up to the point of death (Davis 2002a). Annuities markets 
play a major role in pension reforms in that they, under defined contribution schemes, 
provide a good substitute for social security and occupation defined benefits funds.   
 
Annuities markets, however, are still poorly developed in most countries, even in 
advanced OECD countries (James and Vittas 1999b). The underdevelopment 
manifests itself in such ways as a) small size relative to other kinds of insurance; b) 
absence of mortality tables, etc. Contributing factors include worker myopia, the 
precautionary and bequest motives for saving and the crowding effect by generous 
social security, etc. (James and Vittas 1999a; Vittas and Skully 1991). In addition, as 
we discussed in Section 2.1.1.1, indexed annuities do not exist in many countries. 
Therefore ideal payment methods, i.e. inflation protected retirement payment could 
not be offered in most countries.  
 
Meanwhile, Davis (2002a) highlights the increasing credit risk and broader systemic 
risk in annuities markets, for example, the double gearing between banks and 
insurance companies and book value accounting in Japan. Similar difficulties of life 
insurers are also existent in other OECD countries, e.g. Italy and France (IMF 2002a). 
Therefore, “macroprudential indicators” (IMF 2002b) like those developed for 
banking industry are much needed for insurance companies.  
 
2.2.3.3.5 Transition issue
 
A big problem associated with the transition from unfunded systems, e.g. PAYG to 
funded systems, e.g. the World Bank model is the high level of implicit pension debt 
(IPD) in some countries. IPD is accumulated and made explicit in that under PAYG 
systems, contributions from current working population are normally used to pay 
pensions of current retirees with no funds/assets set aside; in consequence, once 
PAYG is terminated, the government, which has promised to provide benefits to 
pensioners faces the problem of observable pension debts, as contributions under new 
funded schemes have to be credited to individual accounts with property rights and no 
longer be able to be used to pay current pensioners’ retirement benefits.  
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There are a number of different definitions of pension liabilities, among which three 
main ones are identified by Holzmann (1998) and Holzmann et al (2004). The first 
one is accrued-to-date liabilities, which refers to the present value (PV) of pension 
liabilities accrued to a particularly date; future contributions from both current 
workers and new entrants to job markets are not included. The second one is current 
workers and pensioner’s liabilities. As shown by the name, it includes the PV of 
liabilities accrued to a particular date by current workers and pensioners, but new 
entrants are not considered. The logical next step is to include the PV of liabilities of 
new entrants besides current workers and pensioners, which then is the last definition 
noted by Holzmann (1998). 
 
Due to the varying definitions and the resulting methodologies, international estimates 
of pension liabilities across countries differ a lot. Largely in view of this problem, 
Holzmann et al (2004) design a standardized method of calculating IPD, which is 
justified on the ground that, among others, projections of many future variables, e.g. 
projected coverage rate, are not required, thus avoiding questionable/arbitrary 
assumptions. Based on this definition and a corresponding methodology, the estimates 
of IPD are quite large for all 35 developing countries but there is a huge difference. 
For example, based on a 5 per cent discount rate, IPD as a percentage of GDP is 275 
per cent for Brazil, while it is 26 per cent for Morocco. But when using 2 per cent as a 
discount rate, these two figures become 500 and 50 respectively.  
 
If the IPD is large, the next step is to seek a way to reduce or eliminate it. How to 
finance this huge amount of IPD has provoked a wide discussion and research. In 
general, there are two ways, i.e. debt financing and tax financing which in turn 
consists of income tax and consumer tax. If tax financing is used, then the issue of 
double burden arises where the transition generation pays twice (Davis 1995), once 
for existing pensioners via PAYG and once for their own pensions via prefunding. 
The magnitude of the double burden, however, could be mitigated if pension reform is 
followed by improving economic externalities (Holzmann 1998), e.g. less labour 
market distortion and higher saving rate as discussed in Section 2.2.3.1 and more 
developed financial markets as in Section 2.2.3.2.  
 
In addition, Valdes-Prieto (1997) argues that a shift from PAYG to a funded system 
does not necessarily impose a double burden on the transition generation. In a steady 
state, an increase in government expenditure following the pension transition must be 
matched by some sources, i.e. the cash flow from the pension institution. Then in 
order to keep the accounting identity of the pension system, either pension 
contributions need to be decreased or pension payments are raised. The second option 
is rejected by Valdes-Prieto in that it vulnerable to political interference. The first 
option is appropriate where contributions are decreased, then workers are supposed to 
have more take-home salary, but in order to keep the accounting identity of the 
pension system again, the government might levy higher taxes, which can be set to 
match the budget worsening following pension transition from PAYG to funding 
systems.   
 
2.2.3.3.6 Corporate governance
 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms 
assure themselves of obtaining a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny 
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1997). In the past the dispersal of ownership rights in public corporations made 
collective action problematic as it is very difficult and/or costly to aggregate dispersed 
shareholders to assume the role of corporate monitoring. The current trend regarding 
corporate governance, given the rapid growth of pension funds, is toward direct 
control via equity where the institutional investors, including pension funds, mutual 
funds and insurance companies play an increasing important role (Davis and Steil 
2001).  
 
Given that some of traditional corporate governance strategies have drawbacks, for 
example takeovers are costly and managers focus on only short-term targets if they 
have stock-option based compensation, Clark and Hebb (2002) identify four drivers 
which facilitate pension funds’ corporate engagement and even foreshadow the 
emergence of Fifth Capitalism Stage, particularly based on the increasing role pension 
funds play in corporate governance. The four drivers are as follows: The first driver is 
the wide use of indexation techniques in pension funds industry which disenables exit 
from underperforming companies which are in the index. The second driver is the 
increasing demand by owners for more transparency and accountability, particularly 
after Enron and Worldcom scandals. Third, pension funds’ pressure to undertake 
socially responsible investing (SRI). Fourth, pressures to humanize capital with social, 
moral and political objectives extend pension funds’ simple concerns of long-term 
rate of return.   
 
Corporate governance, however, is argued to be mainly an issue for large and defined 
benefit public sector pension funds (Clark and Hebb 2002, 2004), e.g. the California 
Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) in the US and the Universities 
Superannuation Schemes (USS) in the UK, in addition to many operative large private 
DB schemes21. The main reason is that they can and have aggregated huge amount of 
assets which then are able to be used as bargaining power to implement corporate 
engagement in the financial markets. For small pension funds, however, it might be 
more sensible and economically efficient to sell shares if not satisfied with firms’ 
performance. In addition, objectives of private-sector pension funds may differ, given 
they are more likely to have different mandates, and consequently investment 
strategies. Meanwhile, it is due to the fact that this type of fund, i.e. the fund of 
similar size of CalPERS, has never accounted for a significant proportion of all 
pension funds in the reality, and together with other counter-arguments (Blair 2002 
and Orzag 2002), Engelan (2002) argues that pension fund model proposed by Clark 
and Hebb (2002), i.e. the dominating position of pension funds in the context of 
emerging fifth capitalism, is “little more than a fairy tale”.  
 
In addition, it has been noted that the current trend is a shift from defined benefit 
schemes to defined contribution schemes, which almost certainly reduces the average 
size of pension funds (Blair 2002), in that under DC schemes, pension fund assets are 
typically individually managed by dispersed fund managers. It is very difficult, if not 
impossible to accumulate billions of assets, like CalPERS under one single fund22. 
Therefore, some commentator has argued that besides other reasons, one main reason 
                                                
21
 One issue is that private firms do not expect to have a very large DB scheme, in that if the DB 
scheme is too large and active, private firms might be prone to possible retaliation, as well as corporate 
engagement from the shemes. This is what private firms always try to avoid.  
22
 Although it is worth noting that in the US some large defined contribution schemes do exist, e.g. 
TIAA-CREF.  
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which drives current wide shift from DB plans to DC plans, is the dislike of 
corporations and executives. In other words, corporate people who do not like pension 
fund activisms hope to use DC plans to erode investor powers by breading up large 
pension funds.  
 
DC fund managers are always private firms, which means that they might be less 
interested in corporate engagement and social responsible investing (SRI) at large, 
and more concerned about financial targets than large public state pension funds. 
Therefore, buying and selling shares in stock markets might be a more appropriate 
choice for them, particularly when they are subject to performance assessment on a 
regular basis from trustees, and investment risk becomes borne by employees, rather 
by the plan sponsor.  
 
Also, it is often asserted that in the US in that many public pension funds managers 
have no proven skills in management and no experience at selecting directors 
(Wohlstetter 1993). This case will be worse if pension managers are appointed by the 
government, then they might always have political pressure to support local firms and 
engage in social responsible investing (Romano 1993). For example, the public 
managed funds - Public Employee Retirement Systems (PERS) in the US, are 
mentioned by Mitchell and Hsin (1997) that they operate according to principles 
different from the private sector. Regarding the private pension fund assets, managers 
act based on financial criteria, i.e. maximising funds value, but due to the regular 
performance checks (Davis and Steil 2001), they may not care too much about a 
firm’s long term performance. If they are not satisfied with underperforming firms, 
they can simply leave the firm by selling shares.   
 
Woikdtke (2002) and Coronado et al (2003) do provide evidence that pension funds 
operated by local and state governments in the US achieved lower rate of return than 
private pension funds, and they contribute the lower return to the political intervention 
regarding funds investment strategies.  
 
In response to the criticism of public pension funds’ management, Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999) find that public pension funds activism in the US is in line with the 
objective of pension funds value maximisation, i.e. fund activists do not pursue 
objectives other than maximising beneficiary wealth, although they give evidence that 
there is heterogeneity in fund objectives and concrete tactics employed between 
different pension funds. In addition, Smith (1996) studies pension funds activism 
sponsored by CalPERS (California Public Employees Retirement System), and finds 
that the initial public announcement of targeting by CalPERS has an insignificant 
impact on stock prices, but during the period of initial and public announcement and 
the official public announcement of the outcome of the targeting, there is significant 
rise in stock prices. Moreover, a more extensive empirical research by Wahal (1996) 
who analyses firms targeted from 1987 to 1993 by a broad sample including not only 
CalPERS, but also eight other pension funds, suggests that firm performance in terms 
of long-term stock price and accounting measures was negative during both before 
and post targeting. But one of his earlier studies finds that institutions with the efforts 
to promote organisational change bring gains in share prices.  
 
A Event study (Prevost and Rao 2000) on only these firms which had been targeted by 
public pension funds rather than the coalition of both public pension funds and other 
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institutions and even interested individuals, shows that such firms which are targeted 
only once have better long term performance than those firms which are subject to 
repeated targeting. This conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis that targeting 
indicates a sign of reluctance by management to negotiate a settlement with the 
activist pension funds, therefore one-time targeted firms are able to take appropriate – 
performance enhancing - actions to avoid future targeting, while multi-targeted firms 
are not.  
 
In contrast to extensive research in the US where most of existing empirical work on 
pension funds’ engagement in corporate governance is conducted, research on other 
countries are quite few. Pension funds in the UK despite the big size of holdings are 
not known for the activism and have been criticised of not willing to monitor the 
governance of corporate they invest in (Myners 2001; FT 2003). Faccio and Lasfer 
(2001) suggest that occupational pension funds holdings in the UK destroy firm value, 
for example the Tobin Q ratio – the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of 
debt over total assets - decreases around 0.04 per cent with the presence of pension 
fund holdings than without. In addition, pension funds in the UK do not push 
companies to split the roles of chairman and CEO as recommended by Cadbury 
(1992) as sign of good corporate governance.  
 
Regarding the relationship between pension funds holdings and long term stock price 
performance, Faccio and Lasfer find that for the over-performers, defined as firms 
whose Tobin Q ratios are higher than the median, mean industry adjusted share price 
return decreased from 62.66 per cent to 18.59 per cent, while this figure increased 
from –38.96 per cent to 10.25 per cent for under-performers. The differential impacts, 
although surprising, could be explained in such way that share holding by 
occupational pension funds has negative effect on over-performers but a positive 
effect on under-performers. However, it could also be argued that the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis of mean reversion23 and have nothing to do with the 
pension funds holding (Wahal 1996). In other words, there is no a statistically 
significant association between pension funds holding and stock prices.    
 
There is some evidence of institutional investors activism and the increasing 
concentration of shareholdings in Italy (Scatigana 2001). For example, among 221 
holdings which is larger than 1 per cent, around 60 per cent are concentrated in the 
hands of five Italian fund managers, which is conducive to the development of 
pension funds activism, but the negative side is that among 221 shareholdings, only 4 
are independent fund managers with the rest being affiliated to bank or insurance 
groups. This is seen as a big obstacle to the development of pension funds activism, as 
pension funds compared with other stakeholders e.g. banks, are still impotent. It 
should be noted that banks have different interests to pension funds. In general, banks 
might be more concerned about credit claims rather than profitability.  
 
Although empirical results are not strongly in favour of pension funds’ beneficial 
impact on corporate governance, financial regulators and commentators support 
                                                
23
 The hypothesis of mean reversion is a competing theory to that of random walk. Based on the 
former, stock prices have tendency to return to their trend path over time, so investors might be able to 
forecast future returns by analysing past information. In contrast, according to the random walk 
hypothesis, there is no way for an analyst to predict future share prices as the price level does not have 
such a tendency to return to its trend path over time.  
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pension fund activism, particularly after the Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat scandals. 
But, should corporate governance activism be mandated? In the UK Myners’s report 
(2001), it is recommended that pension fund activism should be included in fund 
management mandates, as in the US where The Department of Labour (1994) 
legislates that activism – where it might add value to the shareholders – is part of the 
fiduciary duty of an investment manager. In addition, Myners recommends that such 
activism should in due course be more clearly incorporated into UK law. This might 
reflect Myners’s dissatisfaction about institutions’ engagement in the corporate 
governance issue of investee companies on a voluntary basis, and show his intention 
to remind pension funds of their obligations to vote, rather than walking away by 
selling shares. A more recent report conducted by UK Investment Management 
Association (IMA) (2004), however, reveals that UK large institutions have actively 
and seriously engaged in the issue of corporate governance. For example, it is found 
that all 33 large fund managers surveyed (as of June 2003) had a policy statement on 
how they discharge their responsibilities on behalf of trustees, and all managers with 
corporate engagement as an integrated part of their investment process monitored and 
interacted with investee companies on an ongoing basis.   
 
Pension funds’ activism at a firm level is well documented as we reviewed above, 
although micro studies on it are largely focused on the US. Davis (2002c; 2003d) 
argues that complementary studies at the macro level is needed in that effects of 
governance initiatives from institutions may go wider than “target firms”, so 
institution holdings may have implications on the whole economy. For example, 
although pension funds activism has direct impact on targeted firms, it might also be 
able to affect the non-targeted firms as unaffected firms have incentives to improve 
their performance so as to avoid a threat from pension funds in the future (Marsh 
1990). This point might be used to explain why we will not easily find a difference 
between targeted and non-targeted firms when facing pension fund activism. 
Therefore, if a significant proportion of firms, directly affected and indirectly 
affected, in one economy tends to improve better corporate governance and 
performance, the overall effect might be higher economic growth and productivity for 
the whole economy.  
 
Second, financial theory – Clientele effect (Miller and Modigliani 1961) – suggest 
that high tax bracket shareholders prefer the firm to invest more and receive less 
dividend payment, while low tax bracket shareholders (e.g. pension funds) would 
prefer less investment and more of dividend payout (Masulis and Trueman 1988). But 
this lack of unanimity can be solved somehow if investors can self-select into 
appropriate clienteles, for example, low tax investors, e.g. pension funds purchase 
shares of high-dividend firms and vice versa (Copeland and Weston 1992). The 
consequence of this practice is that research using micro data might not find it easy to 
identify the true association between pension funds and dividend/investment policy; 
in other words, an ostensible positive relation between pension funds and dividend 
payout at a micro level might be due to the pension funds’ self-selection into these 
clientele which prefer high dividend firms rather than pension funds leading to higher 
dividend payment. Therefore, again, one way to get around this limitation is to use 
macro data.  
 
With the help of econometric modelling, Davis (2002c) using macro data reveals that 
a higher share of institutional investors in total equity, especially pension funds and 
 46
insurance companies, tend to boost dividends payment across both Anglo-Saxon 
countries and Continental Europe and Japan (CEJ), although the effects differ, while 
fixed investment is reduced in Anglo-Saxon countries, and this result is mixed for 
Continental Europe and Japan. Despite the effects’ differences in some circumstances 
between Anglo-Saxon countries and CEJ, Davis (2003c) argues that it should not be 
overstressed as some factors, e.g. the emergence of EMU have been driving CEJ to 
converge to Anglo-Saxon systems.  
 
To our knowledge, it is the only empirical work of this kind available at the moment, 
so more research is needed; for example, more data about emerging market economies 
(EMEs) could be used to complement findings derived from only advanced countries, 
and to test whether pension funds’ impacts on OECD countries and EMEs are 
homogenous. In addition, abstracting from the statistical linkage between pension 
assets and economic growth via corporate governance, a serious investigation is 
needed as to whether there is a Granger causality relationship between pensions and 
growth.  
 
2.2.3.3.7 Banking industry
 
The banking industry has been argued to be positively linked to economic growth and 
financial development, while pension reform may influence banks’ role. A recent 
comparative study by Barth et al (2004) shows that higher income countries always 
have a larger banking industry which is proxied by Bank assets to GDP. For example, 
the average ratio of Bank assets/GDP for high income countries was 343.66 per cent, 
and this figure was 91.26 per cent, 79.94 per cent and 52.34 per cent for upper middle 
income, lower upper income and lower income countries respectively.  
 
Cross-country and panel studies on the issue of association between banking industry 
and economic growth are extensively conducted by researchers, notably Beck and 
Levine (2004), Beck et al (2000) and Levine and Zervos (1998) etc. Among the 
commonly used banking indicators are bank assets to GDP, private credit provided by 
deposit money bank assets to GDP, commercial bank asset to central bank assets, etc. 
On balance, both standard cross-country and more recent panel analysis confirm a 
positive correlation between banking, finance and the economy, allowing for not only 
the traditional determinants of GDP growth, such as the initial school enrolment rate 
(Beck and Levine 2004; Levine and Zeros 1998), but also the legal origins (Beck et al 
2003a), endowment indicators, religious composition, etc (Beck et al 2003b).  
 
The banking sector is important, but since the 1980s, OECD countries have witnessed 
the pattern of relative decline of banking (Davis 2000a). For example, as a share of 
financial claims, the volume of deposit and loans has declined while the interest 
margins narrowed, although Kaufman and Mote (1994) conclude that there is little 
evidence of an absolute decline in banking taking into account banks’ non-interest 
income. In addition, as the descriptive statistics indicate in our Part two, there is little 
sign that banking industry is diminishing relative to GDP.  
 
The relative decline of banking since 1980s might be due to the competition from 
institutional investors. For example, on the liability side, banks have faced strong 
competition from mutual funds in some countries, e.g. US. mutual funds play a very 
important role in the US retirement market. Mutual fund share of the US retirement 
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market24 in 2002 was 21 per cent at the order of $2,082bn, while mutual funds made 
up 46 per cent of total IRA assets in the same year (ICI 2003). Mutual funds, given its 
leaner cost structures can offer a higher return, e.g. due to no capital reserve 
requirement, is obviously attractive to households. New technology also has helped 
mutual funds to challenge banks’ role in facilitating payments. For example, the cash 
management accounts offered by mutual funds in the US allow individuals to deposit 
their salaries and make routine payments (Allen and Santomero 2001). Therefore, 
there is a clear sign that mutual funds are becoming a challenging substitute for 
banking liabilities.  
 
In addition, on the asset side, institutional investors have broadened the scope of 
borrowing options for corporations, then these latter realise that it might be more 
convenient and cheaper to finance projects via securities markets than via loans. A 
number of studies (Holzmann 1997) show that corporate bond issuance has increased 
significantly since 1981 when Chile started its pension reform. On the one hand, 
pension funds need new investment instruments, like corporate bonds; on the other 
hand, firms might find it is cheaper to issue debt in the securities markets than 
borrowing from banks (Davis 2000b)25. A three-country comparison study by Schmidt 
et al (1999) gives evidence that households’ claims on banks as a proportion of total 
financial assets has fallen across all three countries – France, Germany and the UK. 
Also, Byrne and Davis (2002) reach the same conclusion that the bank deposits 
holdings in the household’s portfolio have declined significantly for EU-4 countries, 
i.e. the UK, Germany, France and Italy, while holdings of life and pensions assets 
have increased a lot during the period of 1980 – 2000.    
 
In view of increasing competition from institutional investors, banks in many 
countries have taken steps to prosper nonetheless (Davis and Steil 2001; Allen and 
Santomero 2001), e.g. by focusing on off-balance-sheet and fee earning activity and 
cutting costs. The underlying strategy is to develop new lines of business so as to 
compensate for the declining business in traditional intermediation. Davis and Tuori 
(2000) suggest that banks across OECD countries have increased their fee-earning 
ability. For example, the ratio of non-interest income/asset increased from 0.9 per cent 
in 1984-1987 to 1.0 per cent in 1992-1995 for EU countries, while this figure was 1.3 
and 2.1 for the US.  
 
In addition, banks have comparative advantages which are likely to be durable, e.g. 
the importance of bank lending relationships to small firms (Hannan 1991). This point 
is important in that pension funds, e.g. in the UK have shown reluctance to invest in 
                                                
24
 In the US, total retirement market is consist of IRAs, defined contribution plans, state and local 
government employee retirement funds, private defined benefit plans, federal defined benefit plans and 
annuities (ICI 2003). At the year-end of 2002, total asset is $10,150bn.  
25
 The increasing popularity of securitization has eroded banking industry on the assets side as well, 
although it is worth noting that it only reflects the balance sheet size, not necessarily the profitability.  
The transformation of mortgage is particularly relevant here. Traditionally, mortgages were originated 
and financed by the bank until it was paid by the households. But now the mortgage can be originated 
by one firm and then financed by another firm which then aggregates different mortgages into one large 
pool. The most innovative step here is that the firm partitions the expected cash flow from this pool 
into marketable securities which then are sold to the investors in the securities markets. The 
consequence of this mortgage securitization is lower cost from the mortgagee’s point of view and 
bank’s deteriorating role in financing. Institutional investors, including pension fudns, mutual funds, 
etc have play an important role in the rapid development of securitisation.  
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small firms which although have higher expected return than blue chip companies 
(Davis and Steil 2001). Therefore, it is argued that banking industry, is in a state of 
evolution rather than outright decline (Davis 2002a), and will continue playing an 
important role in modern financial systems.  
 
Due to different financial systems, risk management techniques adopted in the 
banking industry vary across Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries and 
Japan (henceforth CEJ) (Allen and Santomero 2001; Allen and Gale 2001). Based on 
the model designed by Allen and Gale (1997), banks in the CEJ, notably Germany, 
France and Japan, due to lack of strong competition from financial markets, e.g. 
mutual funds in the US, can build up a ‘buffer’ during good times by paying less 
while running down this buffer when times are bad, known as intertemporal 
smoothing or time series risk sharing. This theory explains why households in the CEJ 
hold large proportion of assets in liquid and low risk assets, which might be viewed as 
the sign and one of factors contributing to banking’s declining in CEJ.  
 
On the contrary, individuals in the Anglo-Saxon countries, e.g. the US and the UK 
can bear more risk by investing more in equity via cross-sectional risk sharing. In 
order to meet this end, banks have to employ financial engineering techniques, e.g. 
swaps and options to share risks among individuals at a given point of time. If they 
are not serious about risk management and do not undertake cross-sectional risk 
sharing, it is more likely that individuals would withdraw assets from banks and 
invest in financial markets which are to be more developed in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries than CEJ.  
 
Following the competition e.g. from institutional investors, banks have managed to 
prosper as we discussed above. But is competition always good? The conventional 
view is that there is a trade-off between competition and financial instability, i.e. 
competition is desirable but excessive competition might lead to financial instability. 
Therefore, given the massive and visible loss arising from financial instability26 to the 
economy, policy makers always favour concentration, thus financial stability at the 
expense of competition policy27. For example, Beck et al (2003) with a dataset from 
79 countries give evidence that countries with higher banking concentration are less 
likely to incur banking crisis. Theoretical work by Boyd and De Nicolo (2003) shows 
that the traditional wisdom of a trade-off between competition and instability fails to 
identify two fundamental incentive mechanisms, which induces banks to take more 
risk if the markets are concentrated.  
 
Allen and Gale (2004), however, argue that the nature of the trade-off between 
competition and financial stability is more complicated than was conventionally 
perceived. For example, they use 6 theoretical models to identify the relationship 
between competition and financial stability. Some models, e.g. contagion model are 
consistent with the view of this trade-off relation, while others, e.g. a general 
equilibrium model, suggest the co-existence of perfect competition and financial 
                                                
26
 A cross country study by Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) shows that on average, the output loss 
following financial instability is 15-25 per cent of GDP. In addition, this loss would be much larger if a 
twin banking/currency crisis occurs together, the cost of which is around 23 per cent of GDP.  
27
 It might be argued, however, that concentration and competition can co-exist. The underlying 
rationale is that competition from institutionalisation leads to bank concentration, as the latter is willing 
to achieve the economies of scale.   
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instability to ensure optimal efficiency, thus denying the conventional view of trade-
off.   
 
In addition, it has been argued that banking competition, for example, following the 
emergence of EMU as well as institutionalism (Davis and Steil 2001), has a two-fold 
impact. On the one hand, a more efficient banking systems could come, which then is 
beneficial to the financial markets and economic growth via efficient capital 
allocation. On the other hand, financial systems might be prone to crisis, for example 
because banks start to seek more profitable but risky business or due to banks’ 
exposure to non.-bank financial intermediaries e.g. hedge funds which are not subject 
to regulatory requirement (ECB 1999). Moreover, it has been noted that the wide use 
of financial derivatives is conducive to financial instability and difficulty of financial 
monitoring and regulation (Large 2004). Greenspan (2003), however, points out that 
“the use of a growing array of derivatives and the related application of more 
sophisticated methods for measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning 
the enhanced resilience of our largest financial intermediaries”.  
 
Empirical work by Davis and Tuori (2000) reveals that institution competition pushes 
banks towards non-interest income. Meanwhile, they find that small banks in the EU 
have less ability to earn fee related income than large banks, then they tend to hold 
more risky assets, the consequence of which might be increased financial instability. 
They also argue that non-interest income is more stable than interest income in most 
EU countries, but this story is different in the US where non-interest income is more 
volatile. For example, the standard deviation of the ratio of non-interest income/assets 
was 0.35 while it was 0.19 for the ratio of net interest income/assets. Similar results 
are also presented by Schuermann (2004) for the period of 1997-2002. The 
differential volatilities related to interest and non-interest revenue might have 
implication of financial instability if the trend toward non-income earning activities 
will continue in a long term.  
 
Institutionalisation, i.e. growth of institutional investors, has been argued to affect 
banking industry in various ways as shown above, but to what extent this effect is and 
detailed across-countries econometric studies are open to answer and undertake. In 
particularly, is the impact of institutional investors on banking industry homogeneous 
across countries? In addition, what are the long run and short run effects and are they 
same? 
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3 Empirical work 
 
 
In Section 2, we reviewed the relationships between pension reform, pension funds, 
economic growth and financial development in a context of composing a PAYG 
system and the World Bank Model. In this part, we aim to empirically analyse 
whether the hypothesised relations exist and if so, to what extent.  
 
Empirical work in this area is well documented, but their research scope is limited to 
either developed countries or Latin American countries, notably Chile (Holzmann 
1997). Our study intends to put them together and include more countries as well as 
more indicators to cover both economic and financial implications.   
 
Second, many researchers confuse pension reform and pension funds. These two 
concepts are closely linked (for example, most pension reforms introduced funded 
elements which are argued to promote pension fund assets), but not identical. In other 
words, pension reform does not simultaneously mean pension fund growth, 
particularly for some reforms, like defined contribution PAYG systems, while in other 
cases, asset growth is very slow. But it might be argued that pension reform provides 
people with the expectation that pension funds will increase. Therefore, in this study, 
we separate these two concepts i.e. pension reform and pension funds, and investigate 
their contributions to economic growth and financial development separately.  
 
Third, this study intends to identify pensions’ impacts on various aspects of growth 
and finance. For example, regarding the economic implications, we seek to look at not 
only the indirect linkage, e.g. via productivity, investment and savings, but also the 
direct link by introducing variables, like the GDP growth rate. As of stock markets, 
we use variables of market capitalisation, stock turnover and total value traded, 
looking at the size, liquidity and efficiency aspects.   
 
Fourth, we use various econometric specifications, e.g. panel error correction model 
and an extension of panel Granger causality tests to observe the long run and short run 
relations. For the latter methodology, i.e. Granger causality test, our estimation can 
increase statistical significance by pooling observations, which we argue is an 
improvement on the recent work by Impavido et al (2003).   
 
Last, in this study, we use a dataset covering 72 countries, including both OECD 
countries and emerging market economies (EMEs). This dataset to our knowledge is 
larger than that used in most current literature, e.g. in Walker and Lefort (2002). With 
more data in hand, we hope estimation results will be more robust and accurate.  
 
The rest of this part is split into three sections. The first section presents estimation 
results of pension reform’s impact on economic growth, then the second section 
focuses on the estimations between pension fund assets and economic growth, and the 
third section deals with the results of pension funds assets’ effect on financial 
markets. Within each section, we show data sources, variables, econometric 
specifications and results in sequence.   
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3.1 Pension reform’s impact on economic growth 
 
3.1.1 Data and variables 
 
In this study, we mainly use macro-economic and financial data from a panel of 59 
countries, where we have 38 EMEs and 21 OECD countries over the period of 1960 – 
2001. As for EMEs, 19 are defined as no reform countries and the rest are reform 
countries towards World Bank model, while regarding the 21 OECD countries, 13 are 
non-reform countries and 8 reform ones (see Table 6 for country details)28 . By 
passing, it is worth noting that totally in this paper we used 72 countries, which, 
however, are not necessarily included in every estimation, i.e. different estimations 
used different groups of countries (see Appendix 2 for detail). In order to consider 
pension reform impact’s heterogeneity, we naturally group them into a) All countries 
with table heading - All, b) OECD countries with heading - OECD and c) Emerging 
market economies with heading - EMEs, which are in turn estimated separately.  
 
All data are obtained directly from World Development Indicators 2003 (WDI) 
database and the Financial Structure and Economic Development database (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2003). But there are two exceptions. First, the private 
saving rate is obtained from Loayza, Lopez, Serven and Schmidt-Hebbel (LLSS) 
(1998), where they have a dataset covering 150 countries and spanning 1960 – 1995.  
 
Second, like most studies on growth accounting, total factor productivity growth rate 
(TFPGR) is calculated, based on a transcendental logarithmic (translog) production 
function as shown below (OECD 1997): 
 
1
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                                      (10) 
 
Y, output. GDP measured at 1995 constant prices.  
K, input of capital. Measured as the capital stock29. 
L, input of labour. Defined as the total population. 
TFPGR, total factor productivity growth rate. 
lθ
 and kθ , shares of capital and labour input respectively. Assumed to be 1/3 for 
capital input and 2/3 for labour input here30, which is consistent with Davis (2003a). 
 
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the extent to which pension reform 
towards funded systems independently affects economic growth, we use 6 economic 
indicators; total factor productivity growth rate (TFPGR), GDP growth rate 
(GDPGR), gross fixed capital formation/GDP (GFCFGDP), private saving rate 
(private saving/gross national disposable income) (PSR), gross domestic saving/GDP 
(GDSGDP) and gross national saving/GDP (GNSGDP).  
                                                
28
 In addition, in Appendix 2, countries used in our 7 different estimations are detailed in greater length.  
29
 Capital stock is calculated based on the perpetual inventory method. Consistent with Luintel and 
Khan (1999), we used an 8 per cent depreciation rate and averaged the first 3-year growth rate to obtain 
the initial capital stock.  
30
 In fact, a more accurate method is to estimate the share of labour input as the wage compensation as 
a fraction of GDP at current factor cost, while the share of capital input is the complement of the share 
of labour (OECD 1997). 
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The TFP growth rate is calculated based on Equation 10 above and captures the 
residual contribution which is not due to capital and labour input factors. The GDP 
growth rate is included here to complement current pension literature whereby this 
indicator normally is dismissed, i.e. to look at the relationship between pension reform 
and growth per se. gross fixed capital formation is also called gross domestic 
investment, comprising the growth in fixed assets of the economy. The private saving 
rate is residually derived by subtracting government saving from national saving 
(LLSS 1998). Gross domestic saving is calculated as GDP less final consumption 
expenditure, while gross national saving is equal to gross domestic saving plus net 
income and net current transfers from abroad (WDI 2003).  
 
Regarding the explanatory variables, we employ many indicators under different 
headings as shown in Table 7. The inflation rate (INFL) and real interest rate (INT) 
are used to proxy macro-economic conditions. INFL is measured by the annual 
percentage change in the GDP, while INT is the real interest rate, i.e. nominal interest 
rate minus inflation rate. Also, we include GDP per capita (GDPPC) to measure the 
level of development, and initial value of GDP per capita (I_GDPPC) to control for 
convergence; in other words, rich countries are expected to grow less fast than poor 
countries.  
 
In addition, we use four indicators to proxy financial development. One is liquid 
liabilities to GDP (LIQUID), equal to currency and interest-bearing liabilities of 
banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP, and another one is domestic 
credit provided by the banking industry (CREDIT), equal to claims on both private 
and public sectors by deposit money banks divided by GDP. These two indicators are 
used to measure the size and activity of financial intermediaries (Beck, Bemirguc-
Kunt and Levine 2003). The rest two variables are stock market capitalisation to GDP 
(STKCAP) and stock market total traded to GDP (STKTRD).   
 
We include some other variables in our regressions for savings. POP15 is the 
proportion of people aged 15 – 64 to total population, while POP65 is that of people 
aged 65+ to total population. In addition, URBN is the urbanisation rate, i.e. the urban 
population as percentage of total population (Samwick 1999, Loayza et al 2000).  
 
Last, YR is a time trend variable to proxy years-since-reform, e.g. 1 for the year of 
1981 for Chile, 2 for 1982, etc. YR is used to look at the independent effects of 
pension reform on various dependent variables (See Table 7 for all variable details).  
 
3.1.2 Econometric specification  
 
In this subsection, we seek to find the impact of social security systems’ transition 
from PAYG schemes towards the World Bank model31 on economic growth. The 
general specification we employ is as follows: 
                                                
31
 World Bank model country here is a general term referred to any country transforming from a purely 
public PAYG system to a new pension system with a significant funding element, not necessarily the 
specific three pillar model introduced by the World Bank. For example, the Chilean pension reform in 
1981 is not the exactly same as that recommended by World Bank, but we still group Chile into World 
Bank model. As the positive effect of pension reform is most likely to come from the funded pillar, so 
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i = 1,…, N; t= 1,….T. Letter - i denotes 59 countries (21 OECD and 38 EMEs) in this 
study. Letter - t as usual denotes the time dimension from 1960 to 2001. It is worth 
mentioning, however, that due to our unbalanced panel methodology, the actual 
observations we used for each regression estimation might not equal and very likely to 
be less than the simply (N*T), in that our package, i.e EViews automatically drops 
those countries which do not have valid observations. This problem exists for all 
panel regressions in this paper.  
 
The general model we use in this section is a cross-section weighted generalised least 
squares (GLS) unbalanced panel, and the intercept is specified as fixed effect. The 
standard errors are White heteroskedasticity consistent. We believe fixed-effects 
model is better than the random-effects model, as the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity is more likely to be correlated with our included explanatory variables. 
However, we assume that across sections have common intercept as well when initial 
levels of GDP per capita (I_GDPPC) are included into three separate regressions 
where total factor productivity growth rate (TFPGR), GDP growth rate (GDPGR), 
gross fixed capital formation/GDP (GFCFGDP) are used as dependent variables 
respectively. Compared with results estimated from fixed effect model, we found that 
under this specification, the coefficients of I_GDPPC are negative and statistically 
significant - consistent with economic theory, and without sizable deterioration of 
other variables. Therefore, we only report the results estimated from this variant 
specification and ignore those from fixed effect model.   
 
For pension reform’s impact on economic performance, as we mentioned earlier, 6 
different dependent variables are used, i.e. total factor productivity growth rate 
(TFPGR), GDP growth rate (GDPGR), gross fixed capital formation/GDP 
(GFCFGDP), private saving rate (PSR), gross domestic saving/GDP (GDSGDP) and 
gross national saving/GDP (GNSGDP), all of which are represented by the vector K 
as shown in the above equation.  
 
X is a vector of variables controlling for countries’ macro-economic conditions, 
which include inflation (INFL) and the real interest rate (INT). Y is vector of financial 
development variables, including liquid liabilities to GDP (LIQUID), domestic credit 
provided by banking industry (CREDIT) and stock market capitalisation (STKCAP), 
as the positive correlation between finance and growth has been found in empirical 
studies (King and Levine 1993; Beck et al 2000). Z represents other variables if 
necessary, for example the proportion of people aged above 65 (POP65) and 
urbanisation rate (URBAN) are used in our saving regression, because it is mentioned 
that urbanisation is a proxy to measure precautionary saving effects (Loayza et al 
1998) and the variable - POP65 used in view of the life cycle model and precautionary 
motives model (Kohl and O’Brien 1998). Also, we include GDP per capita (GDPPC) 
and initial level of GDP per capita (I_GDPPC). These explanatory variables are all 
                                                                                                                                       
this simplicification should be able to capture the important points. Meanwhile, we defined DC-PAYG 
countries, e.g. Sweden as non-reformers, i.e. classified as non-WBM model.  
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included so pension coefficient does not get significant just due to omitted variables 
bias.  
 
YR is a time trend variable to proxy years-since-reform. Readers will notice that some 
countries, e.g. France, Jordan, etc. adopt PAYG systems throughout our whole time 
dimension, i.e. 1960-2001, while for other countries, pension reform started from 
some point of this period. The coefficient of YR represents the effects in the short run 
while the coefficient of YR^2 is the long run effect. Specification in this way is to 
look at the possible dynamic nature of pension reform, i.e. people need time to 
familiarise themselves with and get confidence about the pension reform, particularly 
if it is a radical change compared with the old systems. The same specification has 
been used by Packard (2003) where he looks at the effect of privatising pension 
system on labour market across 18 Latin American countries.  
 
In addition, some of our data, e.g. CREDIT, are unsurprisingly non-stationary (see 
Table 8 for results of panel unit root tests), but we do not detrend them given our main 
consideration is the long run effect. This similar specification whereby trending data 
are not differenced to be stationary when looking at the long run relation are 
employed by many researchers in pension literatures, e.g. Walker and Lefort (2002). 
Last, we use logarithm of all variables so as to find the elasticity relations. But for 
some variables, i.e. inflation (INFL) and interest (INT), we use log(1+INFL) and 
log(1+INT) (Beck et al 2000) in order to increases valid observation as negative 
values cannot be logged (See Table 7 for all variables used for this and the following 
econometric work).  
 
3.1.3 Empirical result
 
Table 9 shows the pension reform’s impact on total factor productivity growth 
(TFPGR). In Column 1 it is indicated that, in the short run the effect is negative at the 
level of –0.1587 - the coefficient of YR, but it is not significant. In the long run, this 
effect, i.e. the coefficient of YR^2 turns into positive, which is both meaningful 
economically, albeit statistically insignificant32. As we discussed earlier that due to 
less labour distortion and asset accumulation etc, productivity is expected to increase 
following pension reform. Regarding other variables, our estimation looks satisfactory. 
For example, the coefficient of L(I_GDPPC) is –0.4068, which implies that poor 
countries can grow faster than rich countries by around 4 per cent. This magnitude is 
consistent with recent findings by Beck and Levine (2004). Based on different 
specifications, they find the coefficient to be at the level of –0.002 and –1.066, but 
most results range from –0.4 to –0.8. In addition, we complement findings by King 
and Levine (1993) by obtaining a positive coefficient of GDPPC, which indicates the 
positive relationship between the level of development and the growth.  The 
coefficient of LINFL carries the expected sign, minus, showing the damaging effect 
of high real interest rate on the growth.  
 
                                                
32
 Term YR^3 was also included into our equations mainly for the econometric purpose, so we will not 
interpret their economic meanings. It shares the same logic behind the dynamic OLS (DOLS) model 
where lags and leads of independent variables are normally used (Kao and Chiang 2000, Davis and Hu 
2005b). In this paper, by including term YR^3, the coefficients of YR and YR^2 are more likely to 
have results consistent with the economic theory. Same methodology was used in Packard (2003).  
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When we divide all country into two subgroups, i.e. OECD countries and EMEs, the 
general impression is that pension reform is not strongly related to TFP growth rate, 
as our estimation results are not statistically significant. But the signs of YR and 
YR^2 coefficients for EMEs are as expected, while the results for OECD countries are 
less straightforward as indicated in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 9. Abstracting from the 
statistical insignificance, different estimated results of OECD countries and EMEs 
might reflect the heterogeneity across countries.  
 
In developing countries, there are large portions of informal industry in the economy 
and they are slow in response to the efficiency gains e.g. in labour market, given that 
they normally do not participate in the formal social security systems, while for most 
OECD countries with some exceptions, e.g. Italy and Spain, the informal sector is less 
significant. Consequently, the coefficient of YR for OECD is positive, while that of 
YR^2 is negative. 
 
In terms of other explanatory variables, coefficients of L(I_GDPPC) again are 
negative in both cases and consistent with economic theory, while liquid liabilities as 
percentage of GDP (LLIQUID) show positive coefficients, indicating the positive 
effect of financial deepening on economic growth, although it is noted that it is 
statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the credit ratio (LCREDIT) tends to have a 
negative sign in OECD, in contrast to the positive sign in Levine and Zervos (1998). 
This result, although intriguing, is consistent with the findings by Davis (2003a). In 
that paper, he argues that a large banking industry in an advanced economy, might a 
liability by generating macro-economic instability, e.g. via commercial property 
cycles (Davis and Zhu 2004a, 2004b).  
 
Now, we move on to specifications using 2 other different growth indicators as 
dependent variables, i.e. GDP growth rate (GDPGR) and gross fixed capital 
formation/GDP (GFCFGDP) in Tables 9 and 10 respectively. Inclusion of GDP 
growth rate into our regression complements current literature. As we mentioned in 
previous literature review part, most pension researchers, e.g. Holzmann (1997) and 
Walker and Lefort (2002) dismiss this variable in their econometric work, although 
Davis (2003a) uses such growth rate in one of his work on institutional investors. In 
our view, it is appropriate to look at the direct relationship between pension reform 
and growth per se by introducing this indicator. As shown in Table 10, for the 
regression on All countries, the long run effect is positive at the level of 0.01, which 
means pension reform towards funded system can contribute to GDP growth by 1 per 
cent.  
 
Regarding other independent variables, results are generally satisfactory. For example 
the coefficient of L(I_GDPPC) is –0.4210, nearly same as –0.4068 from previous 
regression. Interest rate is significant and negative, reflecting the fact that too high 
interest rates threaten investment, further to economic growth. When this regression is 
run separately on OECD countries and EMEs, pension reform is found to be 
positively linked to GDPGR in the long run and negatively in the short run, although 
it is insignificant. The response lag is consistent with Packard’s results and claims 
(2003) as noted in previous section, that people need time to adjust themselves to new 
pension systems, particularly when such reform is fundamental. Equations for stock 
value traded (LSTKTRD), again have the positive sign, consistent with results by 
Levine and Zervos (1998) and complementary to results by Beck and Levine (2004).   
 56
 
As of the third specification of gross fixed capital formation/GDP (GFCFGDP), we 
find a positive and significant relationship between pension reform and GFCFGDP for 
both subgroups. For example, for estimation on OECD countries in Table 11, in the 
short run, the effect is negative at the level of –0.099, while in the long run, such 
effect is 0.005. The short term negative impact might partly reflect the restraining 
effect of pension funds on investment (Davis 2003a). In Davis’ paper, he finds that 
the share of equity held by life and pension funds is negatively linked to real fixed 
investment in Anglo-Saxon countries at the level of –0.23. The finding might be due 
to the short-termist hypothesis as we reviewed in section 2.2.3.3.6. Due to the regular 
performance on pension funds by the trustee, pension fund managers prefer dividend 
payment to fixed investment, which although is damaging to a firm’s development in 
the long run. 
 
In Table 11, our estimates (not OECD) also tend to have a negative sign for the real 
interest rate, which as we mentioned earlier, reflects these two variables move in the 
opposite directions, higher interest rate, less investment. The coefficients for 
LLIQUID and LSTKTRD are positive, revealing the positive relation between the 
growth and the liquid liabilities and stock value traded (Levine and Zervos 1998).  
 
Last, we focus on the linkage between pension reform and saving rate. Given the data 
availability, we use three saving indicators, i.e. private saving rate (PSR), gross 
domestic saving rate (LGDSGDP) and gross national saving rate (LGNSGDP). Our 
private saving rate is defined as gross private saving/gross private disposable income, 
obtained from Loayza, Lopes, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (LLSS 1998), which is 
currently the largest dataset covering private savings. This constructed private saving 
data are more precise than earlier datasets which have been used by researchers, e.g. 
(Bailliu and Reisen 1997), as it adjusts for capital gains and losses due to inflation 
(LLSS 1998). In Table 12, it is revealed that in general, pension reform positively 
impacts on private saving in the long run. For example, for EMEs, private saving 
increases by 6 per cent following pension reform in the long term. This might be 
explained in the way that people normally would not reduce their discretionary 
savings one by one with increases in pension savings, e.g. due to pension assets’ 
illiquidity (Cifuentes and Valdes-Prieto 1997) and credit constraints to certain groups 
of population, e.g. young people (Davis 2000b). This private saving increase might be 
also due to the “recognition effect” as noted in Section 2.2.3.1.3. In other words, 
people realise the unsustainability of unfunded PAYG systems, thus voluntarily 
saving for their post-retirement lives. This effect is less in magnitude for OECD 
countries, although insignificant. This differentials in effect might be due to the less 
credit constraint in OECD countries, compared to EMEs. Therefore, in OECD 
countries, people are more easily to reduce other forms of private saving (Bosworth 
and Burtless 2004a) or borrowing when facing pension savings.  
 
As for many other saving determinants, our regressions show expected results as well. 
For example, the coefficients of LPOP15 are –0.2106, -0.4518 and 0.6552 
respectively for three separate regressions, while only the former two are statistically 
significant. The results are consistent with Loayza et al (2000), whereby in one of 
their core regressions using full dataset, this variable is found to be –0.299. 
Meanwhile, old age population is found to affect PSR negatively in OECD and All, 
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implying their dissaving behviour based on Life-cycle theory (Kohl and O’Brien 
1998).  
 
Last, we use two other aggregate saving ratios on the national level, i.e. gross 
domestic saving rate/GDP (GDSGDP) and gross national saving rate/GDP 
(GNSGDP). As shown in Tables 13 and 14, pension reform is found to be associated 
positively in the long run and negatively in the short run with both GDSGDP and 
GNSGDP for All countries and EMEs regressions, while this finding is less robust for 
OECD regressions. The short-term reverse relation might be due to the large amount 
of debt financing, thus public dissaving by the reforming governments, i.e. 
government dissaving might crowd out private saving. Based on our estimation, the 
gross national saving rate could be reduced by 9 per cent at the early stage of pension 
reform in all our sample countries. However, when the transition issue or implicit 
pension debt (Holzmann et al 2004) is solved, pension reform would have a long run 
positive impact on gross savings.    
 
The estimation result for OECD in Table 14 deviates from the theory in that they 
show a reverse relation between pension reform and the national saving rate in the 
long run. The result is to some extent consistent with Schmidt-Hebbel’s claims (1999) 
that the establishment of fully funded systems is more effective in developing 
countries than in developed countries. In addition, it might reflect the offsetting effect 
from fiscal policies by the reforming government as reviewed in Section 2.2.3.1.4. If 
the government borrowed a lot in order to finance the implicit pension debts, or 
simply reduced other forms of public saving, the overall effect is the decrease in the 
national savings. Empirical findings by Bosworth and Burtless (2004a) have 
confirmed this point by indicating that pension saving reduces non-retirement public 
saving.  
 
Regarding other saving rate determinants, we find the dampening effect of young and 
old dependency ratio, i.e. POP15 and POP65 on savings, a result in line with other 
major work (Loayza 2000; Samwick 1999). In addition, there is evidence that higher 
inflation rates induce savings, which reflects the precautionary saving hypothesis 
(Banks et al 1995). For example, Table 14 indicates that one per cent increase in the 
inflation rate will increase gross national saving by 0.014 for OECD countries and 
0.012 for EMEs.    
 
3.2 Pension assets’ impact on economic growth
 
Pension fund assets have increased noticeably during the past decades across both 
OECD countries and EMEs. As we mentioned earlier, Figures 4 until 7 clearly reveal 
the steady rising trend of pension assets across all countries (18 OECD countries and 
11 EMEs) over the period 1981-200033 in terms of pension assets both in absolute 
values (Figures 4 and 5) and relative to GDP (Figures 6 and 7) where although we 
have few exceptions, e.g. Fiji, South Africa etc.  
 
                                                
33
 In Figure 1 and 2, we average every 5 year observations over 1981-2000, so total together we have 4 
observations for each country. We use 1901 to denote the 5 year average over 1981-1985, 1902 to 
denote 1986-1990, 1903 to denote 1991-1995 and 1904 to denote 1996-2000. Similar designation has 
been used by Beck et al (2000). These 5 year average data are also created for our econometric analysis 
in this section.  
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Table 15 shows that as of 2000, total pension fund assets across 18 advanced OECD 
countries were US$ 12 trillion, of which, the US as the biggest pension markets, 
accounted for just above half of the whole assets and Japan and the UK followed. In 
addition, in terms of pension assets relative to GDP, the Netherlands had the largest 
figure at the level of 149.09 per cent, while this figure for New Zealand was 0.69 per 
cent, the smallest across OECD countries in the table.  
 
As regards 28 EMEs in Table 16, the biggest pension markets were Singapore and 
Malaysia. It is not surprised given that they are two countries which have adopted 
Provident pension systems since 1950s. Other countries with a significant size of 
pension assets include Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Total pension assets across our 
selected 28 EME countries were US$ 280 billion, while the average of pension assets 
of GDP was 12 per cent, much less than that of OECD countries – 42 per cent.  
 
Given the rapid growth of pension funds and the arguments that pension fund assets 
might be able to induce economic growth as we reviewed in Section 2.2.3.1, in this 
section we aim to empirically examine the link between pension fund assets and 
economic growth. 
 
3.2.1 Data and variable 
 
In this study, we use macro-economic and financial data across up to dozens of 
countries, including both OECD countries and EMEs. As in previous section, all of 
these data are from World Development Indicators 2003 (WDI) database and 
Financial Structure and Economic Development database (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine 2003).  
 
Pension fund assets data are collected from a number of sources. For OECD countries, 
OECD Institutional Investors (2003) and Davis and Steil (2001) are the main sources, 
but some are expanded and updated by checking financial statistical reports in 
individual countries, e.g. National Financial Statistics in the UK. For Latin American 
countries, the website of the International Federation of Pension Fund Administrations 
in Chile is very helpful in this case34, where we obtained pension data up to the year 
end of 2003 on most Latin American countries and some reform countries in Central 
Asia and Eastern Europe, e.g. Hungary and Kazajstan. For South Asian countries and 
South Africa, pension data are largely compiled individually by searching e.g. local 
central banks’ Financial Bulletin, although ASEAN Social Security Association’s 
website was used to update recent pension data35 on some Southeast Asian countries.  
Regarding the observation period, in general, for OECD countries, e.g. the UK, the 
US, we have data ranging from 1960s to 2001, while for many EMEs, e.g. Argentina, 
the data available are relatively limited. See Table 17 for detailed sources of pension 
data on South Asian countries and South Africa.   
 
3.2.2 Econometric specification
 
                                                
34
 One of my friends’ kindness in helping me to read this Spanish language website is greatly grateful.  
35
 Special thank here is given to Mukul Asher who kindly provided me with relevant information on 
data collection regarding Southeast Asian countries. In addition, Gregorio Impavido’s suggestion on 
data searching, particularly on South Africa is also appreciated.  
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In order to find the extent to which pension fund assets are correlated to economic 
growth, we utilise three specifications. The first two are borrowed from the economic 
growth literature, notably by King and Levine (1993) and Beck, Levine and Loayza 
(2000), while the last specification is a Granger-Causality test, aiming to test whether 
there is a causality relation between pension fund assets and economic growth.  
 
3.2.2.1 Panel Contemporaneous regression on 5 year averages 
 
The first regression is to look at the contemporaneous relation between pension fund 
assets and economic growth which is proxied by three indicators, i.e. total factor 
productivity growth (TFPGR), gross fixed capital formation growth rate (GFCFGR) 
and GDP per capital growth rate (GDPPCGR). Explanatory variables are pension 
fund assets as % of GDP (PFAGDP), liquid liabilities as % of GDP (LIQUID) to 
proxy financial development, ratio of government expenditure to GDP (GOVEXP), 
interest rate (INT) and inflation rate (INFL) as indicators of macroeconomic stability, 
export and Import as % of GDP (EXIMGDP) to capture an economy’s openness and 
initial GDP per capita (I_GDPPC) to control for convergence (Beck and Levine 2004; 
Levine and Loayza 2000). In addition, we use a number of variables which appeared 
in our earlier study, but normally dismissed in many growth-finance literature e.g. 
work by Levine et al (2000, 2004). They are stock market capitalisation (STKCAP), 
stock market turnover (STKNV) to indicate stock market development, domestic 
credit provided by banking industry (CREDIT) to measure the banking system, and 
urbanisation to measure industrialisation. Therefore, the model we used is as follows: 
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= + + + +
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+ + +
+ + + +
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                           (12) 
 
EG: vector of economic growth indicators, including TFPGR, GFCFGR and GDPGR.  
 
In order to seek the long run relation and remove the business cycle effects, we 
average every 5 year’s observations over the period of 1981-2000, so at the end, we 
have 4 observations for each variable. Note, for some variables, particularly PFA, data 
are not complete for each 5 year interval, so in some cases, we average 3 or 4 year’s 
observations, but we still have 4 observations for all variables regardless if each 
interval has full data. In fact, in view of this problem, we carefully selected countries 
from our sample, so we only use those countries which either have full data over 
1981-2000, or have data straddling at least two intervals, i.e. two 5-year periods and 
in each interval at least two observations are available so as to make assure our 
averaging technique does not lose its meaning. Following these criteria, only 29 
countries are available to use (See Table 18 for a country summary). In addition to 
this core regression, we also seek to control for other countries, i.e. countries without 
or having very few pension assets during the period 1981-2000. In other words, we 
run the same regressions, but include all other countries, e.g. France, China; in this 
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way, we hope to see whether the inclusion of countries with no pension assets can 
materially affect our previous results. For the latter methodology, we include all 72 
countries (See Appendix 2 for country summary).  
 
3.2.2.2 Cross country initial regression
 
The first regression, i.e. panel contemporaneous regression we have just discussed 
above, aims to find the extent to which growth is linked to pension fund assets after 
removing business cycle effects with the variables set in 5 year averages. The second 
regression, also from King and Levin (1993), seeks to look at the relationship between 
initial values of pension fund assets at the beginning of specified period and the 
subsequent period of economic growth. The underlying logic is, abstracting from the 
debate whether there is any long run relation between pension assets and growth, that 
one very interesting question is whether the former is a good predictor of the latter.  
 
As regards this regression, we still use three growth indicators as in our first panel 
contemporaneous regressions. They are TFPGR, GFCFGR and GDPPCGR; 5 year 
averages of 1996-2000 and 10 year averages of 1991-2000 are used in two separate 
regressions, although the latter is considered as core regression, as in this case we 
have more reasonable length of observations. Among explanatory variables are 
pension assets (PFAGDP), domestic credit provided by banking sector (CREDIT), 
stock market capitalisation (STKCAP), government expenditure (GOVEXP), inflation 
(INFL), real interest rate (INT), ratio of export plus import to GDP (EMIMGDP). For 
all explanatory variables, initial values of 1991 and 1996 are used, again for two 
separate regressions. It is worth noting that due to limited dataset in this study of cross 
country initial regression, we are not able to use all potential explanatory variables, 
e.g. stock market turnover, which are argued to be linked to economic growth as used 
in our previous study. Regarding countries included, we use all 72 countries and 
assign zero to PFAGDP for those countries which have no or very few pension assets 
in 1991 and 1996. It should be, however, noted again that due to automatic endpoint 
adjustment in our package, the included countries are always less than 72.  
 
3.2.2.3 Granger-causality test
 
Above, we followed the estimation procedures by King and Levine (1993) and Beck 
et al (2000) to examine the relationship between pension fund assets and economic 
growth. On balance we found a positive link between pensions and growth as 
presented in next section, but the estimation results at best imply that pensions and 
growth are positively correlated. The question of the causality relation, i.e. the 
causality direction between pensions and growth, however, are still unanswered.  
Therefore, in this section, as our last specification, we seek to complement our 
analysis above by using Granger causality and intend to find the temporal causality 
relation between pensions and growth.  
 
The best known causality test is the Granger causality test (Granger 1969), but this 
test is commonly used with time series data. In this study we adapt it to a panel data 
context (cross section and time series). The general model specification for panel 
Granger causality is as follows:  
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p ∈ , and [ ]1,k p∀ ∈ . K indicates the lag of variables Y and X. i and t denote time 
and country respectively.  
 
The introduction of both cross section and time series dimensions largely increases 
the observation, which is urgently needed in this study and reduces the collinearity 
among independent variables, thus improving the efficiency of Granger causality 
tests.  
 
We use the testing procedure proposed by Hurlin and Venet (H-V) (2003) and Hurlin 
(2004) for panel Granger causality tests.  
 
A. Homogeneity (HO) hypothesis test 
 
The first step of the H-V (2003) approach is to test the homogeneity of the 
coefficients associated with X at all lags. We allow the coefficients of Y, i.e. kλ  in 
Equation 13 to vary across countries. The hypothesis is as follows: 
 
[ ]0 : 1, ( , )k ki jH k p i jβ β= ∀ ∈ ∀                                                                            (14) 
[ ]1 : (1, ) ( , ) 1,k k k ki j i jH or k p i j Nβ β β β≠ ≠ ∃ ∈ ∃ ∈                                          (15)           
 
0H  shows that coefficients associated with ,i t kX −  in Equation 13 are identical for each 
lag, while 1H  indicates that for some lag k, coefficients across countries are different. 
The relevant F statistics is: 
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                                                                                (16) 
 
0RSS  is the restricted residual sum of squared under 0H , while 1RSS  is the 
unrestricted residual sum of squared under 1H , without any restriction.  
 
If the hypothesis of homogeneity (HO) above is accepted, we need to move to the 
testing of the Homogeneous non-causality (HONC) hypothesis against the alternative 
of which there is a homogenous causality (HOC) across all N units. In contrast, if the 
HO hypothesis is rejected, H-V (2003) proposes to test the Homogeneous non 
causality (HONC) against the alternative of which only a subgroup of N units shows 
the Granger-causality relationship, i.e. a heterogeneous causality (HEC).    
 
B. HONC VS HOC hypothesis test 
 
Therefore, if the HO hypothesis is accepted, the next step is to test the Homogenous 
non causality (HONC) hypothesis against the hypothesis of HOC. Mathematically,  
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Equation 17 shows the presence of 
_
,i tX  does not have any explanatory power on 
,i tY , 
reflecting the hypothesis of HONC.  
 
Given Equations 13 and 17, the corresponding test is proposed as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ]0 : 0 1, , 1,kiH i N k pβ = ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                                                                        (18) 
1 : 0 ( , )kiH i kβ ≠ ∃                                                                                               (19) 
 
What we need to do is to test if kiβ is zero for all country i and at all lag k. The F 
statistics is defined as: 
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                                                                             (20) 
 
2RSS  is the restricted residual sum of squared under 0H  in Equation 18, while 0RSS  
is the restricted residual sum of squared under 0H  in Equation 14.  
 
If 0H  cannot be rejected, then it might imply that X does not Granger cause Y as 
shown in Equation 17, and the non-Granger causality process is homogenous. 
However, if 0H  is rejected, it implies that X Granger causes Y across all units, which 
in turn is homogeneous. This test is similar to the panel unit root test proposed by 
Levin et al (2002).   
 
C. HONC VS HEC hypothesis test 
 
As mentioned earlier, if the HO hypothesis is rejected, then we need to test the 
hypothesis of HONC against heterogeneous causality (HEC). Under the HEC 
hypothesis, it holds that there exists at least 1 and at most N individual causality 
relationships which are heterogeneous. Mathematically,  
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Therefore, the corresponding hypotheses are specified as follows: 
 
0 : 0 1,..., 1,...,
k
iH k p i Nβ = ∀ = ∀ =                                                                        (23) 
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k
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 63
 
Specially, in a subgroup of units, i.e. 1N , there is no Granger causality relationship as 
shown in Equation 24, while for the rest units, i.e. N - 1N , X Granger causes Y as in 
Equation 25.  
 
Given that the structure of the hypothesis of HEC above is similar to the panel unit 
root test of Im et al (2003), Hurlin and Venet (2003), and Hurlin (2004) design a Wald 
statistic. The Wald statistic is a simple average of individual Wald statistics.  
 
3.2.3 Empirical results 
 
3.2.3.1 Panel Contemporaneous regression on 5 year averages 1981-2000 
 
Tables 20 and 21 summarise the results of our contemporaneous regression between 
pension fund assets and economic growth indicators. Table 20 is for regressions on 
those countries having pension assets, while Table 21 presents results for all sample 
countries, i.e. controlling for those without pension assets. Estimations in Table 20 are 
again split into three groups, OECD countries, Emerging market economies (EMEs) 
and Sub-all which is defined as all countries (35) having pension assets in our dataset, 
in order to be differentiated from All countries (72) in Table 21.    
 
It is revealed in Table 20 that pension assets are positively and significantly linked to 
growth, although we do have few opposite results. For example, in the LTFPGR 
regressions, pension funds (LPFAGDP) show a positive sign in EMES, indicating that 
pension growth induces higher productivity in emerging markets. Meanwhile, the 
positive effects of pension funds also are found in investment regressions 
(LGFCFGR) for sub-all and OECD countries, and GDP growth regressions (GDPGR) 
for EMEs. It worth noting that, when using GDP growth rate (GDPGR) as dependent 
variable, for OECD countries, LPFAGDP is negatively associated with LGDPGR at 
the level of –1.799; this result, however, should be taken with caution, as we have 
only 32 observations for the regression.  
 
Regarding other explanatory variables, we find evidence of the detrimental effects of 
high inflation rate on growth. In row 5 of Table 20, 7 out of 9 coefficients of LINFL 
are negative. Specifically, one per cent increase in inflation can reduce GDP growth 
rate by 0.2 per cent for EMEs. Also, there is some evidence that higher interest 
dampens investments, which is revealed in the LGFGFGR regression for OECD. In 
terms of CREDIT, i.e. domestic credit provided by banking industry, our regressions 
favour a negative sign. It is intriguing, but same result has been found by Davis 
(2003a) who argues that large banking lending might contribute to macro-economic 
volatility, for example via commercial property cycles (Davis and Zhu 2004a). 
Consequently, economic growth is affected negatively. In addition, there is evidence 
that initial level of income is reversely linked to economic growth. As shown in Table 
20, the variable of L(I_GDPPC) is frequently negative, implying poor countries grow 
faster than rich countries, consistent with our findings earlier in Section 3.1.3 and 
those of Beck and Levine (2004). Government expenditure in Table 20, i.e. 
LGOVEXP frequently shows the negative sign, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that macro-economic instability move with economic growth in opposite 
directions. The magnitude is consistent with other studies. Most estimates of Beck et 
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al (2000) as concerns the contribution of government expenditure to the economic 
growth varies from –0.4 to –1.5, similar as what we found in Table 20. In passing, we 
also find the positive effect of higher openness to the economic growth in LGFCFGR 
regression for sub-all countries. In addition, we find that stock market turnover ratio 
has a positive and significant sign, in consistent with research results by Levine and 
Zervos (1998) and Beck et al (2000).  
 
If pension assets in general can boost economic growth, to what extent this result 
would be changed if countries without assets are included? In addition, we mentioned 
earlier that the negative sign of PFAGDP in GDPGR regression for OECD countries 
in Table 20 might be due to small observation. Therefore, in view of these issues, we 
run the same regression again, but controlling for countries with no assets, as a variant 
to check our finding’s robustness. Results are given in Table 21. Coefficients for 
PFAGDP are mixed, although two of three are positive. Some other results are 
significant. Our regressions favour a negative link between CREDIT, initial level of 
GDP per capital (I_GDPPC) and growth, in line with our previous findings. 
Meanwhile, government expenditure, i.e. GOVEXP shows a negative sign, indicating 
the damaging impact of government size on growth. The same relation is found by 
Beck et al (2000) who use a dataset covering 77 countries. In addition, the positive 
contribution from stock market liquidity, proxied by LSTKTNV, to the economic 
growth is also found. For example, one percent increase in LSTKTNV boosts 
productivity growth by 0.05 percent. Last, liquid liabilities can stimulate growth, as 
revealed by the positive signs of LLIQUID in Table 21.  
 
3.2.3.2 Cross country initial regression
 
As noted, we ran two separate regressions based on two sets of data. For the first 
dataset, the values of dependent variables are averages of 1996-2000, while those of 
independent variables are corresponding initial values of 1996. For the second dataset, 
we use averages of 1991-2000 and initial values of 1991. It should be noted, however, 
that we believe the results from the second regression are less reliable given the small 
observation and only included here as a variant. Results are given in Tables 22 and 23.  
 
Regarding the ratio of Pension fund assets/GDP, results are encouraging as revealed 
in Table 22. Pension assets are a good predicator of productivity, capital formation 
and GDP growth, a result statistically significant and economically meaningful. This 
complements our earlier results where there might not exist a strong relationship 
between pension assets and some growth indicators; pension assets growth is always 
followed by a faster growth in the subsequent years. In addition, there is evidence that 
urbanisation predicts economic growth, which is consistent with the argument of a 
positive link between industrialisation and growth.  
 
Last, as a variant, we run regressions using data of averages of 1991 and 2000 and 
initial values of 19991. Pension assets are not strongly linked to economic growth, 
and signs are mixed with positive and negative. Some other variables, however, are 
significant. For example, initial values of stock market capitalisation are found to be a 
good predictor of subsequent economic growth, consistent with findings by Levine 
and Zervos (1998), and Beck et al (2000).    
 
 65
3.2.3.3 Panel Granger-causality test
 
Tables 24, 25 and 26 present results of panel Granger causality estimation based on 
pooled annual data across 38 countries36 (see table 19 for country details). By pooling 
data in this way, our dataset is significantly enlarged. Normally, we have observations 
above 100 and up to 600. In order to check the robustness of our results, we use six 
growth indicators, which are total factor productivity growth rate (TFPGR), GDP 
growth rate (GDPGR), gross fixed capital formation growth rate (GFCFGR), private 
saving rate (PSR), gross national saving rate (GNSGDP), and gross domestic saving 
rate (GNSGDP). In addition, we specify 5 lags order37. As regards the hypothesis of 
homogeneity (HO), our F-test statistics results in Table 24 are satisfactory, as in most 
cases, they are well above the critical values at 1 per cent significance which are at the 
range of 1.50-2.00 depending on the lag levels. This suggests that the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of X in Equation 13 are homogenous can not be rejected. Given 
the consideration that the data generating process (DGP) might be heterogonous 
across courtiers, we split our sample countries into two groups, OECD countries and 
EMEs. Despite separate estimations on different sub-groups, our results, however, are 
still robust. Results of these two regressions are given in Tables 25 and 26.  
 
As the hypothesis of HO cannot be rejected, we then move on to test the hypothesis of 
homogenous non-causality (HONC) against the alternative of which there is a 
homogenous causality across all N countries by following the procedure of Hurlin and 
Venet (2003). The underlying rationale is that if the homogeneity of coefficients of X 
across all countries is valid, then the question of homogenous causality from pension 
assets to growth arises. Results are reported next to column HO in Tables 24, 25 and 
26. Regardless of lags order and growth indicators, our results strongly favour a 
rejection of the HONC hypothesis, as all F statistics with few exceptions are 
significantly greater than critical values at both 1 per cent level. Therefore, there 
exists a homogenous causality relation between pension assets and all six growth 
indicators (TFPGR, GDPGR, GFCFGR, PSR, GDSGDP and GNSGDP). The results 
hold even if all countries are split into two sub-groups, OECD and EMEs. The 
findings from panel Granger causality tests are an encouraging complement to our 
previous work (Davis and Hu 2005b), in that pension assets are not only closely 
associated with economic growth, but also Granger cause growth in a positive way. 
Meanwhile, such a causality relationship is, on one hand, indirect through 
productivity, investment and savings, and on the other hand, direct as indicated by the 
significant results on GDP growth rate (GDPGR).  
 
Table 27 gives results where we are curious about the reverse Granger causality, i.e. 
from GDP growth to pension fund assets. Similarly, the hypothesis of homogenous 
coefficients of the variable - GDP growth is not rejected for the All regression. But in 
all cases, the hypothesis of HONC is rejected. Therefore, we have to accept the 
alternative hypothesis, i.e. homogenous causality (HOC). But when separate 
                                                
36
 It is noted that the maximum number of countries in this paper is 38. But for different estimations, 
observations from different number of countries are used, due to data limitation of particular variables.  
37
 Choice of 5 lags order is a little bit arbitrary, but the same order of lag is used by Hurlin and Venet 
(2003) for their empirical work. In addition, 5-year lags are believed to be reasonable length to consider 
the dynamic structure of our panel data. It is to some extent in line with current growth and finance 
literature where 5-year averages of annual data are utilised to remove business-cycle effects (King and 
Levine 1993 and Beck et al 2000).  
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regressions for OECD and EMEs are estimated, different results emerge. As regards 
the hypothesis of HO, in 2 of 5 cases for OECD, and 4 of 5 cases for EMEs, HO is 
rejected. That means for OECD, we do not strongly accept the hypothesis of HO, 
while for EME, we have to reject that of HO. But as regards the hypothesis of HONC, 
in all cases of OECD, it should be rejected. In consequence, we conclude that 
compared to the Granger causality from pension asset to GDP growth, the reverse 
causality, i.e. from GDP growth to pension assets is not strong.  
 
In sum, in this section based on three econometric specifications, i.e. panel 
contemporaneous regression, cross-country initial regression and panel Granger 
causality test, on balance we find a both positive linkage and strong causality 
relationship between pension assets and growth indicators. Such positive effect of 
pensions on growth might arise from improved corporate governance of targeted firms 
at the micro level (Clark and Hebb 2002) and the whole economy at macro level 
(Davis 2002c, 2003d). In addition, pension assets growth is followed by the increase 
in productivity due to the benefits of higher saving/investment (James 1996) and/or 
less labour market distortion (Disney 2003) as reviewed in Section 2.    
 
3.3 Pension assets’ impact on financial development
 
Compared with the study of the impact of pension assets on economic growth, the 
relationship between pension assets and financial markets has been investigated 
extensively (Davis 1995, 1998c, 2003c and Walker and Lefort 2002). In this section, 
we revisit this same issue, but with a dataset, covering both OECD countries and 
EMEs, in addition to more robust econometric specifications.  
 
3.3.1 Data and variable 
 
This section looks at pension fund assets’ impact on financial development from four 
aspects, i.e. financial intermediaries, the banking industry, the stock market and the 
bond market. Regarding financial intermediaries, we use the ratio – private credit 
provided by deposit monetary bank and other financial institutions to GDP 
(PCDMBOFIGDP) as the dependent variable. It should be noted that other financial 
institutions include other banklike institutions, e.g. development banks, and nonbank 
financial institutions, e.g. provident and pension funds (Beck et al 2003) 38 . We 
concentrate here on private credit rather than credit issued to public enterprises so as 
to better investigate financial intermediaries’ ability to channel saving between 
householders and investors. In addition, we exclude credit provided by the central 
bank from the numerator given that government credits are always granted to public 
sector. Same indicator has been used by Levine et al (1999) and Levine and Zevos 
(1998).  
 
As for the banking industry, we have two indicators to proxy its development, a) the 
ratio of deposit monetary bank assets to total financial assets (DMBTFA), b) the ratio 
of deposit monetary bank assets to GDP (DMBGDP) and c) the ratio of domestic 
credit provided by banking industry to GDP (CREDIT). The underlying logic is to 
find out whether with pension fund assets’ growth, the traditional commercial banking 
                                                
38
 But, a check of the data (Beck et al 1999) found that pension assets are included in only very few 
countries across their dataset.  
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industry is declining relative to both other financial institutions and the whole 
economy, and whether the credit provided by the traditional biggest credit providers is 
under competition from other institutions.  
 
Concerning the stock market, we employ stock market capitalisation to GDP 
(STKCAP), stock market total value traded to GDP (STKTRD) and stock market 
turnover (STKTNV), which are most commonly used stock market indicators (Levine 
and Zervos 1998). In this way, three different aspects of stock market, i.e. size, 
activity and efficiency are able to be examined.  
 
Last, as regards bond market, public bond market capitalisation to GDP (PUBBND) 
and private bond market capitalisation to GDP (PRIBND) are employed. More 
attention should, however, be paid to estimated results on private bond market, in that 
the extent to which and whether private bond market develops with pension assets 
growth is our major research question. In contrast, public bond issuance will normally 
increase following pension reform towards funded systems as the government 
typically chooses debt financing to make up the implicit pension debt (Holzmann et al 
2001).  
 
Most of our macro financial data are from from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2003), and macro economic data are again from World Development Indicators 
(2003). Pensions data are collected from different sources as mentioned in the 
previous section (See Table 7 for details).  
  
3.3.2 Econometric specification
 
In this pension funds study, we use two specifications, i.e. Panel error correction 
model (PECM) and Panel Granger causality tests. 
 
The advantage of Panel error correction model is its ability to identify the short run 
and long run relationships simultaneously between economic variables (Banerjee, 
Hendry and Smith 1986) as well as testing the co-integration hypothesis with the 
presence of lag terms (Pesaran and Shin 1995). This technique has been widely used 
by researchers, and most recent applications are with e.g. Barrell and Davis (2004) 
and Davis and Zhu (2004).  
 
The general formulation for our PECM is as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
it it it it
i t i t i t i t i t i it
DLOG K DLOG PFAGDP DLOG X LOG Y LOG Z
ECM LOG PFAGDP LOG X LOG Y LOG Z
β β β β
β β β β β ε υ
− − − − −
= + + +
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, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i tECM LOG K LOG PFAGDP LOG X LOG Zλ λ λ λ− − − − −= − − −  
 
                                                                                                                               (26) 
 
i. is the across country dimension and t is the time dimension. D represents first 
difference. K is a vector of dependent variables, including various financial indicators, 
as we have just discussed. PFAGDP is the ratio of pension fund assets/GDP, X is the 
economic growth indicator, i.e. constant GDP, US dollars in 1995. Y is a vector of 
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variables controlling macro-economic stability, i.e. inflation (INFL) and real interest 
rate (INT). Z is a vector of other variables which we believe can determine the 
dependent variables.  
 
ECM is an error correction term for our panel error correction model, which measures 
the speed of convergence from short run to long run equilibrium. Coefficients on log 
level terms show the long run relationship. Note that INFL and INT are stationary, so 
we use the level terms of these two variables. In addition, they both are not included 
in the term itECM , as they are I(0) variables and should not affect the cointegration 
test (Demetriades and Luintel 1996). (see Table 8 for results of panel unit root tests)  
 
In addition to the core regression as we have just described, we also use a two-stage 
least squares (TSLS) method as a variant. The underlying rationale is the potential 
problem of measurement errors as well as simultaneity (Baltagi 2001). In other words, 
our financial development indicators and pension assts might have a two-way 
causality relation. Same methodology has been used to eliminate the simultaneity bias 
in empirical work (Bailliu and Reisen 1997). For the TSLS, we first calculate the 
fitted values of variable – PFAGDP by running Autoregressive Integrated Moving 
Average (ARIMA) (p, t, q) model as below  
 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2... ...t t t p t p t t t q t qu u u uα α α ε β ε β ε β ε− − − − − −= + + + + + + + +                            (27) 
 
tu , autoregressive term (AR) and tε , moving average (MA) term.  
 
Then, by replacing the original data of PFAGDP with fitted values, we re-estimate the 
regression of Equation 26 again. As of ARIMA-, we normally use ARIMA (p,1,q) 
specification, in that PFAGDP is non-stationary but becomes stationary after first 
differencing (see Table 8 for panel unit root rests). Regarding the orders of p and q, 
we specify them at the levels of 1 or 2, depending on countries. The method we utilise 
to choose appropriate order of lags is Ljung-Box Q-statistics and their corresponding 
p-values (Greene 2003).  
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jσ is the j-th autocorrelation, whileT is the number of observations. Based on Ljung-
Box (1979), if ARIMA is correctly modelled, the residuals should be nearly white 
noise.   
 
We believe PECM is an improvement than those used by other pension researchers, 
e.g. Walker and Lefort (2002), in that our model enables the identification of the 
dynamics of pension funds growth, i.e. both a long run and short run effects. In 
addition, in Walker and Lefort’s paper, we suspect their model suffers from spurious 
estimations, as some explanatory variables, e.g. bank_assets (the assets of deposit 
money banks to GDP) are non-stationary, but they are included in the regressions in 
levels.   
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In addition to Panel error correction model (PECM), Panel Granger causality tests 
same as in previous section are employed. This specification, complementing our 
PECM, seeks to identify the extent to which the Data generating process (DGP) 
reveals the underlying link between pension fund assets and corresponding financial 
indicators.  
 
3.3.3 Empirical result
 
3.3.3.1 Panel error correction model
 
3.3.3.1.1 Panel unit root test 
 
Before proceeding to formal panel regression analysis, the first step is to examine our 
data’s stationarity.  
 
There are a number of ways to test panel data’s stationarity (Maddala and Wu 1999; 
Baltagi 2001). In this study, in order to check our results’ robustness, we use two 
different but commonly quoted tests, i.e. one designed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
(hereafter LLC), and the other by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (hereafter IPS).  
 
Consider the following model 
 
, , 1 , , 1,... : 1,...i t i i t i t i i ty y X i N t Tρ δ ε−= + + = =                                               (29)
   
where y is our variable of interest; X is vector of exogenous variables, including fixed 
effects and/or a time trend, or simply one or unity, based on the modelers’ 
assumptions. 
,i tε  are i.i.d.
2(0, )εσ . As customary, t proxies time, while i proxies 
country.    
 
The principal difference between LLC and IPS is the assumption made on iρ . LLC 
proposes that iρ = ρ , implying the coefficient of lagged dependent variable in 
Equation 29 is the same across countries, while under IPS, iρ  is allowed to vary 
across countries. Given that in our sample, both OECD countries and EMEs are 
included, we put more emphasis on the latter test, i.e. IPS (2003), in that there might 
be heterogeneity across countries. 
 
Both LLC and IPS tests are an extended version of time series’ Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF) into the context of panel data. The formulation is as follows: 
 
, , 1 , , , ,
1
1,... : 1,...
ip
i t i t i j i t j i t i i t
j
y y y X i N t Tβ ρ δ ε
− −
=
∆ = + ∆ + + = =                                  (30) 
 
LLC tests the null hypothesis of β =0, while IPS is testing that of iβ =0 for all i. In 
addition, for the IPS test, t-bar statistics is used, which are formed as a simple average 
of the individual t statistics for testing iβ =0 in Equation 30, namely 
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Results for panel unit root tests are given in Table 8, where test results for all 
variables used in this paper are presented. In this study, however, we only used some 
of them, i.e. PFAGDP, INT, INFL, GDPCON, STKCAP, STKTNV, STKTRD, 
PCDMBOFIGDP, CREDIT, DMBTFA, PUBBND and PRIBND. As shown in Table 
8, on balance, all variables, but INT and INFL, are non-stationary in levels, but 
become stationary after first-differencing, although there are some variations, e.g. 
CREDIT, and STKCAP.  
 
3.3.3.1.2 Impact on financial intermediaries and banking industry
 
Results regarding how pension fund assets contribute to one of the financial system’s 
function, i.e. channelling funds, i.e. private credit between investors and savers 
(Merton and Bodie 1995) are given in Table 28. All coefficients of ECM(-1) are 
negative and significant as expected, which implies that pension fund assets and the 
variable – private credit provided by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP (PCDMBOFIGDP) are co-integrated. The coefficient of 
DLPFAGDP on our All countries regression in Column A Table 28 is 0.03708, 
positive and significant, suggesting that pensions induce financial development by 
facilitating saving transfer. This impact, however, is short run and the long run effect 
is not statistically significant. When we divided All countries into two sub-groups, the 
results as shown in two other Columns A in Table 28, indicate that there is a positive 
link in the short run and negative link in the long run, but all are not significant.  
 
Results of Two-stage least squares (TSLS) regressions are given in Columns B Table 
28. For OECD countries, we find a negative relationship between pension assets and 
PCDMBOFIGDP in both short and long terms, while for EMEs, such relation turns 
into positive. This result is interesting, and it might reflect the heterogeneous 
corporate financing across countries. Davis and Stone (2004) present results, showing 
that the equity accounts for a larger share of corporate liabilities in the firms of 
advanced countries than those of developing countries. For example, the median ratio 
of debt-equity was 0.59 in G-7 countries, while it was 0.73 in EMEs. Therefore, in 
OECD countries, crowding-out effect of pension assets on debt financing might be 
larger. In terms of other variables, we find the benefit of larger stock market 
(LSTKACAP) on the dependent variable, while the coefficients of LSTKTNV are 
positive, but not statistically significant.  
 
Table 29 gives results of regressions of PFAGDP on CREDIT (private credit provided 
by banking industry to GDP). As revealed, the coefficients of DLPFAGDP and 
LPFAGDP(-1) are negative, implying that domestic credit provided by banking sector 
across our sample country is declining in both short run and long run. This result, 
consistent regardless of estimation methods (core or TSLS estimations) and sample 
grouping, reflects the strong competition from other financial institutions, e.g. mutual 
fund and large finance companies (AT&T, GE in the US) which have become very 
active in proving credit to consumers and enterprises (Allen and Santomero 2001). 
Table 30 clearly shows such trend in the US. For the commercial banking sector, its 
share of credit providing declined from 33.16 per cent in 1945 to 17.31 per cent in 
2003, a 47.82 per cent decrease over this 60-year period. Life and other insurance 
 71
companies followed the same trend. Other financial intermediaries, however, had 
grown significantly during the same period, particularly Mutual funds which nearly 
increased by 150-fold!  
 
As of other explanatory variables, inflation rate indicates its damaging effect on the 
credit leading aspect of financial development. This effect, however, is short-term. 
The long run impact is mixed across countries and estimations, and for most part, not 
statistically significant. The impacts of stock markets development on credit lending 
by banks also are mixed and not consistent across OECD countries and EMEs. We, 
however, find the positive impact of stock market capitalisation on credit lending in 
EMEs in the long run. This is in line with the “financial accelerator” hypothesis. In 
EMEs, people are getting richer, which leads to more capital available in the stock 
market. Consequently, such higher net wealth leads to more bank lending, which in 
turn stimulates the economic growth.  
 
Table 31 presents the results of regressions of deposit money bank assets to total 
financial assets (DMBTFA) on pension fund assets. This ratio is designed to look at 
how traditional banking industry in terms of financial assets responded to pension 
assets growth. For OECD countries, such effect is negative at the beginning as shown 
by the negative sign of DLPFAGDP’s coefficient, although such effect is not 
statistically significant based on TSLS estimator. The long run effect is positive, but 
again statistically insignificant. Abstracting from the insignificant long run term, this 
finding of negative link to some extent is in line with the statistics presented by Barth 
et al (1997) which show that during the period of 1950 - 1995, the share of 
commercial banking industry in the US relative to other intermediaries, such as 
pension funds and investment companies diminished.  
 
However, for EMEs, the estimated results are different; both in the short run and long 
run, pension funds growth leads to a higher ratio of DMBTFA. This result is 
intriguing, but could be explained by the different circumstances between developing 
and developed countries. In other words, for developing countries, economic and 
financial environment, e.g. legal systems, accounting standards, is not good enough to 
significantly induce the development of other financial institutions, e.g. insurance 
companies, mutual funds. Typically, at the beginning stage, governments (for 
example, Chile and China) always restrict pension funds investment to a large share 
of bank deposits for the reason of security 39 . Correspondingly, in the short run 
following pension funds growth, traditional banking industry improves. On the 
contrary in the developed countries where markets are more mature, other financial 
institutions, e.g. life insurers and mutual funds have witnessed rapid growth following 
pension reform and pension funds. Although there is investment portfolio restriction 
in developed countries, the magnitude is much less, and also such restriction is more 
about the debate of international and alternative investments, e.g. hedge funds 
(Financial Times 2003), rather than whether to invest in equity or hold bank deposit as 
in many developing countries. In addition, there are some arguments that in EMEs, 
banking industry and financial institutions, e.g. pension funds are complementary. In 
other words, banks still serve as important information providers and transaction 
agents, which is much needed for EMEs (Vittas 200, Mitchell 2000, Davis 1998c).   
                                                
39
 For Peru, even after 10 years’ pension reform, i.e. in 2000, one third of pension funds portfolio is still 
bank deposit (Walker and Lefort 2002).  
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If the response of banking industry/total financial sector (DMBTFA) to pension funds 
growth is differential across countries at least in the short run, the ratio of deposit 
money bank asses/GDP, i.e. DMBGDP40 is more consistent over time and across 
countries. As indicated in Figure 9, our time series descriptive statistics about 72 
countries across the world give evidence that deposit money banking sector relative to 
the whole economy is not weakening. Only five countries, Algeria (DZA), Bulgaria 
(BGR), Czech Republic (CZE), Finland (FIN) and Romania (ROM) show obvious 
downward trend in recent years (1990-2001); for BGR, CZE and ROM, the declining 
trend might be due to the crisis which happened during the transition to market 
economy in the 1990s. All other countries in Figure 9 either maintained the same level 
or witnessed rising DMBGDP. Similar statistics have been presented by Scholtens 
and van Wensveen (1999), and Allen and Santomero (2001), but they only focus on 
the US.  
 
In addition, Figure 10 shows that over the period of 1960-2001, the average 
(arithmetic mean) deposit money bank assets/GDP (DMBGDP) for each OECD 
country was around the line of 0.5 with some countries, e.g. Switzerland (CHE), 
Germany (DEU) having highest ratios. Compared with OECD countries, EMEs 
relatively had less developed banking industry, as Figure 11 reveals that most of these 
48 EMEs had lower DMBGDP which was much below the 0.5 line, although Hong 
Kong (HKG) enjoyed the highest ratio. Moreover, the mean of the average DMBGDP 
for OECD countries was 0.68, while this figure was 0.37 for EMEs. These descriptive 
statistics are in line with Barth et al (2004) where they use statistics from 50 countries 
and conclude that more developed banking industry one country has, richer the 
country is. Therefore, there is a positive link between economic growth and banking 
sector. Under this rationale, it might be argued that pensions funds induce economic 
growth via positive impact on banking industry.  
 
Taking into account all the empirical results presented and discussed above in this 
section, it could be concluded that given the growth of institutional investors, e.g. 
pension funds, there is evidence that relative to other financial intermediaries, 
commercial banking institutions are losing ground in traditional business, e.g. credit 
lending, but the role banking sector plays in the whole financial systems and economy 
is still very important (Allen and Santomero 2001); banking industry is in a state of 
evolution by developing and entering new businesses, e.g. securities underwriting,  
rather than outright decline (Davis 2002a, Davis 2003c).  
 
3.3.3.1.3 Impact on stock market and bond markets
 
Results of pension fund assets’ impact on stock market are given in Tables 32 through 
34. Although large stock markets do not necessarily function efficiently, stock market 
capitalisation (STKCAP) is still the most frequently used indicator, measuring the 
overall size of markets. Our estimated results suggest that both in the long run and in 
the short run, pension funds growth leads to a larger stock market, which is both 
statistically significant and economically meaningful. When we estimated regressions 
on two separate groups, e.g. OECD and EMEs, the results remain. Again, in order to 
                                                
40
 We also ran regressions on pension assets (PFAGDP) for DMBGDP, but results show that in both 
short run and long run, pension assets growth leads to a decrease in DMBGDP, which is inconsistent 
with our hypothesis. Thus, results are not reported.  
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check results’ robustness as well as eliminating the simultaneity bias noted earlier, we 
run the estimation based on TSLS by using fitted values of PFAGDP. Results are 
given in Columns B Table 32. For most part, results do not change much; there is still 
evidence of a positive association between STKCAP and PFAGDP. Some other 
explanatory variables are significant. Error correction terms (ECM) are all negative, 
signalling the long run relationship between pension assets and market capitalisation. 
Interest rate shows negative sign, implying the opposite movement of interest rate and 
stock market; normally when interest goes down, stock market goes up.  
 
In terms of stock market’s liquidity indicator, i.e. total value traded (STKTRD), we in 
Table 33 find a positive link between pensions and stock market, although the positive 
long run effect is statistically insignificant for the All countries regression. Also, there 
is sign that such positive impact is stronger for OECD countries than EMEs. For 
example, all four coefficients (Columns A and B) of LPFAGDP(-1) and DLPFAGDP 
on OECD regressions are significant, while one out of four is significant on EME 
regressions. This might reflect the easiness of more developed markets to grow with 
pension assets, as in such markets, excellent telecommunications etc. are more ready 
to utilise and take advantage of pension growth. Meanwhile, more pension funds 
traded in the markets, more cheap the transaction costs, which in turn encourage 
infrastructure development.  
 
As indicated by the sign of coefficients of LINFL(-1) across sample groupings and 
estimators, there is sign of the negative impact of macro-instability on stock market 
turnover. Also, four out of six coefficients of DGDPCON are positive and significant, 
which indicates a faster economic growth can boost the development of financial 
market (Levine and Zervos 1998; Beck, Levine and Loayza 2000).  
 
The last indicator we use is stock market turnover ratio (STKTNV). Regression of this 
indicator as shown in Table 34 is less satisfactory, as most signs associated with 
DLPFAGDP and LPFAGDP are not statistically significant, although we still find a 
strong and positive short-term linkage between pension assets and STKTNV for 
OECD countries.  
  
On balance, by using three indicators, we find a positive link between pension assets 
growth and stock market development, in line with arguments from World Bank 
(1994) and Davis (1998c). Such positive impact encompasses not only the creation 
and emergence of new financial instruments via financial engineering, but also 
secondary/qualitative effects (Davis and Hu 2005a), e.g. more efficient regulatory and 
accounting systems. The latter effects will be beneficial to the whole financial markets 
and not just the pension funds industry. In consequence, it will lead to faster economic 
growth in the long run as depicted as arrow e in Figure 3.   
 
As for pensions’ impact on the public bond market (PUBBND), results are given in 
Table 35. Our regressions, based on both two sub-groups and different estimators, 
favour a positive relationship in the short run, but negative in the long run. The 
positive short-run effect may be partly due to the willingness of government to use 
pension funds to finance implicit pension debts (Holzmann 2001). But in the long run, 
the impact turns into negative for OECD countries. It might be argued that most of 
OECD members are developed nations with more mature financial markets, therefore 
from the perspective of long run, governments are not able to force large proportion of 
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pension funds invested in government bonds, thus leading to diminishing public bond 
market. Or, it might be explained that if pension system is reformed in OECD 
countries, there is less need for deficit financing. And given that debt issuance is one 
important way of financing pension debts, public bond market will go down in the 
long run. Concerning other explanatory variables, the negative effects of inflation on 
bond market are discernible in Table 35, implying the importance of macro-stability 
in maintaining financial markets. In addition, we find a negative effect of stock value 
traded on public bond market. For example, one per cent increase in STKTRD can 
reduce public bond issuance by 0.02 and 0.08, depending estimation methods.  
 
Regarding the private bond market (PRIBND), results in Table 36 are more consistent 
than those of estimations on PUBBND; all six separate regressions indicate a positive 
link between pensions and PRIBND, although some coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Specifically, in both long run and short run, pension assets growth boost 
private bond market in our core (A) and EMEs and All regressions, although not in 
OECD. Given that this indicator is more meaningful as we discussed in Section 
2.2.3.2.1, we might expect a more developed private bond market following pension 
asset growth. Our separate regressions in this section on private and public bond 
markets improve findings by Impavido et al (2003), who use the aggregated data, i.e. 
public bond market development following pension reform at least in the short run 
does not crowd out private bond issuance.  
 
3.3.3.2. Panel Granger causality test 
 
3.3.3.2.1 Impact on financial intermediaries and banking industry  
 
Results are given in Table 37. The hypothesis of homogeneity (HO) is unanimously 
accepted on three regressions - All, OECD and EMEs and for both indicators – 
PCDMBOFIGDP and CREDIT, as all calculated F statistics are below the 
corresponding critical values. The only exception is the 2.66 statistic obtained in 
CREDIT regression at lag 4. Then based on the testing procedures by Hurlin and 
Venet (2003), we tested the hypothesis of homogeneous non-causality (HOC) against 
the alternative of which there is a homogenous causality across all N countries. 
Regardless of the lag level, all F statistics, with are much greater than corresponding 
critical values. This implies that pension fund assets (PFA) Granger cause 
PCDMBOFIGDP and CREDIT, and this causality relationship is applicable to both 
OECD countries and EMEs. This result might be viewed as extra evidence to 
strengthen our conclusion from earlier Panel ECM model where we found relatively 
strong correlation for EMEs, but statistically insignificant correlation for OECD 
countries.  
 
3.3.3.2.2 Impact on stock market and bond market 
 
For the panel Granger causality estimation, we used three indicators, i.e. STKCAP, 
STKTRD and STKTNV, seeking to look at the causality of pensions on the size, 
liquidity and efficiency of stock market. Results are presented in Tables 38 through 
40. Again, the hypothesis of HO cannot be rejected in all cases. The only exception is 
under the EME-STKTRD estimation and at lag 3. Then, for the HONC VS HOC 
hypotheses, our statistics strongly reject the former and accept the latter, as all F-
statistics are greater than critical values. The results remain when sample is divided 
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into two sub-groups, OECD countries and EMEs. Therefore, our results from earlier 
panel ECM model in Section 3.3 are consolidated in that pension assets are not only 
positively linked to stock market’s development, but also cause a larger, more liquid 
and more efficient market. This finding confirms the results of Granger causality tests 
by Catalan et al (2000) where they conclude a Granger causality relation between 
contractual saving and stock market. In our study, however, we have observations in 
most cases, ranging from 100 up to 500, a much larger dataset than that used by 
Catalan et al (2000).   
 
Regarding pension funds’ effect on public bond market, the estimate results are shown 
in Table 41. As for the All countries regression, the HO hypothesis cannot be rejected, 
but the HONC is frequently rejected. When we run separate regressions on OECD 
countries and EMEs. Results again favour an acceptance of the HO hypothesis at all 
lag orders, and the rejection of the HONC hypothesis. This implies that there is a 
strong positive causality between pension assets and public bond market across both 
OECD countries and EMEs, which deviates from our PECM estimation in Section 
3.3.3.1 where we found a positive link for EMEs, but a negative link for OECD in the 
long run. It is due to the dynamic nature of the underlying effect. In this section, the 
strong positive causality between pension growth and public bond market is temporal 
and short run, while the negative relationship in OECD obtained from our PECM 
model is concerned with the long run.  
 
Concerning private bond market (PRIBND), results from the All countries regression 
are given in Table 41. At all lag levels, the hypothesis of HO is not rejected, while 
that of HONC is rejected at all lags, but lag 5. When estimating separately, similar 
results are obtained. The HO is not rejected, and the HONC is frequently rejected, 
although at lags 4 and 5 under the estimation of OECD-PRIBND, the HONC could 
not be rejected.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the findings in this section based on Granger 
causality test – our complementary technique only mean whether there is a causality 
correlation between indicators. Therefore, rejecting causality does not necessarily 
contradict our findings earlier from panel error correction model. For example, the 
non-existence of a Granger causality from pensions to private bond market for the 
OECD countries regression at lags 4 and 5 does not and should not deny a positive 
correlation between them as we found earlier from PECM model in Section 3.3.3.1.  
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4  Conclusion 
 
4.1 Concluding remarks 
 
In this part of the paper, we empirically analysed three relationships, a) that between 
pension reform towards World Bank model and economic growth, b) that between 
pension fund assets and economic growth and c) that between pension funds growth 
and financial development.  
 
Regarding the first relationship, we used data from 59 countries which included both 
reforming and non-reforming countries. It was found that pension reform is negatively 
linked to such growth indicators as TFP, GFCGGDP and PSR, GDSGDP, GNSGDP 
in the short run and positively in the long run. This nonlinearity relationship is in line 
with Packard’s findings (2003) and might be argued that people need time to get used 
to the dramatic change to the public pension systems. For example, it takes a few 
years to persuade people to convert to private systems, i.e. after they are confident 
about the new system. Then assets accumulation could be raised, therefore increasing 
both private and domestic savings. This finding, however, is less robust for OECD 
countries. In addition, we found evidence of a direct linkage between pension reform 
and economic growth per se by using the indicator of GDP growth rate.  
 
The second empirical work was focused on the link between pension fund assets and 
economic growth. Our contemporaneous estimation favours a strong positive link 
between pensions and the TFP growth rate, the gross fixed capital formation growth 
rate and GDP growth rate, although results are less robust after controlling for 
countries without pension assets. This effect might be due to less labour market 
distortion following pension reform (Disney and Whitehouse 1999) and pension 
funds’ increasing participation in corporate governance, thus improving corporate 
performance on the firm level and (Clark and Hebb 2002) economic productivity on 
the macro level (Davis 2002c, 2003d). In addition to the contemporaneous 
regressions, we employed a second specification, i.e. initial regression. It was 
revealed that pension fund assets in 1996 are a good predictor of economic growth in 
the subsequent years (1996-2002) in terms of all three indicators. But, regressions 
using pension data of 1991 was not very successful, which might be due to the small 
number of observations. This positive link is further strengthened by our panel 
Granger causality test where we found the hypothesis of Homogenous non-causality is 
rejected and that of Homogenous causality could not be rejected, which implies that 
pensions cause economic growth across both OECD countries and EMEs.  
 
The last empirical work dealt with the relationship between pension fund assets and 
financial development. Our Panel error correction model, including a TSLS estimator, 
suggested a positive short run effect from pensions to private credit provided by banks 
and other financial institutions (PCDMBOFIGDP), while the long run is not 
significant. Regarding the banking industry, we found that pension funds growth leads 
to less credit provided by commercial banks in the economy in both short run and 
long run. This might imply the strong competition from other financial institutions, 
e.g. mutual funds, etc. (Allen and Santomero 2001). Also, banks assets relative to total 
financial assets (DMBTFA) declined in the short run for OECD courtiers. But for 
EMEs, both short run and long run effects were positive. It might reflect the 
heterogeneity across countries where in EMEs, deposit money banks are more 
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important at the beginning stage of pension reform than in OECD countries. In 
addition, even there is some evidence that banking sector is declining relative to other 
institutions, our statistics showed that the important role of banking plays in the 
economy is not diminishing and even increasing for many countries. Meanwhile, our 
statistics also suggests that a larger banking industry in the economy, the higher of the 
income level, implying the positive link between banking sector and economic 
performance.  
 
When turning to the stock market, panel error correction model is in favour of a 
strong positive link between pension fund assets and three stock market indicators, i.e. 
market capitalisation, market value traded and market turnover. This impact is both 
short run and long run. This finding is consistent with results by Davis (1995, 2000a) 
Holzmann (1997) and Walker and Lefort (2002). Pension growth is indicated to 
reduce the cost of capital, and transaction costs, thus increasing market liquidity and 
efficiency.   
 
As for the public bond market, impacts are heterogeneous across countries. In the 
short run, a positive link between pensions and public bond market is found, but in the 
long run, such effects are negative for OECD countries and positive for EMEs. This 
could be explained in that for both OECD countries and EMEs, in the short run, 
governments are willing to use pension funds to finance public projects or implicit 
pension debts, but the former countries are less able to do it for a relatively long 
period. Concerning the private bond market, positive impacts from pension funds are 
homogenous across countries. This is consistent with pension reform experiences in 
many countries, e.g. Chile where pension managers required and stimulated the 
growth of a more developed bond market to manage long term assets, e.g. by 
introducing zero-coupon bond (Bodie 1989).  
 
As in the previous study, we used panel Granger causality to complement our panel 
error correction model. For two financial intermediary indicators, i.e. 
PCDMBOFIGDP and CREDIT1 and three stock market indicators, i.e. STKCAP, 
STKTRD and STKTNV, our Panel Granger causality specification strongly favours a 
homogenous causal relationship from pension funds assets to these financial 
indicators. Results we obtained in this study should be more robust than those by 
Catalan et al (2000) in that we have a much larger dataset. Regarding bond markets, 
we found little causality correlation from pensions to public bond market for both 
OECD countries and EMEs. For private bond market, our Panel Granger causality 
estimation suggests that the causality relation is not existent for OECD countries, but 
existent for EMEs. It should be noted, however, panel Granger causality is a different 
specification from PECM; estimated results from the former suggest the causal 
relationship, so the non-existence of the Granger causality relation does not and 
should not deny any pure correlation between variables as we found when using 
PECM.  
 
4.2 Summary
 
The world is aging rapidly. It is anticipated that by 2050, one in four people will be 
aged above 65 at the world level. Mainly due to rising longevity and declining fertility 
rate as well as the unfunded nature of Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, most 
governments in both OECD countries and Emerging market economies (EMEs) are 
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facing financial difficulties, which has led many countries to re-think their pension 
systems. Typically, they switch partially or wholly from unfunded systems, e.g. 
PAYG to funded systems, e.g. the three-pillar World Bank model (1994).  
 
In this paper, we empirically analysed the linkage between pension reform, pension 
assets, economic growth and financial development. The dataset we used covers 72 
countries, including 21 OECD countries and 51 EMEs. By utilising various 
econometric models, on balance, we found a positive impact of pension reform and 
assets on economic growth, not only indirectly via increasing productivity, investment 
and savings, but also directly leading to rising GDP growth rate. Regarding financial 
markets, we found a negative effect of pensions on credits provided by banking 
industry as well as the declining role of banking compared to other financial 
institutions, reflecting the strong competition from institutions investors (Davis and 
Steil 2001). Results remain when using Two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimator as a 
variant. Relative to the whole economy, however, there is no strong sign that banking 
sector has been diminishing; on the contrary, it is rising as shown by our statistics 
across 72 countries over 1960-2001. In addition, our models are in favour of a 
positive relationship between pension assets and stock market in terms of size, 
liquidity and efficiency (Walker and Lefort 1997; and Davis 1998).  
 
In sum, the empirical results in this paper, in general, favour the positive effects of 
pension reform on growth and finance. Therefore, the benefit of the pension reform 
trend towards funded systems, typically the 3-pillar scheme supported by World Bank 
(1994) (Holzmann 1999a) is not a myth (Orszag and Stiglitz 1999; Barr 2000; 
Kotlikoff 1999), but a real benefit (Holzmann 1999b).  
 
Given that EMEs are normally younger and social security coverage is not as wide as 
that in OECD countries, the sooner governments start implementing pension reform 
fully or partially towards funded systems, the less the transition debt incurred and the 
earlier the benefits of transition will be realised. In addition, pre-conditions are argued 
to be needed for the development of financial markets following pension reform 
(Vittas 2000; Blake 2003). Hence, before introducing private pension accounts, 
governments in EMEs should seek to maintain a healthy banking sector, and good 
accounting standards as well as a sound macro-economic policies etc. (Davis 1998).   
 
Regarding OECD countries, the fiscal burden of transition is quite heavy compared 
with that in EMEs. In consequence, together with other reasons as we discussed in 
Part one, many OECD governments, e.g. Germany and France, are reluctant to 
implement structural pension reform towards fully funded systems. Parametric reform 
and/or Notional defined contribution (NDC) reform might be acceptable politically in 
the short run. It is, however, not financially sustainable in the long run, and has the 
risk of accumulating pension debts in a intolerable level in decades; not least to say to 
realise the positive externalities, e.g. less labour market distortion, etc. Therefore, 
OECD countries should start pension reform at least towards a partially funded 
systems immediately. In other words, a less radical reform, and not necessarily the 
reform like Chile in 1980s, might be politically reasonable and practically feasible. 
For example, a basic pillar could be maintained as a public pension scheme, while at 
least one private and funded pillar should be established. The problem as of the 
relative size of private/public pillar within the whole multi-pillar systems, however, is 
a country-by-country issue and should not and could not have a one-fit-all model.  
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Table 1 Dependency ratios %, 1950-2050 
 World 
 
 
More 
developed 
regions 
  
Less 
developed 
regions 
  
Year Total Child Elderly Total Child Elderly Total Child Elderly 
1950 65 57 9 54 42 12 71 64 7 
1955 69 60 9 55 42 13 76 69 7 
1960 73 64 9 58 44 13 80 73 7 
1965 75 66 9 58 43 14 84 77 7 
1970 75 65 10 56 41 15 83 76 7 
1975 74 64 10 54 37 17 82 75 7 
1980 70 60 10 52 34 18 76 69 7 
1985 65 55 10 49 32 17 70 63 7 
1990 63 53 10 49 31 19 67 60 7 
1995 61 51 11 50 29 20 65 57 8 
2000 59 48 11 48 27 21 62 53 8 
2005 55 44 11 48 25 23 57 49 9 
2010 53 41 12 47 24 23 54 45 9 
2015 52 40 13 50 24 26 53 43 10 
2020 53 39 14 54 24 29 53 41 11 
2025 53 37 16 58 25 33 52 39 13 
2030 54 36 18 62 25 37 52 37 15 
2035 54 34 20 65 25 39 53 36 17 
2040 55 33 22 67 26 42 53 34 19 
2045 56 32 23 69 26 43 54 33 20 
2050 56 31 25 71 27 44 54 32 22 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World 
Urbanization Prospects. 
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Table 2 Summary of pension systems and reform across the world 
Asia/Pacific 
   
Central & Eastern 
Europe  
   
16 Year of reform Pension model Systemic/Parametric  11 Year of reform Pension model Systemic/Parametric 
China 1997 WBM Systemic  Bulgaria 2000 WBM Systemic  
Fiji 1966 PPF N.A. Czech Republic 1994 WBM Systemic  
Hong Kong 2000 WBM Systemic  Croatia 2002 WBM Systemic  
India 1952 PPF Parametric Hungary 1997 WBM Systemic  
Indonesia 1992 PPF Parametric Latvia 1996 NDC Systemic  
Iseral  1995 WBM Systemic  Poland 1999 NDC Systemic  
Jordan  PAYG Parametric Romania 2001 WBM Systemic  
Kazajstan 1998 WBM Systemic  Russian Federation  PAYG Parametric 
Malaysia 1951 PPF Parametric Slovak Republic  PAYG N.A. 
Pakinstan 1976 PPF N.A. Turkey  PAYG Parametric 
Philippines 1957 PPF Parametric Ukraine  PAYG N.A. 
Singapore 1955 PPF Parametric     
South Korea  PAYG Parametric     
Sri Lanka 1958 PPF N.A.     
Thailand 1990 PPF Parametric     
Vietnam  PAYG Parametric     
Latin America    OECD    
16    23    
Argentina 1994 WBM Systemic  Australia 1992 WBM Systemic  
Bolivia 1997 WBM Systemic  Austria  PAYG Parametric 
Brazil  PAYG Parametric Belgium  PAYG Parametric 
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Chile 1981 WBM Systemic  Canada 1997 WBM Systemic  
Colombia 1994 WBM Systemic  Denmark 1991 WBM Systemic  
Costa Rica 2001 WBM Systemic  Finland  PAYG Parametric 
Dominican Republic 2003 WBM Systemic  France  PAYG Parametric 
El Savaldor  1998 WBM Systemic  Germany  PAYG Parametric 
Ecuador  PAYG N.A. Greece  PAYG Parametric 
Honduras  PAYG Parametric Iceland  PAYG Parametric 
Mexico 1995 WBM Systemic  Ireland  PAYG Parametric 
Panama  PAYG N.A. Italy 1995 NDC Systemic 
 Paraguay  PAYG Parametric Japan  PAYG Parametric 
Peru 1993 WBM Systemic  Luxembourg  PAYG N.A. 
Uruguay 1996 WBM Systemic  Netherlands 1960 WBM Systemic  
Venezuela  PAYG N.A. New Zealand  PAYG Parametric 
Africa 
   Norway  PAYG Parametric 
6    Portugal  PAYG N.A. 
Algeria  PAYG N.A. Spain 1997 WBM Systemic  
Egypt  PAYG Parametric Sweden 1998 NDC Systemic  
Morocco  PAYG N.A. Switzerland 1985 WBM Systemic  
Nigeria  PAYG N.A. UK 1988 WBM Systemic  
South Africa  PAYG Parametric US 1981 WBM Systemic  
Tunisia  PAYG N.A.     
 
1. PAYG, Pay as you go pension systems. PFF, Provident pension fund systems, WBM, World Bank model. Countries are defined as Reform countries towards World Bank 
model (WBM) if they introduced a new pension system with significant funding element, but not necessarily the specific three pillar model recommended by the World Bank 
2. The Year of reform in most cases is cross checked by at least two sources. Two of those sources which are particularly helpful and comprehensive are regional survey 
papers from Vols. 54, 55 and 56, International Social Security Review (2001, 2002 and 2003) and one World Bank paper from Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999). For 
many countries with PAYG systems, we leave this entry blank as we did not find widely agreed information or simply not exist.  
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3. All reform countries are then classified into Systemic and Parametric countries (see main text in Section 2.2.2 for definitions). All WBM and NDC countries are by 
definition systemic countries.  
4. N.A., Not available. For some countries, we did not find relevant literature regarding whether they have implemented parametric reform or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Comparison of two papers on the link between demographics and bonds 
 Davis and Li (2003) Cannon (2003) 
Dependent variable Real stock yields Real return on bonds 
Explanatory variables   
20+ 40+ 65+ 20+ 40+ 65+       Demographic variables 
0.125* -0.311* 0.406* 0.759* -0.031 0.405 
       Other control variables Not available 
Population growth, Standard 
deviation of bond, inflation 
No. of countries 7 16 
Observation period 1950-1999 1950-1999** 
* indicates statistically significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels. ** in Cannon’s study, an estimation based on a long observation period, i.e. 1900-1999 is also employed, but in 
order to make it comparable with Davis and Li’s work, we only consider the estimation with observation period from 1950-1999.  
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Table 4 Comparison of two papers on the link between demographics and 
equities 
 Davis and Li (2003) Cannon (2003) 
Dependent variable Real stock prices Real return on equities 
Explanatory variables   
20+ 40+ 65+ 20+ 40+ 65+      Demographic variables 
0.017* 0.016* -0.008 0.101 -0.259 -1.358 
     Other control variables GDP, lag of GDP, CPI, lag of CPI 
Population growth, Standard 
deviations of equity and inflation, 
inflation 
No. of countries 7 16 
Observation period 1950-1999 1950-1999** 
* indicates statistically significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels. ** in Cannon’s study, an estimation 
based on a long observation period, i.e. 1900-1999 is also employed, but in order to make it 
comparable with Davis and Li’s work, we only consider the estimation with observation period from 
1950-1999.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Comparison of charge ratios across 11 selected countries, in percentage 
Bolivia 9.8 
Australia 11.2 
Kazakhstan 15 
Colombia 13.5 
Sweden 15 
Uruguay 14.7 
El Salvador 17.1 
Poland 18 
Chile 18 
Peru 19.1 
UK: stakeholder 23 
UK: personal 25 
Argentina 23.1 
Mexico 26 
Source: Whitehouse (2000). Charge ratio is defined as one minus the ratio of the accumulated pension 
assets net of charges to the accumulation assets without charges (Whitehouse 2000).  
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Table 6 Country summary for panel pension reform estimation, OECD countries and EMEs 
EMEs         OECD  
Asia/Pacific  Latin America  Central & Eastern Europe  Africa     
7 Year of reform 16 Year of reform 9 Year of reform 6 Year of reform 21 Year of reform 
China 1997 Argentina 1994 Bulgaria 2000 Algeria   Australia 1992 
Hong Kong 2000 Bolivia 1997 Czech Republic 1994 Egypt   Austraia  
Israel 1995 Brazil  Croatia 2002 Morocco   Belgium  
Jordan  Chile 1981 Hungary 1997 Nigeria   Canada 1997 
Kazajstan 1998 Columbia 1994 Romania 2001 South Africa  Denmark 1991 
South Korea  Costa Rica 2001 Russian Federation  Tunisia   Finland  
Vietnam  Dominican Rep. 2003 Slovakia     France  
  
El Savaldor  1998 Turkey     Germany  
  
Ecuador  Ukraine     Greece  
  
Honduras       Iceland  
  
Mexico 1995      Ireland  
  
Panama  
  
   Japan  
  
Paraguay  
     
Luxembourg  
  
Peru 1993 
     
Netherlands 1960 
  
Uruguay 1996 
     
New Zealand  
  
Venezuela  
     
Norway  
  
  
     
Portugal  
  
  
     
Spain  
         
Switzerland 1995 
         
UK 1988 
         
US 1981 
Countries without year of reform are No Reform countries, while others are Reform countries as in the main text. Countries are defined as Reform countries toward World 
Bank model if they introduced a new pension system with significant funding element, but not necessarily the specific three pillar model recommended by the World Bank 
(1994).  The Year of reform for each country is obtained from several pension papers and a range of relevant websites. The Year of reform in most cases is cross checked by 
at least two sources. Two of those sources which are particularly helpful and comprehensive are regional survey papers from Vols. 54, 55 and 56, International Social 
Security Review (2001, 2002 and 2003) and one World Bank paper from Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999). 
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Table 7 Variable summary, definition, sources and observation period 
Group Variable  Definition Source Observation period 
Pension assets PFA Pension fund assets, in US$ millions  Various  Various  
 PFAGDP pension fund assets/GDP, % Various  Various  
Economics GCFGDP Gross capital formation (constant 1995 US$)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GDPCON GDP (constant 1995 US$)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GDPGR GDP growth rate WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GDPPC GDP per capita WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GDPPCGR GDP per capita growth rate WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GDSGDP Gross national savings, including NCTR (% of GDP)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GFCFGDP Gross fixed capital formation  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GFCFGR Gross fixed capital formation (annual % growth) WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GNSGDP Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 TFPGR* Total factor productivity growth rate WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 CAPSTK Capital stock WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 PSR Private saving/gross national disposable income, % LLSS(1998) 1971-1994 
Financial intermediary LIQUID Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 CREDIT Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 DMBGDP Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP BDL(2003) 1960-2001 
 DMBTFA Deposit Money Bank Assets to total financial assets BDL(2003) 1960-2001 
 I_CREDIT Initial value of CREDIT in 1991 and 1996 WDI(2003) 1991, 1996 
 PCDMBOFIGDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP BDL(2003) 1960-2001 
Stock market STKCAP Stock market capitalization to GDP BDL(2003) 1960-2001 
 I_STKCAP Initial values of STKCAP in 1991 and 1996 BDL(2003) 1991, 1996 
 STKTNV Stock market turnover ratio BDL(2003) 1960-2001 
 STKTRD Stock market total value traded to GDP BDL(2003) 1960-2001 
Bond market PRIBND 
Private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and 
corporations, % of GDP 
BDL(2003) 1990-2001 
 PUBBND Public domestic debt securities issued by government, % of GDP BDL(2003) 1990-2001 
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Labour & Demographics LBTTL Labour force, total  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 POP15 Population ages 15-64 (% of total)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 POP65 Population ages 65 and above, total  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
Others ECM 
Error correction, i.e. residual term for our Panel Error Correction Model 
(PECM) 
  
 EXIMGDP Export and import as % of GDP WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 GONCONS Gross government finanical consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 I_EXIMGDP Initial values of EXIMGDP in 1991 and 1996 WDI(2003) 1991, 1996 
 I_GOVEXP Initial values of GOVEXP in 1991 and 1996 WDI(2003) 1991, 1996 
 I_INFL Initial values of INFL in 1991 and 1996 WDI(2003) 1991, 1996 
 INFL Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 INT Real interest rate (%)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 I_INT Initial values of INT in 1991 and 1996 WDI(2003) 1991, 1996 
 URBAN Urban population (% of total)  WDI(2003) 1960-2001 
 YR Year since pension reform, e.g. 1 for 1981 for Chile, 2 for 1982, etc.     
Memo I 
Variables prefixed with capital letter I are always referred to as initial value at 
a particular year, until otherwise 
  
 D 
Variables prefixed with capital letter D are always referred to as first 
difference, until otherwise 
  
 L 
Variables prefixed with capital letter L are always referred to as logarithm, 
until otherwise 
  
1. Various: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and national sources. Various yearly data for our sample countries; some 
have longer observations, while others have shorter ones. See Section 3.2.1 for more information. 
2. WDI: World Development Indicators database (2003); 
3. LLSS: Loayza, Lopez, Serven and Schmidt-Hebbel (1998); 
4. BDL: Financial Structure and Economic Development database (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2003); 
*, derived based on methodology of OECD (1997) and Davis (2003), rather than directly obtained  from WDI(2003) dataset.  
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Table 8 Panel unit root test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Table 7 for variable details. IPS, Im, Pesaran and Smith (2003). LLS, Levine, Lin and Chu (2002). 
Both methods are based on null hypothesis of unit root. *, rejection of null hypothesis at 1%; **, 
rejection of null hypothesis at 5%. If levels are stationary, we normally will not test first difference, 
which is in turned indicated as N.A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Level First difference 
 IPS (2003) LLC (2002) IPS (2003) LLC (2002) 
CAPSTK 17.06 2.66 -2.50* 1.70 
CREDIT -1.38*** -1.50*** -29.92* -30.78* 
DMBTFA 3.10 0.28 -21.05* -20.19* 
GDPCON 20.39 16.09 -23.01* -19.78* 
GDPGR -27.19* -25.74* N.A. N.A. 
GDSGDP -6.36* -6.72* N.A. N.A. 
GFCFGDP -6.41* -5.72* N.A. N.A. 
GNSGDP -4.96* -4.11* N.A. N.A. 
INFL -15.99* -8.82* N.A. N.A. 
INT -10.11* -8.95* N.A. N.A. 
LIQUID 4.54 4.67 -29.27* -32.21* 
PCDMBOFIGDP 4.07 1.91 -15.83* -15.84* 
PFAGDP 6.56 5.60 -11.20* -25.10* 
PRIBND 5.82 5.66 -7.08* -11.87* 
PSR -6.63* -6.65* N.A. N.A. 
PUBBND 1.04 -6.67* N.A. N.A. 
STKCAP -2.39* -21.29* N.A. N.A. 
STKTNV -5.72* -66.95* N.A. N.A. 
STKTRD 5.48 5.71 -19.03* -31.84* 
TFPGR -25.11* -25.10* N.A. N.A. 
UNEMPT -2.40* -6.21* N.A. N.A. 
URBAN -2.77* -9.59* N.A. N.A. 
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Table 9 Panel estimation for log of total factor productivity growth rate 
(LTFPGR) 
 All OECD EMEs 
C -1.5493* 10.4100* -2.1273* 
LINFL 0.0355 -0.1468 -0.0262 
LINT -0.0990* -0.1015 -0.1234* 
LLIQUID 0.0587 0.0044 0.0785 
LCREDIT -0.1984 -0.6473*** -0.1539 
LSTKCAP -0.0868* -0.4921* -0.1139* 
LSTKTRD 0.0899* 0.7044* 0.0728* 
L(I_GDPPC) -0.4068* -1.3605* -0.3058* 
L(GDPPC) 0.2360* -0.0630 0.2191 
YR -0.1587 0.0879 -0.0776 
YR^2 0.0120 -0.0036 0.0091 
YR^3 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002 
RSQ-bar 0.9438 0.9226 0.9644 
SE 0.8586 0.8232 0.7981 
OBS 296 118 178 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%. *** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
 
  
Table 10 Panel estimation for log of GDP growth rate (LGDPGR) 
 All OECD EMEs 
C -1.3904* 10.7566* -2.3671* 
LINFL 0.0315 -0.1286 -0.0400 
LINT -0.0973* -0.2732 -0.1169* 
LLIQUID 0.1186 0.0446 0.0805 
LCREDIT -0.2548* -0.4774 -0.1285 
LSTKCAP -0.1039* -0.5019** -0.1198* 
LSTKTRD 0.0920* 0.5475* 0.0700* 
L(I_GDPPC) -0.4210* -1.1695* -0.3106* 
L(GDPPC) 0.2626* -0.2717 0.2429* 
YR -0.1145 -0.3234 -0.0059 
YR^2 0.0101*** 0.0202 0.0051 
YR^3 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 
RSQ-bar 0.9534 0.5762 0.9841 
SE 0.8657 0.8613 0.8001 
OBS 318 122 196 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%. *** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
 
 
Table 11 Panel estimation for log of gross fixed capital formation (LGFCFGDP) 
 All OECD EMEs 
C 3.5805* 1.4818* 3.6632* 
LINFL -0.0212* 0.0610* -0.0785* 
LINT -0.0460* 0.0870* -0.0739* 
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LLIQUID 0.0759* 0.0426* 0.0977* 
LCREDIT -0.0227 0.0928* -0.0425** 
LSTKCAP -0.0050* -0.0073 -0.0282** 
LSTKTRD 0.0302* 0.0179 0.0378* 
L(I_GDPPC) -0.1632* -0.2478* -0.1064* 
L(GDPPC) 0.1192 0.3158* 0.0867* 
YR -0.0553 -0.0999* -0.0746*** 
YR^2 0.0031 0.0050* 0.0051** 
YR^3 0.0000 -0.0001* -0.0001** 
RSQ-bar 0.9980 0.9998 0.9936 
SE 0.1793 0.1088 0.1817 
OBS 351 134 217 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%. *** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
 
Table 12 Panel estimation for log of private saving rate (LPSR) 
 All OECD EMEs 
LINFL 0.0234** 0.0027 0.0527 
LINT -0.0244* -0.0192* -0.0221 
LLIQUID -0.1200* -0.0143 -0.2315*** 
LCREDIT1 -0.0283 -0.1478* 0.1281 
LPOP15 -0.2106 -0.4518* 0.6552 
LPOP65 -0.1882*** -0.3294* 0.9638 
LURBAN 1.1014* 0.2136 1.3363 
YR -0.0808*** -0.0089 -0.9223* 
YR^2 0.0054*** 0.0008 0.0623* 
YR^3 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0010* 
RSQ-bar 1.0000 0.9905 1.0000 
SE 0.2500 0.0928 0.6822 
OBS 428 232 196 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%. *** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
 
Table 13 Panel estimation for log of gross domestic saving (LGDSGDP) 
 All OECD EMEs 
LINFL 0.013836** 0.013235*** 0.007455 
LINT -0.03565* -0.01639* -0.05647* 
LLIQUID 0.046695* 0.072638* 0.054025*** 
LCREDIT1 -0.08135* -0.08163* -0.09189* 
LPOP15 -0.52673* -0.43844* -1.06961* 
LPOP65 -0.50339* -0.47062* -0.72608* 
LURBAN 0.492521* 0.077164 0.487889* 
YR -0.05086* -0.00355 -0.15917* 
YR^2 0.002938* -0.00031 9.59E-03* 
YR^3 -4.17E-05* 1.06E-05 -1.41E-04* 
RSQ-bar 1 0.996275 1 
SE 0.208809 0.090374 0.28329 
OBS 725 320 405 
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RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%. *** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
 
Table 14 Panel estimation for log of gross national saving (LGDSGDP) 
 All OECD EMEs 
LINFL 0.029936* 0.014424*** 0.012364 
LINT -0.03039* -0.02751* -0.0462* 
LLIQUID 0.045563*** 0.010202 0.110412* 
LCREDIT1 -0.2273* -0.18594* -0.25067* 
LPOP15 -0.59457* -0.76573* -0.46169 
LPOP65 -0.3421* -0.54247* -0.57995* 
LURBAN 1.003399* -0.04152 1.586602* 
YR -0.08837* 0.01552 -0.46014* 
YR^2 0.004963* -0.00159** 2.57E-02* 
YR^3 -6.83E-05* 3.21E-05* -0.00036* 
RSQ-bar 1 0.99488 1 
SE 0.29892 0.0916 0.375209 
OBS 665 278 387 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%. *** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
 
Table 15 Total assets of pension funds within advanced OECD countries (as of 
2000) 
 Country Name Total assets (US$ million) As % of GDP As % of Total 
AUS Australia 188892.83 48.63 1.54 
AUT Austria 7300.00 3.87 0.06 
BEL Belgium 14400.00 5.74 0.12 
CAN Canada 310500.00 43.94 2.54 
CHE* Switzerland 268600.00 124.25 2.19 
DEU Germany 62200.00 3.33 0.51 
DNK Denmark 40100 23.05 0.33 
ESP** Spain 32806.00 5.85 0.27 
GBR** UK 1141830.72 79.87 9.33 
ISL Iceland 6700.00 78.91 0.05 
ITA Italy 48100.00 4.48 0.39 
JPN Japan 2893319.29 60.72 23.63 
NLD Netherlands 550935.92 149.09 4.50 
NOR** Norway 11300.00 7.36 0.09 
NZL*** New Zealand 615.00 0.69 0.01 
PRT Portugal 12400.00 11.70 0.10 
SWE Sweden 93922.37 41.01 0.77 
USA US 6559771.48 66.87 53.58 
 Total assets within 
OECD countries 12243693.61 42.19**** 100.00 
Source: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and 
national sources. See Section 3.2.1 for more information. All data are converted into and measured at 
US Dollars, for the convenience of across-country comparison.  
* 1998 data, ** 1999 data and ***2002 data. **** average of pension assets of GDP within OECD countries.  
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Table 16 Total assets of pension funds within EMEs (as of 2002) 
 Country Name
 
Total assets (US$ million) As % of GDP As % of Total 
ARG Argentina 11409.00 11.16 4.07 
BGR Bulgaria 41.94 0.27 0.01 
BOL Bolivia 1144.00 14.90 0.41 
BRA Brazil 47656.00 10.53 17.00 
CHL Chile 35500.00 55.34 12.66 
COL Colombia 5482.00 6.67 1.96 
CRI Costa Rica 136.00 0.81 0.05 
DOM Dominican Republic 184.49 0.87 0.07 
ECU Ecuador 14.27 0.06 0.01 
FJI Fiji 846.95 45.11 0.30 
HND Honduras 3.28 0.05 0.00 
HUN Hungary 1835.00 2.79 0.65 
IDN Indonesia 278.21 0.05 0.10 
KAZ Kazajstan 1432.00 5.92 0.51 
KOR* Korea 11500.00 2.49 4.10 
LKA* Sri Lanka 2697.99 16.55 0.96 
MEX Mexico 31748.00 4.98 11.33 
MYS Malaysia 53605.11 56.33 19.12 
PAK Pakistan 947.98 1.57 0.34 
PAN Panama 464.00 3.77 0.17 
PER Peru 4527.00 7.96 1.61 
PHL Philippines 3062.50 3.97 1.09 
POL Poland 6674.00 3.56 2.38 
RUS Russia 1612.70 0.47 0.58 
SGP Singapore 55526.98 63.85 19.81 
SLV Slovakia 1088.00 7.62 0.39 
UKR Ukraine 2.62 0.01 0.00 
URG Uruguay 893.00 7.25 0.32 
 Total assets within EMEs 280313.00 11.96** 100.00 
Source: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and 
national sources. See Section 3.2.1 for more information. All data are converted into and measured at 
US Dollars, for the convenience of across-country comparison.  
* 2000 data. ** average of pension assets of GDP within EMEs.  
 
Table 17 Pension data sources for South Asian countries and South Africa 
Country Main source Website and others 
Fiji National Provident Fund www.fnpf.com.fj/ 
Hong Kong Mandatory Provident Fund Authority www.mpfahk.org/ 
India Employees Provident Fund Organisation www.epfindia.com/ 
Indonesia ASEANN Social Security Association www.asean-ssa.org 
Malaysia Bank Negara Malayisa www.bnm.gov.my 
Pakistan Employees Old Benefit Institution www.eobi.gov.pk 
Philippines Social Security System www.sss.gov.ph/ 
Singapore Central Provident Fund www.cpf.gov.sg and Asher (1999) 
Sri Lanka Employees and Provident Fund www.epf-cbsl.lk/ 
Thailand ASEANN Social Security Association www.asean-ssa.org 
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South Africa South African Reserve Bank www.resbank.co.za and Beck et al  (1999) 
Asher, M. G.; 1999; The Pension System In Singapore; Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9919; 
The World Bank. 
Beck, T, A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine; 1999; A New Database on Financial Development and 
Structure; The World Bank.  
 
 
 
Table 18 Country summary in panel contemporaneous regression on 5 year 
averages (countries with pension assets only), 1981-2000 
OECD countries EMEs 
18 11 
Australia Brazil 
Austria Chile 
Belgium Fiji 
Canada Korea 
Denmark Malaysia 
Germany Pakistan 
Iceland Peru 
Italy Philippines 
Japan Singapore 
Luxembourg South Africa 
Netherlands Sri Lanka 
Norway  
Portugal  
Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
UK  
US  
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Table 19 Country summary for panel Granger causality test 
OECD countries EMEs 
18 21 
Australia Argentina 
Austria Bolivia 
Belgium Brazil 
Canada Chile 
Denmark Columbia 
Germany Ecuador 
Iceland Fiji 
Italy Hungary 
Japan Indonesia 
Luxembourg Korea 
Netherlands Malaysia 
Norway Mexico 
Portugal Pakistan 
Spain Panama 
Sweden Peru 
Switzerland Philippines 
UK Poland 
US Singapore 
 South Africa 
 Sri Lanka 
 Uruguay 
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Table 21 Economic growth and contemporaneous pension fund assets. All 
countries. 5 year averages 1981-2000 
 LTFPGR LGFCFGR LGDPGR 
Constant -0.8975** 3.1407* 0.7568** 
LPFAGDP 0.5334 1.3318** -0.8311* 
LINFL -0.0923* 0.0641 0.0168 
LINT -0.0022 0.1525*** 0.0495 
LLIQUID 0.4570* 0.3858 0.4992* 
LCREDIT -0.5453* -0.5309* -0.3524* 
LSTKCAP -0.0163 -0.0071 0.0296 
LSTKTNV 0.0564* 0.1052** 0.0470* 
LGOVEXP -0.2285** -0.5228** -0.5714* 
LURBAN -0.0308 0.0215 -0.3355* 
LEXIMGDP 0.0264 0.4191* 0.0891*** 
L(I_GDPPC) -0.1339* -0.1440*** -0.0024 
RSQ-bar 0.9966 0.8659 0.9795 
SE 0.6274 0.9058 0.5165 
OBS 125 105 105 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%.*** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
 
 
 
Table 22 Economic growth and initial pension fund assets 1996-2000 
 LTFP LGFCFGR LGDPPCGR 
Constant -6.0099* 3.0211 -5.7010* 
L(I_PFAGDP) 0.1753* 0.2608*** 0.1443** 
L(I_INFL) 0.1420 0.1322 0.1664 
L(I_INT) -0.1139 -0.4139 -0.1065 
L(I_CREDIT) -0.2302 -0.1136 -0.1982 
L(I_STKCAP) -0.0088 -0.1824 0.0629 
L(I_EXIMGDP) 0.3141 -0.0120 0.2606 
L(I_URBAN) 0.6160** 0.0323 0.5562** 
RSQ-bar 0.4327 0.2615 0.3993 
SE 0.4839 0.5177 0.4458 
OBS 28 21 29 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%.*** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.  
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Table 23 Economic growth and initial pension fund assets 1991-2000 
 LTFP LGFCFGR LGDPPCGR 
Constant 0.2672 5.1636 0.3644 
L(I_PFAGDP) -0.1079 0.0274 -0.1129 
L(I_INFL) 0.1139 0.0256 0.1196 
L(I_INT) 0.8623* 0.6614 0.8788* 
L(I_CREDIT) -0.4892** -0.9842 -0.4910** 
L(I_STKCAP) 0.9157* 0.5476 0.9356* 
L(I_EXIMGDP) 0.0300 0.3136 0.0320 
L(I_URBAN) -0.6896** -0.3954 -0.7144** 
RSQ-bar 0.6310 0.1638 0.6332 
SE 0.3165 0.8685 0.3215 
OBS 21 21 21 
RSQ: Adjusted R Squared.  SE: Standard errors. OBS, Observation. * indicates significant at 1%. ** 
indicates significance at 5%.*** indicates significance at 10%. See Table 7 for variable details.
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Table 24 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation for all countries (pension assets to growth indicators) 
Lag DLTFPGR DLGDPGR DLGFCFGR DLPSR DLGDSGDP DLGNSGDP 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 1430.90* 0.00 443.89* 0.00 1487.11* 0.00 3246.80* 0.00 11269.30* 0.00 3682.47* 
2 -0.77 830.71* 8.16* 525.19* 0.01 471.29* 0.05 1236.21* -6.83* 5841.49* -0.08 1632.21* 
3 6.52* 183.11* 9.28* 192.59* 0.25 312.74* -0.16 795.18* 0.78 3423.16* -0.11 1233.99* 
4 0.19 389.92* 0.12 493.25* 1.34 176.05* 0.30 811.00* -0.02 2454.97* 0.05 1231.43* 
5 0.39 420.12* 0.39 479.08* 1.33 176.85* 0.44 473.21* -1.05 1913.76* 1.48* 726.05* 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 37 430 38 460 32 263 26 389 38 633 38 560 
2 34 353 35 379 26 195 26 363 38 595 37 520 
3 31 288 32 310 25 142 26 337 36 557 35 481 
4 27 235 28 254 24 100 25 311 33 521 32 445 
5 25 179 25 208 20 66 23 286 32 488 31 412 
DLTFPGR, first difference of log of total factor productivity growth rate, DLGDPGR, first difference of log of GDP growth rate, DLGFCFGR, first difference of log of 
Gross fixed capital formation growth rate, DLPSR, first difference of log of private saving rate, DLGDSGDP, first difference of log of gross domestic saving/GDP, 
DLNSGDP, first difference of log of national saving/GDP. HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 
1%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation. 
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Table 25 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation for OECD countries (pension assets to growth indicators) 
Lag DLTFPGR DLGDPGR DLGFCFGR DLPSR DLGDSGDP DLGNSGDP 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 303.50* 0.00 469.20* 0.00 208.06* 0.00 259.41* 0.00 1105.26* 0.00 148.87* 
2 0.02 179.06* 0.04 275.52* 0.05 75.52* 0.09 124.88* 0.07 562.14* 0.09 74.91* 
3 0.23 115.85* 0.30 185.86* 0.24 76.02* 0.15 73.83* 0.07 340.12* 0.04 44.60* 
4 0.37 117.03* 0.45 167.99* 0.96 35.18* 0.20 60.14* 0.09 222.56* 0.11 33.44* 
5 0.66 153.95* 0.79 200.39* 1.04 37.75* 0.25 35.32* 0.09 163.46* 0.15 24.38* 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 18 270 18 312 18 185 17 287 18 420 18 351 
2 18 241 18 262 17 139 17 270 18 402 17 331 
3 18 198 18 217 17 101 17 253 18 384 17 312 
4 18 160 18 177 17 71 16 236 18 366 17 294 
5 18 127 18 142 15 46 15 220 18 348 17 276 
DLTFPGR, first difference of log of total factor productivity growth rate, DLGDPGR, first difference of log of GDP growth rate, DLGFCFGR, first difference of log of 
Gross fixed capital formation growth rate, DLPSR, first difference of log of private saving rate, DLGDSGDP, first difference of log of gross domestic saving/GDP, 
DLNSGDP, first difference of log of national saving/GDP. HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 
1%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation. 
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Table 26 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation for EMEs (pension assets to growth indicators) 
Lag DLTFPGR DLGDPGR DLGFCFGR DLPSR DLGDSGDP DLGNSGDP 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 1363.46* 0.00 1546.26* 0.00 204.59* 0.00 1256.71* 0.00 5769.55* 0.00 2005.40* 
2 2.82* 555.01* 0.05 1077.20* -0.88 435.48* 0.07 456.33* -2.11* 3028.71* -0.86 1008.93* 
3 0.08 582.21* 9.97* 271.90* 19.13* 32.27* 0.27 307.41* -0.70 1624.50* 3.99* 425.29* 
4 0.42 388.35* -3.75* 397.33* 0.60 142.64* 0.31 379.77* 0.06 1071.24* 0.00 716.69* 
5 0.10 390.18* 0.25 408.12* 0.60 162.80* 0.30 208.22* -0.36 799.83* -0.75 666.10* 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 19 139 20 148 14 78 9 102 20 213 20 209 
2 16 112 17 117 9 56 9 93 20 193 20 189 
3 13 90 14 93 8 41 9 84 18 173 18 169 
4 9 75 10 77 7 29 9 75 15 155 15 151 
5 7 65 7 66 5 20 8 66 14 140 14 136 
DLTFPGR, first difference of log of total factor productivity growth rate, DLGDPGR, first difference of log of GDP growth rate, DLGFCFGR, first difference of log of 
Gross fixed capital formation growth rate, DLPSR, first difference of log of private saving rate, DLGDSGDP, first difference of log of gross domestic saving/GDP, 
DLNSGDP, first difference of log of national saving/GDP. HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 
1%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation.  
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Table 27 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation (GDP growth rate: 
GDPGR to pension assets) 
Lag All countries OECD countries EMEs 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 2223.27* 0.000 176.63* 0.00 N.A. 
2 0.58 1359.97* 7.847* 21.90* -9.50* N.A. 
3 1.19 897.62* 0.036 196.49* -2.89* N.A. 
4 -0.24 776.73* 0.079 223.77* 1.26** N.A. 
5 -1.55* 482.01* 1.955* 134.98* 2.27* N.A. 
 No OBS No OBS No No 
1 38 512 18 336 20 N.A. 
2 38 426 18 285 20 N.A. 
3 35 346 18 235 17 N.A. 
4 30 278 18 190 12 N.A. 
5 27 224 18 150 9 N.A. 
HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality hypothesis and. * indicates 
rejection at 1%. * *indicates rejection at 5%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation.  
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Table 28 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of private credit (DLPCDMBOFIGDP) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP 0.03708* 0.04012 0.01454 -0.13214** 0.02993 0.12856** 
LINFL -0.00278 -0.00063 0.00047 -0.00162 0.01716 0.01187 
LINT 0.02600* 0.02193* 0.01263*** 0.01342*** 0.04467* 0.03500* 
DLGDPCON -0.69357* -0.62407* -0.15968 -0.24263 -0.68349* -0.92704* 
DLSTKCAP -0.01064 0.00042 0.01621 0.01446 -0.07219* -0.03320 
DLSTKTNV 0.00576 0.00125* 0.00568 0.00766 0.00929 0.01919 
ECM(-1) -0.14151* -0.13509* -0.08354* -0.07772* -0.25557* -0.20408* 
LPFAGDP(-1) -0.00151 0.00847 -0.00127 -0.03987** -0.01238 0.03830*** 
LINFL(-1) 0.00867 0.00803 0.00982 0.00703 0.00074 0.00352 
LINT(-1) -0.00057 0.00011 0.00202 0.00278 0.00532 0.00755 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.06850* -0.03387* 0.02776 0.05717 -0.15706* -0.18130* 
LSTKCAP(-1) 0.04314* 0.02209 0.00743 -0.00236 0.07437* 0.08817* 
LSTKTNV(-1) 0.00036 0.00062 0.00124 0.00826 0.02193 0.02140 
RSQ-bar 0.88764 0.33829 0.11571 0.13922 0.90797 0.56792 
SE 0.08614 0.09655 0.06797 0.08435 0.10430 0.10713 
OBS 407 376 267 279 140 97 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
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Table 29 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of domestic credit provided by banking industry (DLCREDIT) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP -0.04291** -0.13198* 0.00210 -0.17661* -0.15416* 0.04061 
LINFL -0.01798* -0.00964** -0.00622 -0.00325 -0.06006* -0.04273*** 
LINT 0.02333* 0.01272** 0.00740 0.00829 0.02097 0.00951 
DLGDPCON -0.46139* -0.26690*** 0.04831 0.04239 -1.02899* -0.69044** 
DLSTKCAP -0.01326 0.01092 0.03019 0.03812** 0.01147 -0.03174 
DLSTKTNV 0.00802 0.00331 0.00637 0.00564 0.00324 0.00128 
ECM(-1) -0.12614* -0.10775* -0.09320* -0.09930* -0.19251* -0.19015* 
LPFAGDP(-1) -0.02833* -0.04192* 0.00210 -0.05252* -0.09363* -0.06626** 
LINFL(-1) 0.00078 0.00361 0.00939*** 0.00725 -0.00682 -0.00082 
LINT(-1) 0.00333 0.00382 0.00372 0.00592 -0.00227 0.00800 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.02484 0.07274* 0.01379 0.12069* -0.13417* -0.06192 
LSTKCAP(-1) 0.01295 -0.00550 -0.01128 -0.01465 0.04314** 0.04003*** 
LSTKTNV(-1) 0.00298 0.00798*** 0.00276 0.00617 0.00106 -0.00240 
RSQ-bar 0.41077 0.28219 0.11852 0.19315 0.84844 0.40350 
SE 0.09131 0.08945 0.07209 0.07727 0.11354 0.10367 
OBS 409 378 268 280 141 98 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
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Table 30 Share of credit provided by selected financial intermediaries in the US, 1945-2003, % 
         Change 
 1945 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 1945-2003 
Commercial banking 33.16 29.54 25.60 28.42 27.25 20.17 18.28 17.31 -47.82 
Life and other insurance companies 17.30 15.31 15.53 12.83 10.75 10.76 8.96 9.05 -47.68 
Private and public pension funds 1.80 2.35 4.95 5.38 6.31 6.77 5.38 4.40 144.16 
Mutual funds 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.36 1.25 5.32 8.72 8.43 14862.81 
Finance companies 1.01 1.83 3.12 3.41 3.80 3.43 3.11 2.74 169.94 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States”. Various years.  
 
 
Table 31 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of  bank assets to total financial assets (DLDMBTFA) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP 0.02473*** 0.00101 -0.09833*** -0.04429 0.05691** 0.11320 
LINFL 0.01090* -0.00727 0.01135* 0.00900** -0.02417 -0.02986 
LINT 0.00356 0.01788* 0.01372 0.01396 -0.00254 -0.00428 
DLGDP 0.31803* -0.65363* 0.00205 -0.06025 0.42086** -0.00137 
DLSTKCAP -0.00345 -0.02657** 0.02473 0.00407 -0.06241*** -0.04623 
DLSTKTNV 0.00549 0.00812 0.00681 0.00149 0.01357 0.00018 
ECM(-1) -0.07614* -0.13740* 0.00020 0.00952 -0.16926* -0.28263* 
LPFAGDP(-1) 0.02377* -0.01349*** 0.04004 0.02718 0.03284*** 0.14327* 
LINFL(-1) 0.00020 -0.00083 -0.00485 -0.01058** -0.01144 -0.03401 
LINT(-1) -0.01408** -0.00189 -0.02221*** -0.01951 -0.00958 -0.02338** 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.03411 -0.03737*** -0.13970** -0.14516* -0.10296** -0.22646* 
LSTKCAP(-1) 0.00094 0.01223 0.01306 0.02588*** 0.00451 0.00075 
LSTKTNV(-1) 0.01277*** 0.00883*** 0.00759 0.01102 0.07242* 0.06938* 
RSQ-bar 0.34671 0.30808 0.33243 0.25157 0.30903 0.44371 
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SE 0.05869 0.08106 0.05090 0.04921 0.06119 0.05698 
OBS 206 375 111 127 95 66 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
 
Table 32 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of stock market capitalisation (DLSTKCAP) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP 0.30419* 0.34786*** 0.63711* 0.89834* 0.19722* -0.38154 
LINFL 0.00612 -0.02128 -0.01258 -0.02186 0.02901 0.04974 
LINT -0.02419*** -0.02393 -0.04006* -0.02530*** -0.00656 0.01258 
DLGDPCON 2.04066* 1.61678* 1.53185* 1.06558** 2.05248* 2.28440* 
DLCREDIT 0.02774 0.01604 0.14187 0.23408 -0.07988 -0.29923 
DLLIQUID 0.17267 0.07486 0.08340 0.08847 0.18450 0.14111 
ECM(-1) -0.15895* -0.15025* -0.14861* -0.14197* -0.15574* -0.14985** 
LPFAGDP(-1) 0.13411* 0.09992** 0.13324** 0.10420 0.10004* -0.01734 
LINFL(-1) -0.01273 -0.00287 0.00226 -0.01748 0.00084 0.09608 
LINT(-1) 0.00288 -0.00061 -0.00039 -0.01069 0.01238 0.07020*** 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.18152* -0.21952** -0.31265** -0.34854** -0.14806*** -0.02885 
LCREDIT(-1) -0.04830 0.04190 0.14426 0.15582 -0.15333 -0.11291 
LLIQUID(-1) -0.10667 -0.15830 -0.15841 -0.17173 -0.00867 -0.09696 
RSQ-bar 0.65863 1.00000 0.54992 1.00000 0.65129 0.26314 
SE 0.15721 0.18607 0.12523 0.13258 0.19030 0.20558 
OBS 344 298 204 200 147 98 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
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Table 33 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of stock market traded (DLSTKTRD) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP 0.33685** 0.81232*** 1.39857* 3.12497* 0.04871 -0.63489 
LINFL 0.03707 0.01320 -0.00515 0.00277 0.31681* 0.02262 
LINT -0.10609** -0.11889* -0.19165* -0.15016* 0.04636 -0.02440 
DLGDPCON 4.74242* 2.29475** 0.14705 -1.26503 6.81132* 3.92205** 
DLCREDIT -0.06590 -0.26179 1.23954** 1.43219** 0.05383 -0.94439*** 
DLLIQUID 0.84915*** 1.09791** 0.21994 0.26399 1.10693*** 1.55594** 
ECM(-1) -0.20966* -0.18351* -0.10379* -0.12091* -0.48488* -0.45379* 
LPFAGDP(-1) 0.10399 -0.00047 0.47207* 0.64437* 0.23459*** -0.24607 
LINFL(-1) -0.10064** -0.13657* -0.13225** -0.18131* 0.07110 0.26423*** 
LINT(-1) 0.06481** 0.03551 0.04474 0.01654 0.09914 0.15492*** 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.20497 -0.26270 -1.82962* -2.01564* 0.29765 0.43411 
LCREDIT(-1) 0.10999 0.26140 1.06159* 0.70064*** 0.64701* 0.46024 
LLIQUID(-1) -0.40254*** -0.42346*** -0.97202* -0.81216** -0.99316** -0.77994 
RSQ-bar 0.23599 1.00000 0.24662 1.00000 0.37333 0.31133 
SE 0.46957 0.44350 0.38384 0.38512 0.50697 0.50634 
OBS 355 294 200 195 142 99 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
 
Table 34 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of stock market turnover (DLSTKTNV) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP 0.01546 0.95407*** 0.76833* 2.64679* -0.11897 0.15174 
LINFL 0.03825 0.02751 0.03029 0.02573 0.21044** -0.02887 
LINT -0.07581** -0.08461** -0.14675* -0.11530* 0.08346 0.02127 
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DLGDPCON 2.87018* 1.30430 -0.28215 -1.31332 3.36328* 1.65769 
DLCREDIT -0.11849 -0.29984 0.79759 1.00158*** -0.43195 -1.20720** 
DLLIQUID 0.71984*** 1.15122* 0.28481 0.22371 0.63142 1.36893** 
ECM(-1) -0.27829* -0.25631* -0.16854* -0.20185* -0.67452* -0.67318* 
LPFAGDP(-1) -0.02118 -0.03833 0.19866 0.51356* 0.04247 -0.15179 
LINFL(-1) -0.09112** -0.13024* -0.14089* -0.17929* 0.07474 0.11214 
LINT(-1) 0.04497*** 0.01657 0.04348 0.02228 0.06726 0.06939 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.01301 -0.09410 -0.91707** -1.69504* 0.04446 0.34190 
LCREDIT(-1) 0.21939 0.12853 0.67283** 0.50475 0.17674 0.46317*** 
LLIQUID(-1) -0.29615 -0.13924 -0.54515 -0.61706*** -0.52105 -0.63325*** 
RSQ-bar 0.17600 1.00000 0.19099 1.00000 0.29756 0.35189 
SE 0.40951 0.37664 0.35944 0.33025 0.41267 0.39164 
OBS 330 290 189 192 141 98 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
 
Table 35 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of public bond market (DLPUBBND) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP 0.21266* 0.23950* 0.01877 0.04614 0.29412* 0.23943 
LINFL -0.02066 -0.02109*** -0.02059 -0.01771 -0.07224** -0.1181*9 
LINT 0.04451* 0.03879* -0.07017 -0.05265 0.06861** 0.04890* 
DLGDPCON -0.70188** -0.87720* 0.40042 0.29171 -1.11110* -2.51974* 
DLCREDIT 0.10442 0.09497 0.17951*** 0.15899*** 0.29557* 0.15797*** 
DLLIQUID -0.22269** -0.08119 0.03471 0.03613 -0.81841* -0.48914* 
DLSTKCAP 0.09827* 0.14327* 0.11457* 0.11808* 0.09145** 0.19065* 
DLSTKTRD -0.04096* -0.05206* -0.02366 -0.02327 -0.02692 -0.03858* 
ECM(-1) -0.22693* -0.25720* -0.29388* -0.26966* -0.36877* -0.54178* 
 127
LPFAGDP(-1) 0.08060** -0.03846 -0.27031* -0.24126* 0.11001** -0.24614* 
LINFL(-1) -0.01425 -0.02131 -0.01793 -0.01776 -0.05643** -0.10975* 
LINT(-1) -0.01258 -0.02998** -0.04896 -0.04968 -0.00277 -0.02007 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.27890* -0.27684* 0.19222 0.16535 -0.60991* -0.92222* 
LCREDIT 0.02527 0.01071 0.36437* 0.32668* 0.01891 -0.35636* 
LLIQUID 0.10200 0.15393** -0.28390** -0.24470*** 0.18346 0.82560* 
LSTKCAP(-1) -0.06394*** -0.02572 -0.00829 0.00486 -0.04970 0.13874** 
LSTKTRD(-1) -0.02492 -0.03034*** -0.07691* -0.08316* -0.02416 -0.08344* 
RSQ-bar 0.78488 1.00000 0.75538 1.00000 0.88409 0.92344 
SE 0.07883 0.06124 0.05001 0.04945 0.08678 0.05812 
OBS 156 135 85 84 71 51 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
 
 
Table 36 Panel error correction model estimation for difference of log of private bond market (DLPRIBND) 
 All OECD EMEs 
 A B A B A B 
DLPFAGDP 0.27914* 0.20547 0.11086 0.12460 0.41275* 0.04577 
LINFL -0.00598 -0.01096 0.00965 0.00498 -0.03764 -0.07078 
LINT -0.01138 -0.00096 -0.00799 0.00827 -0.02313 -0.00342 
DLGDPON -0.12844 -0.87539*** 0.16952 -0.02094 -0.10032 -1.08554 
DLCREDIT 0.13903 0.23041** 0.17718 0.17181 0.28434 0.96246** 
DLLIQUID 0.01282 0.01438 0.18264 0.21614 -0.40279*** -1.04657** 
DLSTKCAP 0.00911 0.11348* 0.10259** 0.11681* -0.12353** 0.10752*** 
DLSTKTRD 0.01428 -0.02942 -0.01131 -0.02014 0.07041** -0.02860 
ECM(-1) -0.32432* -0.23647* -0.14493*** -0.13985*** -0.47616* -0.27731 
LPFAGDP(-1) 0.07651* 0.01312 0.10422 0.08581 0.15088** 0.03620 
LINFL(-1) 0.02932** 0.01792 0.02197 0.01252 0.02322 -0.00134 
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LINT(-1) -0.00527 -0.01973 -0.02542 -0.02851 -0.00184 0.03176 
LGDPCON(-1) -0.10151 -0.13542 0.15533 0.16621 -0.35578** -0.45626** 
LCREDIT -0.02070 0.10071 0.03325 -0.01396 -0.16817 0.58518** 
LLIQUID 0.03412 0.07749 0.17224 0.24225 0.15588 -0.46832 
LSTKCAP(-1) -0.09363** 0.01585 -0.06299 -0.03165 -0.27882* -0.00792 
LSTKTRD(-1) 0.08960* 0.03689 0.01339 0.00041 0.18538* 0.09784 
RSQ-bar 1.00000 1.00000 0.61304 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
SE 0.08291 0.10476 0.06422 0.06286 0.09082 0.09342 
OBS 144 125 85 84 59 41 
D first difference and L log; See Table 7 for variable details. Column A presents the results of regressions on all countries, 
 while Column B presents those of regressions, using fitted values of PFAGDP. See Appendix 2 for country details. 
 
Table 37 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation (pension assets to financial intermediaries indicators) 
 All countries OECD EMEs 
Lag DLPCDMBOFIGDP DLCREDIT DLPCDMBOFIGDP DLCREDIT DLPCDMBOFIGDP DLCREDIT 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 4011.45* 0.00 3629.04* 0.00 215.35* 0.00 274.12* 0.00 2523.62* 0.00 2143.90* 
2 0.04 2112.26* 0.16 1844.79* 0.02 121.38* 0.00 128.08* 1.42 944.11* 0.32 1136.91* 
3 0.19 1166.60* 1.64* 1035.22* 0.34 72.84* 1.12 57.49* 1.20 653.40* 0.70 718.74* 
4 0.34 740.24* 0.42 871.81* 0.33 46.77* 0.46 48.47* 0.11 519.45* 2.66* 302.71* 
5 0.07 566.96* 1.20 546.45* 0.30 35.29* 1.31 36.42* 0.03 407.58* 0.38 340.33* 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 38 614 38 638 18 412 18 417 20 202 20 221 
2 37 574 38 596 18 393 18 396 19 181 20 200 
3 35 536 37 555 18 375 18 376 17 161 19 179 
4 32 500 34 517 17 357 17 358 15 143 17 159 
5 30 467 32 482 17 340 17 341 13 127 15 141 
 129
DLPCDMBOFIGDP, first difference of log of private credit provided by deposit money bank and other financial institutions to GDP, DLCREDIT, domestic credit provided 
by banking industry to GDP. HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 1%. No: number of countries, 
and OBS: observation.
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Table 38 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation. All countries 
(pension assets to stock market indicators) 
Lag DLSTKCAP DLSTKTRD DLSTKTNV 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 1043.65* 0.00 1059.42* 0.00 769.47* 
2 0.14 430.80* 1.25 383.83* 0.22 355.11* 
3 0.06 239.56* 0.20 280.10* 0.85 173.84* 
4 0.08 153.54* 0.02 210.60* 0.02 161.70* 
5 0.00 124.97* 0.08 149.81* 0.02 119.95* 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 38 527 38 518 38 504 
2 37 489 35 478 35 464 
3 35 452 32 442 32 428 
4 32 417 31 409 31 395 
5 31 385 31 378 30 364 
DLSTKCAP, first difference of log of stock market capitalisation to GDP, DLSTKTRD, first 
difference of log of stock market total traded value, DLSTKTNV, first difference of log of stock 
market turnover ratio. HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality 
hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 1%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation.  
 
 
Table 39 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation. OECD countries 
(pension assets DLPFA to stock market indicators) 
Lag DLSTKCAP DLSTKTRD DLSTKTNV 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 323.42* 0.00 305.66* 0.00 184.19* 
2 0.03 144.32* 0.03 138.08* 0.01 93.96* 
3 0.04 95.27* 0.02 89.98* 0.01 62.24* 
4 0.05 64.92* 0.10 66.67* 0.21 34.49* 
5 0.09 65.87* 0.08 52.00* 0.76 16.23* 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 18 325 18 327 18 315 
2 18 307 18 307 18 295 
3 18 289 18 288 18 276 
4 18 271 18 269 18 257 
5 18 253 18 251 17 239 
DLSTKCAP, first difference of log of stock market capitalisation to GDP, DLSTKTRD, first 
difference of log of stock market total traded value, DLSTKTNV, first difference of log of stock 
market turnover ratio. HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality 
hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 1%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation 
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Table 40 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation. EMEs (pension 
assets DLPFA to stock market indicators) 
Lag DLSTKCAP DLSTKTRD DLSTKTNV 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 638.69* 0.00 827.24* 0.00 520.56* 
2 -0.16 277.78* 0.16 351.18* 0.84 231.89* 
3 -0.55 154.61* 1.71* 129.51* 0.15 139.94* 
4 0.19 83.37* 0.08 132.03* 0.07 101.59* 
5 0.05 55.01* 0.16 93.48* 0.09 77.62* 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 20 202 20 191 20 189 
2 19 182 17 171 17 169 
3 17 163 14 154 14 152 
4 14 146 13 140 13 138 
5 13 132 13 127 13 125 
DLSTKCAP, first difference of log of stock market capitalisation to GDP, DLSTKTRD, first 
difference of log of stock market total traded value, DLSTKTNV, first difference of log of stock 
market turnover ratio. HO is homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality 
hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 1%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation 
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Table 41 F-Test results of panel Granger causality estimation (pension assets to bond market indicators) 
 
All countries
 
OECD
 
EMEs
 
Lag DLPUBBDN DLPRIBND DLPUBBDN DLPRIBND DLPUBBDN DLPRIBND 
 HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC HO HONC 
1 0.00 195.90* 0.00 271.26* 0.00 15.81* 0.00 4.10* 0.00 99.83* 0.00 194.12* 
2 0.03 48.21* 0.04 91.80* 0.09 2.49* 0.02 4.50* 0.33 22.18* 0.24 55.43* 
3 0.03 16.02* 0.01 25.67* 0.02 1.53* 0.02 2.22* 0.03 8.89* -0.10 14.16* 
4 -0.01 5.42* -0.06 7.17* -0.04 0.62 -0.14 0.74 -0.11 1.87* -0.18 3.68* 
5 -0.08 -0.66 -0.32 -0.64 -0.09 -0.09 -0.23 -0.13 -0.41 -1.54 -1.06 -1.24 
 No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS No OBS 
1 28 235 26 224 17 158 17 158 11 84 9 66 
2 27 207 26 198 17 141 17 141 10 66 9 57 
3 26 180 25 172 17 124 17 124 9 56 8 48 
4 25 154 24 147 17 107 17 107 8 47 7 40 
5 24 129 23 123 16 90 16 90 8 39 7 33 
DLPUBBND, first difference of log of public bond market capitalisation to GDP, DLPRIBND, first difference of log of private bond market capitalisation to GDP. HO is 
homogeneity hypothesis, and HONC is homogeneous non-causality hypothesis and. * indicates rejection at 1%. No: number of countries, and OBS: observation 
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Figure 1 Fertility rate 1950-2050 
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Source Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects. 
 
 
Figure 2 Life expectancy at birth, 1950-2050 
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Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects. 
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Figure 3 Links between pension reform, pension funds, economic growth and 
financial development 
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Figure 4 Pension fund assets (US$ million) across 18 OECD countries, 5 year average 1981-2000 
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Source: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and national sources. See Section 3.2.1 for more information. All data are 
converted into and measured at US Dollars, for the convenience of across-country comparison.  
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Notes: we average every 5 year observations over 1981-2000, so total together we have 4 observations for each country. We use 1901 to denote the 5 year average over 1981-
1985, 1902 to denote 1986-1990, 1903 to denote 1991-1995 and 1904 to denote 1996-2000. Similar designation has been used by Beck et al (2000). 
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Figure 5 Pension fund assets (US$ million) across 11 Emerging market economies. 5 year average 1981-2000 
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Source: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and national sources. See Section 3.2.1 for more information. All data are 
converted into and measured at  US Dollars, for the convenience of across-country comparison.  
Note: we average every 5 year observations over 1981-2000, so total together we have 4 observations for each country. We use 1901 to denote the 5 year average over 1981-
1985, 1902 to denote 1986-1990, 1903 to denote 1991-1995 and 1904 to denote 1996-2000. Similar designation has been used by Beck et al (2000). 
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Figure 6 Pension fund assets to GDP across 18 OECD countries. 5 year average 1981-2000 
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Source: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and national sources. See Section 3.2.1 for more information. All data are 
converted into and measured at  US Dollars, for the convenience of across-country comparison.  
Note: we average every 5 year observations over 1981-2000, so total together we have 4 observations for each country. We use 1901 to denote the 5 year average over 1981-
1985, 1902 to denote 1986-1990, 1903 to denote 1991-1995 and 1904 to denote 1996-2000. Similar designation has been used by Beck et al (2000). 
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Figure 7 Pension fund assets to GDP across 11 EMEs. 5 year average 1981-2000 
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Source: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and national sources. See Section 3.2.1 for more information. All data are 
converted into and measured at  US Dollars, for the convenience of across-country comparison.  
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Note: we average every 5 year observations over 1981-2000, so total together we have 4 observations for each country. We use 1901 to denote the 5 year average over 1981-
1985, 1902 to denote 1986-1990, 1903 to denote 1991-1995 and 1904 to denote 1996-2000. Similar designation has been used by Beck et al (2000). 
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Figure 8 Costs of capital, optimal capital structures and WACC lines with and 
without pension fund 
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WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. ρ : Discounted rate for an all-equity firm.     Rf : Risk free 
rate of return. B: Proportio of bonds. S: proportion of shares. M and M*: optimal capital structure 
without and with introdcutio of pension funds. N and N*: cost of capital without and with introduction 
of pension funds.  
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Figure 9 Deposit money bank assets to GDP (DMBGDP) across 72 countries 1960-2001 
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Figure 10 Deposit money bank assets/GDP, average over 1960-2001 OECD countries 
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Figure 11 Deposit money bank assets/GDP average 1960-2001, EMEs 
0.37
0
1
2
Country
ARG BGR BOL BRA CHL CHN COL
CRI CZE DOM DZA ECU EGY FJI
HKG HND HRV HUN IDN IND ISR
JOR KAZ KOR LKA LVA MAR MEX
MYS NGA PAK PAN PER PHL POL
PRY ROM SGP SLV SVK THA TUN
TUR UKR URG VEN VEM ZAF AVERAGE
 146
Appendix 1 Economics of funding and unfunding pension systems 
 
The leading economist, Paul Samuelson (1958) published one paper, trying to identify 
the rationale underlying PAYG scheme. In that paper, an overlapping generation 
model involving two periods is designed to help academia to under the basic 
economics of PAYG retirement programme. People are assumed to work in Year t 
and retire in Year t+1 with constant tax rate θ.  There is no capital in this economy, 
and people must consume all the goods in the current year. In addition, Labour (L) 
and wages (W) increase rates are n and g respectively.  
 
Then Samuelson shows that PAYG arrangement implies a rate of return 1+r, equal to 
(1+n)(1+g) as follows;  
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θθ
                                    Equation 1 
                                                             
 
1+tB : benefits paid out to current retirees at time t+1 
tT :   taxes collected by government at time t, equal wages tW  times tax rate θ, then        
         times numbers of Labour L, i.e. tt LWθ .  
 
As for the above equation, a special case is considered, i.e. there is no wage increase 
over this two periods, then g equals to 0. Then equation 1 is reduced to R=1+n; or in 
words, implicit rate of return is 1 plus the labour increase rate, n which is assumed to 
be same as population growth rate p, a rate labelled by Samuelson as the biological 
rate of interest.  
 
In addition to this positive implicit rate of return, the initial generation participants get 
one-off windfall from PAYG, since they did not contribute to this scheme by paying 
tax during their working period, therefore implying the Pareto improvement. 
 
Following Samuelson’s demonstration on social security systems as shown above, 
Aaron (1966) extends that paper and outlines condition which can be used to justify 
unfunded or funding systems, well known as “Aaron condition/rule”.  
Besides expressions, tW and tL which are used in the way as that in equation 1, Aaron 
introduces two extra terms, i.e. M, replacement rate – proportion of final salary earned 
when individuals are young as pensions when retired, and N, contribution rate – 
proportion of salaries used to contribute to pension systems. Then if assuming the 
budget is balanced, the following equation is obtained: 
 
                            
nnLgWnLWmLW tttttt )1()1(11 ++== ++
                  Equation 2 
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The left hand side of equation 2 is the pension liabilities, calculated by multiplying 
total wages in aggregate - tt LW  during period t by replacement rate, while the right 
hand side of equation 2 is the pension contributions, which is equal to the product of 
1+tW and 1+tL during period t+1then multiplied by n, contribution rate. If equation is 
rewritten as follows: 
 
                         
)1)(1(// 11 ngLWLWnm tttt ++== ++
                             Equation 3 
 
we get the rate of return implied by a PAYG system, i.e. )1)(1( ng ++ , which is the 
same as that in equation 1, but in this case, we do not assume away g as Samuelson 
did. Moreover, it is noted that the rate of return under a funded systems is 1+r, then 
Aaron condition is given as: 
 
                            
)1)(1(1 ngorr ++≥≤+
                                             Equation 4 
 
But when r, g and n are only slightly different from 1, then equation 4 is reduced to  
              
                                  
ngorr +≥≤
                                                        Equation 5 
 
In words, if the market return, i.e. r is less than the sum of growth rates of wages and 
labour population – ng + , then funded systems are less advantageous than unfunded 
systems, e.g. PAYG. In contrast, if the market return is greater than the sum, funded 
systems are more beneficial.  
 
But it should be noted that the standard Aaron condition as we have just outlined does 
not allow for the heterogeneity across individuals, e.g. in terms of wage rate and 
labour participation rate. Steurer (2003) extends the Aaron condition by relaxing this 
assumption and consider four scenarios based on two dimensions, i.e. PAYG/Funded 
and Earning-related/Flat41.   
 
The current trend has been increasingly favouring the funded systems, in that g – 
growth of wages and particularly the n – population growth rate have dropped during 
the past decades across OECD countries and are expected to continue such trend in 
the following years in both advanced and many developing countries. Davis (1995) 
examines this issue across OECD countries while Steurer (2003) conducts a detailed 
study using historic data from the US and both confirm the benefit of transferring 
from unfunded systems to funded systems given the ageing population and higher rate 
of return of market investment.  
 
  
                                                
41
 The first dimension is referred to whether the pension system is funded or not funded, i.e. PAYG. 
The other one concerns the situation where for some pension systems pensions are closely linked to 
salaries, e.g. the occupational final salary schemes in the UK, while for some pension systems whereby 
pension payments are flat, regardless of final salary or years of service. 
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Appendix 2 Summary of countries used in different estimation studies 
 
EMEs        OECD  
Asia/Pacific  Latin America  Central & Eastern Europe  Africa    
16  16  11  6  23 72 
China a, b2 Argentina a, b2, c1, d, e Bulgaria a, b2 Algeria a, b2 Australia a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
Fiji 
b1, b2, c1, 
d, e Bolivia a, b2, d Czech Republic a, b2 Egypt a, b2 Austria a, b1,b2, c1, d, e 
Hong Kong a, b2 Brazil 
a, b1, b2, c1, 
c2, d, e Croatia a, b2 Morocco a, b2 Belgium a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
India  Chile 
a, b1, b2, c1, 
c2, d, e Hungary 
a, b2, 
d, e Nigeria a, b2 Canada a, b1, b2, c1, d, e 
Indonesia 
b2, c1, d, 
e Columbia a, b2, c1, d, e Latvia b2,  South Africa 
a, b1, b2, 
c1, c2, d, e Denmark a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
Israel a, b2 Costa Rica a, b2 Poland b2,  Tunisia a, b2 Finland a, b2 
Jordan a,b2 Dominican Republic a, b2 Romania a, b2   France a, b2 
Kazajstan a,b2 El Salvador  a, b2 Russian Federation a, b2   Germany a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
Malaysia 
b1, b2, c1, 
c2, d, e Ecuador a, b2, c1, d, e Slovakia a,b2   Greece a, b2 
Pakistan 
b1, b2, c1, 
c2, d, e Honduras a, b2 Turkey a, b2   Iceland a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
Philippines 
b1, b2, c1, 
c2 Mexic1o a, b2, d, e Ukraine a,b2   Ireland a, b2 
Singapore 
b1, b2, c1, 
c2, d, e Panama a, b2, d, e     Italy b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
South Korea 
a b1, b2, 
c1, c2, d, e Paraguay A, b2   
  
Japan a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
Sri Lanka 
b1, b2, c1, 
c2 Peru 
a, b1, b2, c1, d, 
e 
    
Luxembourg a, b1, b2, c1,c2, d, e 
Thailand b2, c1 Uruguay a, b2, c1 
    
Netherlands a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
Vietnam a, b2 Venezuela a, b2 
    
New Zealand A, b2 
  
  
    
Norway a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
  
  
    
Portugal a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
        
Spain a, b1, b2, c1,c2, d, e 
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Sweden b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
        
Switzerland a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
        
UK a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
        
US a, b1, b2, c1, c2, d, e 
          
 
a. Pension reform estimation. 59 countries. EMEs (38), of which are no reform countries; OECD (21), 13 of which are no reform countries 
b1. Panel contemporaneous estimation 1981-2000 5 Yr average. 29 countries. EME(11), OECD (18) 
b2. Panel contemporaneous estimation 1981-2000 5 Yr average. All 72 countries, controlling for countries without pension assets. EME(49), OECD (23) 
c1. Cross country initial estimation 1996-2002. 35 countries. EME(49), OECD (23) 
c2. Cross country initial estimation 1996-2002. 26 countries, using fitted values of PFAGDP. EME(9), OECD (17) 
d. Panel granger causality tests. Total 39 countries. EME(21), OECD(18) 
e. Panel ECM. Total 39 countries. EMEs (21), OECD (18). 
 
 
 
